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2ABSTRACT
This thesis deals with the provisions of 
the Indian Constitution which seek to protect minority 
interests and secure equality of political and civil 
rights.
Chapter I outlines the Indian problem in the
larger perspective of minorities generally. It explains
the nature of the minorities* problems, defines mino­
rities and indicates their characteristics. It discu­
sses the role of law in the protection of minority inte­
rests, gives the historical background, and evaluates 
the principle of equality as a basis for the protection 
of minority interests.
Chapter II considers the scheme of political 
equality envisaged in the Indian Constitution in three 
principal areas of citizenship, political representation, 
and the public services.
Chapter III deals with the religious interests
of minorities, in the context of Indian secularism. The
chapter defines religious minorities and religious
3interests. Autonomy in religious affairs, the right to 
propagate religion, education, and the safeguarding of 
communal interests are discussed at length.
Chapter IY discusses linguistic and cultural 
interests. The chapter begins with a general background 
of the language problem in India, followed by the defi­
nition of linguistic minorities. Specific minority 
issues dealt with include the conservation of their lan­
guage and culture, education, employment, and the use 
of minority languages for official purposes. The need 
for a review of safeguards is indicated.
Chapter Y deals with socio-economic interests, 
a relatively new factor in the present context but of 
special significance in India. The chapter discusses 
the problem of defining fbackward classes* and considers 
the measures proposed and implemented for the removal 
of backwardness. Attention is focused on two issues of 
particular importance, the removal of social disabilities 
by law, and the use of protective discrimination to 
achieve equality.
This is followed, in Chapter VI, by concluding
remarks.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
India, a vast country with an immense popu­
lation, is a land of tremendous diversity. The lines 
that divide the population are many and overlapping, 
inevitably giving rise to majority and minority groups 
of every kind. The Indian Constitution seeks to achieve 
unity amid this diversity through the common basis of 
an equal citizenship. The interests of minorities are 
sought to be protected through a scheme of equality of 
civil and political rights of all citizens. It recog­
nises that differences do exist, but rules that they 
shall not be barriers to participation in the public 
life of the country and does not hesitate to take extra­
ordinary measures to secure equality where circumstances 
warrant it. This work is an attempt to consider the 
scheme of minority protection incorporated in the 
Constitution.
The discussion of the specific issues concer­
ning Indian minorities starts in the next chapter. The 
present chapter is devoted to the consideration of a
14
number of preliminary issues of a general nature. The 
question of Indian minorities is part of a larger question 
of human relations and needs to be viewed in that pers­
pective. This chapter provides a background to the dis­
cussion of the Indian minorities in the light of a wider 
general discussion of the nature of the problem, definition 
of minorities, the role of law, the historical background 
and the principle of equality, which is the fundamental 
basis of minority protection.
I. Nature of the problem of minorities
The problem of minorities arises from the fact 
that there is an inherent diversity in human society.
Men differ from each other in a variety of ways in capa­
city, opinion, taste, inclination and outlook. Those 
with similar interests tend to develop a group conscious­
ness, which will seek to assert itself when common inte­
rests are, or are thought to be, in danger. Different 
groups are identified by reference to a predominant factor 
of diversity; such as language, race, religion, social 
and economic status, and nationality. In a politically 
organised society this diversity may lead to the existence 
of a dominant group called the 1majority1 and one or more 
subordinate groups called ,minoritiesf.
Features of this problem are, its universal 
existence, continuity, and characteristic complexity.
15
There is no area on earth where it does not exist in 
some form or other. It has featured very prominently 
in the social and political developments of most countries, 
especially those of Europe, over a long period of time. 
Attempts at its solution have been many and varied. While 
they may have provided a temporary solution, the problem 
itself continues to exist, though possibly in an altered 
form. In a sense no permanent cure is possible so long 
as men continue to live in society. It cannot be catego­
rised or assigned exclusively to any one particular 
branch of study. As has been pointed out, it is not a 
’problem* or a ’question1 (as it has been often designa­
ted) which is susceptible of a clear solution, as those 
of physics or mathematics.^ If is a complex issue with 
many facets and its solution requires the application 
of the entire field of human knowledge and behaviour. 
Politicians, sociologists, psychologists, lawyers, or 
any other professional group by themselves can do little 
towards that end.
The social and political implications of this 
question need particular attention.
^P. de Azcarate, League of Nations and National Minorities, 
(1945), Preface, p.vii.
16
Social Aspect
Minority problems are said to be but one form
of the struggles of the individuals and groups who differ
2in their ability to exert power within a social unit.
The possession of, and the ability to use power allow 
individuals and groups to achieve their ideological obje­
ctives in varying degrees, by influencing and impressing 
others. On the group level, social power is the sum 
total of all those capacities, relationships, and proce­
sses by which compliance of others is secured; this compli­
ance may be voluntary or involuntary, conscious or uncon­
scious, beneficial or detrimental —  but always for pur­
poses determined by the power holder. This exercise of 
power is accompanied by domination on one side and subor­
dination and dependence on the other. The relations 
between individuals and groups are regulated by social 
control, including the supreme control exercised by the
government. The issue of minorities is thus seen as an
x
aspect of power relationship within society.
Prom another point of view, the subject belongs 
to the field of social pathology in the wider sense.
2J. S. Roucek^The Eternal Problem of Minorities", XVI,
4, United Asia. (1964),p. 235 at p. 237.
5ibia.
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She position of minorities in a society is said to be 
a critical instance of the general social health (or sick­
ness), and an index to the state of the "parent society".^"
It is also a subject that belongs to the study of social 
stratification, for the specific places which the minori­
ties occupy in the social structure have to be identified 
in relation to the whole.^
Political Aspect
It is, however, at the level of political orga­
nisation that the problem of minorities has the greatest 
implications in the national and international spheres.
It remains essentially an issue of domestic 
jurisdiction of the states concerned both on legal and 
poactical grounds. With regard to the former, the doctrine 
of state sovereignty strictly confines the issue within 
the borders of the state and makes it a matter of internal 
adjustment. Wo state would be willing to permit another 
state, or even an international organisation, to interfere 
in what it considers its internal affairs. She latter 
ground is even more fcjjceful. As P. W. Drost has pointed 
out,^ human rights and minority rights are always depended;
^uth Glass, "Insiders ;—  Outsiders: Ihe Position of 
Minorities", 17, Wew Left Review  ^ (1962), p.34, at p.37.
5IMd.
C
P. H. Prost, Human Rights as legal Rights.fTCApri7it.1965Vp.lfe8.
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on the structure of the society and its positive laws.
All rights are relative and dependent on the (local) 
national milieu of the individual or group. She limita­
tions set on individual's rights in the interests of the 
community must necessarity vary from country to country, 
according to the conditions of national life. Minority 
rights are, therefore, generally understood to comprise 
only the preservation of particular characteristics and
7
the promotion of cultural development within the state.
Por this reason it would not be practical to lay down 
minority rights of universal application. It was pointed 
out during the deliberations in the United Rations on 
such a proposition that the problem of minorities was 
greatly complicated by the different structures of various 
states and that such an attempt to apply minority provi­
sions of universal scope might lead to disruption of
8national unity.
An outstanding feature of the problem at the 
national level is that it is a constitutional issue of 
the greatest importance. Por, this determines and regu­
lates the relationship between the majority and the mino­
rities, which so profoundly affects political, cultural
7
8  Y.U.ff.. 1948-49, p.544.
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and economic life of the states, and whose ramifications 
extend to the basic issues of social and political philo­
sophy. It is related to such problems as the nature of 
the state, the legitimacy and limits of political authority 
and the adjustment of relationships between the individuals, 
groups, and the state. It introduces the question of dicho­
tomy between culture and politics, and thus leads to an 
examination of sub—state associations and an evaluation 
of the moral function of the government. It raises the 
question of the degree of uniformity which is essential 
to a political society and the relevance of compulsion to 
its attainment, thereby presenting itself as a phase of 
the moral problem of human freedom and toleration.^
At the supra-national level the problem of 
minorities is part of the general problem of international 
order. A notable feature of International law today is 
its increasing concern for the promotion of human rights 
throughout the world. It is of interest to note that the 
international concern for human rights has its origin in 
early provisions for the protection of minorities. Parti­
cular mention may be made of the stipulations of religious 
liberty incorporated in various treaties in the period
Q
I. 1. Claude, Jr., National Minorities; An International
Problem. (1955), p. 5.
20
following the Reformation. 3,0 The protection of minorities 
and the development of human rights have gone hand in 
hand in contributing to the grouth of international law, 
which in turn has influenced their recognition everywhere.
The rights of minorities and the creation of 
an international community have each influenced the other, 
though the manner of that influence has undergone conside­
rable change over the years. In the past, the problem 
chiefly concerned itself with the national minority groups, 
witlj the attendant danger of external intervention by a 
state in an effort to control the treatment of a minority 
affiliated to it. Rational aspirations of minorities 
might have led to a demand for secession or for union with 
an ethnically related state, thus threatening the inter­
national structure. Bilateral dispute might have developed 
if a state displayed an active interest in a minority in 
another state. If a state persecuted its national minority 
groups, the moral indignation of other people might have 
led to action against the offending government. Poreign 
intervention would have raised controversies on sovereignty, 
jurisdiction, boundaries, and the legality of intervention. 
While at present such intervention cannot altogether be 
ruled out, it may be assumed that in the existing inter-
3,0 Moses Moskowitz, Human Rights and World Order. (1959), 
p. 14.
21
national set-up such a possibility is very remote.
At present problems of minorities are viewed 
in a broader perspective and on a wider scale than 
formerly. The term fminorities* need now no longer refer 
to national minority groups only, but may include a number 
of other groups. The question of the protection of mino- ! 
rities is now regarded as one aspect of the larger issue 
of human rights. The growth of international law has 
now lessened the danger of intervention and consequent 
conflict to a great extent. The position of minorities 
today is greatly influenced by international standards, 
and a state1a freedom with respect to its own people is 
limited by it.^ Due to the advance of science and commu­
nications, the world has grown smaller. What would have 
been purely local issues earlier now make world headlines 
pointing out the problems that lie beneath them. In a 
sense no such issue today is without international impli­
cations. This is likely to affect significantly the 
location, structure, and aspirations of minorities. As 
Ruth Glass has pointed out, their status and horizons 
can no longer be fixed by parent societies alone, but 
will be determined largely with reference to international
^  I. I»* Claude, Jr., Op. cit., p. 60.
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12standards. International organisations, such, as the 
United Nations, the European Commission of Human Rights, 
and the International Commission of Jurists have played 
a significant role towards this development.
II. Definition and Characteristics of Minorities
Two brief definitions can serve as a starting 
point for this discussions a purely objective one according 
to which a minority is "a group whose race, language or 
religion is different from that of the majority"; and a 
purely subjective one (from the point of view of the mino­
rity) according to which a minority is "a group that thinks
13of itself as a minority."  ^ Extreme as they are, they 
serve to indicate the underlying issues.
It is necessary to add at the very outset that 
no single universally acceptable definition of a minority 
exists. The term •minority1 is a vague and variable 
concept. In trying to make it specific the students of 
politics, sociology, history and law tend to differ in 
their emphasis on the various characteristics of minorities, 
land consequently on the method of their protection.
■^Ruth Glass. Op . cit.. at pp.44-45*
^J. A. laponce, The Protection of Minorities. (I960), 
pp. 3-4*
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Their definitions are purpose-oriented. The concept 
itself, in general, has been undergoing change over the 
years. Before the first World War it was understood only 
in its legal, arithmatical and political meanings.^ 
recent times it has come to he accepted in a wider sense 
in modern Constitutions, so as to include cultural and 
other groups. The Indian Constitution makes a distinct 
contribution, as social and bconomic backwardness emerges 
as a new factor in determining minority status.
The task of definition is bound to remain an 
unenviable one. The characteristics of minorities must 
necessarily vary from one society to another and also in 
time and place. While there are certain common characte­
ristics, there are others which are peculiar to particular 
groups. The treaties of the prerLeague of Nations period 
concerned themselves with providing for specific groups 
mentioned therein without involving themselves in defini­
tions. The Beague of Nations, which created an elaborate 
system of treaties for the protection of minorities, made 
no mention of minorities in the Covenant, and the treaties
referred only to "inhabitants differing from the majority
15of the population in race, language or religion." v The
^  Ibid, p.3; also J. S. Roucek, note 2 supra,p.236.
^  Treaty of Yarsailles, Article 93.
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United Nations Commission on Human Rights set up a Sub­
committee and entrusted it with the task of defining 
16minorities, but at its sixth session the Sub-Committee
decided to abandon its attempt. It concluded that, in
view of the great variety of minority groups in the world,
it was not feasible to arrive at a brief, and satisfactory
definition of groups entitled to protection, and that each
situation, where a group claims recognition as a minority
and claims special measures of protection, should be consi-
17dered on its own merits. ' The Sub-Committee was urged
to give further study to the problem but at its seventh
18session it again decided to abandon the whole question.
Generally speaking various definitions on 
minorities can be divided into two broad categories: those 
with a political approach, which by and large concern 
themselves with the problem of national minorities, and 
others with a predominantly sociological approach.
"National11 Minorities
According to P. de Azcarate, the expression 
"National minority" refers to a more or less considerable
16 Y. U. F..1947-48. p. 581.
17 Y. U. ST.. 1954, PP 214-215.
18 Y. U. H.. 1955, p. 172.
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proportion of the citizens of a state who are of a 
different “nationality* from that of the majority.^ The 
sub-stratum of such a minority is an indefinite and inde­
finable factor known as “national consciousness11. Gene­
rally speaking, though not necessarily, linguistic, cultu­
ral, racial and religious factors, together with innumerable 
others of a historic, economic, psychological and geogra­
phical nature are responsible for creating such a consci- 
20ousness. Such a minority is —
* ... a group of people, who, because of common 
racial, linguistic, religious or national heritage 
which singles them out from the politically dominant 
cultural group;) fear that they may either be pre­
vented from integrating themselves into the national 
community of their choice or be obliged to do so at 
the expense of their identity.
The problem of “national minorities* arises from 
the conflict between the ideal of a homogenous national 
state and the reality of ethnic heterogeneity, and thek 
tendency of the majority nationality to resent the presence 
of an unassimilated mass in its body politic. This type 
of situation exists the world over, where one national 
group happens to live in a country inhabited by a different 
national group. Europe and South-East Asia can be cited 
as examples.
^  Op * cit * * P*4*
20 Ibid. p. 6 .
21 J. A. Laponce, Op. cit., p. 6.
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However, this situation does not exist in 
India* Indians as a whole have a single nationality*
The most outstanding feature of India is that, despite 
its vastness and breathtaking diversity, there is the 
consciousness of a single nationality. Historical, cul­
tural and geographical factors have promoted a common 
consciousness in India, which transcends the barriers 
of race, religion and language. The divisions and diffe­
rences are many, but group-consciousness is limited in 
time and place to a particular interest characteristic
of that group. Even the idea of a sub-national groups
22has been repudiated. The definitions of a national 
minority have, therefore, little or no relevance in 
India. This does not, however, mean that there are no 
characteristics common to both the national minorities 
and other minorities, nor that the definitions are mutu­
ally excltisive.
Other minorities
Of the definitions which can be applied to all 
minorities, one attempted by the United nations may be 
cited. Minorities are —
^  Report of the Linguistic Provinces Commission, (Ear 
Commission}, (1948), pp. 2lo-2li.
27
those non-dominant groups in a polpulation, which 
possess and wish to preserve stable ethnic, religi­
ous or linguistic traditions or characteristics 
markedly different from those of the rest of the
population. 25
But mere differences alone are not sufficient.
As the following definition indicates, there must be the 
elements of dominance and sj>servience, which result from 
a constellation of social processes and which find expre­
ssion in terms of subtle discrimination or overt behavi­
our. Minorities are -
the individuals and groups which differ or are 
assumed to differ from their dominant social groups 
and have developed, in varying degree, an attitude 
of mind which gives them a feeling of greater social 
security within their own growp than in their rela­
tion to the dominant group. The differences, although 
varying in degree, are distinguishing characteristics 
not only in terms of race, religion, nationality, ; 
and state allegiance, but also in the composite cul­
tural pattern. However, such differences in and 
of themselves are not sufficient to make a group a 
minority without the accompanying attitude of domi­
nance and subservience, consciously accepted or 
tacitly assumed.
The important factor appears to be the dominant 
position of the "majority" group, which lies in its greater 
power over the social, political, and economic mechanism 
of the society. This aspect has been highlighted by 
Margaret Mead in another definition. Minorities are -
^  Yearbook on Human Rights for 1950. (1952), p. 490; also,
Y. U. H1.', 1951. u. 496.
24. P. J. Brown, "The Meaning of Minorities", in P. J. B rown 
and J. S. Roueek (ed.), Our Racial and Rational Minorities, 
(1937), p.6. ----- :----------------------------
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those groups suffering subordinate position 
as segments of complex social and cultural units 
forming political entities
Emphasis on political organisation as a significant factor 
may also be noted.
Differential and unequal treatment, whether
forced upon minorities or desired by them, emerges from
other definitions. Louis Wirth indicates the earlier type.
According to hing a minority is
a group of peolle, who, because of physical or 
cultural characteristics, are singled out from the 
others in the society in which they live for diffe­
rential and unequal treatment, and who therefore 
regard themselves as objects of collective discrimi­
nation. . •. Minority status carries with it the 
exclusion from full participation in the life of 
the society.gg
The remedy in such situations may seem to lie in providing 
for the equality of treatment of these groups wisth the 
rest of the population. But this alone would not be suffi­
cient in all cases. Distinction has to be made between 
two types of minority groups: one whose members desire 
equality with dominant groups in the sense of non-discri­
mination alone; and the other whose members desire equality 
with dominant groups in the sense of non-discrimination
25 Quoted in J. S. Roucek, op. cit.. (n. 2, supra). p. 239*
p 5
“The Problem of Minority Groups", in Ralph Linton, (ed.), 
The Science of Man*:::.in the World Crisis. (1945), p. 347*
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plus the recognition of certain special rights and the
rendering of certain positive services. ^  The consensus
in some quarters is that the minority status should he
restricted to only the latter. This was the line adopted
by the Sub-Committee of the Commission on Human Rights in
the text proposed by its
The protection of minorities is the protection of 
non-dominant groups, which while wishing in general 
for equality of treatment with the majority, wish 
for a measure of differential treatment, in order 
to preserve basic characteristics which they possess 
and which distinguish them from the majority of the 
population. 2 3
It is apparent that different definitions 
emphasise different characteristics of minorities. It is 
now proposed to consider briefly some of the important 
characteristics of minorities emerging from the generality 
of definitions.
Collective status
Whatever the particular circumstances and modes 
of differentiation, a minority group is so categorised 
not on grounds of its individual origin, conditions and 
aptitude, but because the members of the group have parti­
cular roles or locations in the society, explicitly or
27' Memorandum submitted by the Secretary General of the 
United Nations, Definition and Classification of 
Minorities, (1950), p. 2. U. N. Document No. 33/ CN.4/ 
SuF727^57 of 27th December, 1949.
U. N. Document No. E/ CN.4/ Sec. IY.
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implicitly. A minority group in a sense is created, and 
certainly maintained by such categorisation.J. S.
Roucek suggests that minority groups survive only by beco­
ming self-conscious social units. Their special traits 
form the basis of an esprit de corps. a sense of belonging 
to a group distinct from the dominant cluster. Their group 
self-consciousness is kept alive by the awareness of their 
common problems, which keeps the group intact. The inten­
sity of that self-consciousness, however, will vary accor-
30ding to local conditions.
Social status and marginal location
According to Ruth Glass, differential social 
status in a society indicates the existence of minorities. 
Minorities are said to exist in stratified societies by 
having a more specifit ingroup structure and culture than 
the rest. It is a group whose "crossing points" to a 
wider social universe are restricted, which has not the 
comprehensive distribution of social status, and which is 
concentrated in the lower and marginal ranks. Even where 
such.; groups positions are scattered, the status of the 
individual at the higher level is still determined by
Ruth Glass, op. cit.t (n. 4, supra), at p. 35*
30 J. S. Roucek, op. cit.. pp. 240-241.
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or associated with their collective status of inferiori­
ty (e*g*> a "Hegro Banker"), Hence the most distinctive 
and also the most general characteristic of a minority is 
its marginal location in society. Por a variety of reasons 
—  ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, occupation, 
social custom, or a combination of these and other factors—  
minorities are regarded as being different, and as being 
somehow apart. Such a group can never have a homogenously 
high social status, though it need not necessarily have 
a homogenously low one either. It is a status of not belon­
ging, or not quite belonging, that is their characteristic 
mark. 3?he treatment that they receive may be contradictory: 
accepted in some places, and kept out of other (e.g., more 
easily accepted as employees than as tenants); more easily 
accepted in formal social relationship in the public sphere 
than in the informal relationship in the privete sphere.
It is a vulnerable social status associated with notions 
of inferiority.^1
Quantitative and qualitative aspect: power relationship
Although the term •minority* indicates a numeri­
cal factor, as a test it is far from being satisfactory.
' Ruth Glass, op. cit. pp. 43-44**
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It is a minority that runs the government, pioneers social 
thinking, and generally exercises influence and control 
over a larger body. In the colonial world the native “Mino­
rities" always outnumbered the ruling "Majorities". A 
simple quantitative definition of minorities can cause a 
good deal of bewilderment, and in some instances one would 
find whole societies seemingly consisting of minority 
groups.
According to Roucek, the minority status is cha­
racterised by a power-relationship aspect. Minority problems 
are said to be but one form of the struggles of the indivi­
duals and groups, who differ in their ability to exert 
power within a social unit. It is not so much the actual 
differences, but the creation of power-loaded situations,
leading to social and political subordination of a group
52that creates minority status. This implies the existence 
of a corresponding dominant group, with a higher social 
status and greater privileges. Rot all groups that exist 
in a society can be categorised as minorities on account 
of differences, whether real or assumed, nor under all 
circumstances. There are societies which have traditionally 
consisted of many distinct components, without giving rise 
to minority status. It is not specific characteristics
J. S. Roucek, on. cit, p. 237*
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that mark a people as a minority, but the relationship 
of that group to some other group in the society in which 
they live.
While the ratio between a majority and a minority 
may not always be a significant factor, it should be rea­
lised that numbers are nevertheless important. Por the 
purpose of their recognition and protection, minorities 
should properly include a number of persons sufficient by 
themselves to preserve their traditions or characteristics.^
Permanence as a condition
She existence of differences among people is a
normal phenomenon and so is t&e tendency to form themselves
into groups. A minority situation can arise only when
these group differences are permanent, and when there is
no possibility of the groups being merged with one another
34.
in the foreseeable future. ^ This feature of permanence 
is in addition to the factors which we have discussed 
earlier. Where the differences are of a temporary nature, 
as in the case of political parties, no minority problem 
arises, and the groups based on such differences will 
dissolve as aoon as the differences disappear.
33 Y. U. N.. 1951, p. 496.
Victor D'Souza, "The Problem of Minorities", 96, 
Modern Review. (1954) •
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In general the term ,minority* has been restri­
cted to the unifying symbols of race, language, religion
35and nationality. Whether any other groups of a social, 
political or economic nature can be designated as minori­
ties would very much depend on particular circumstances.
As we shall see, social and economic backwardness in India 
under peculiar circumstances of social stratification, 
bids fair to be classified as such.
In summing up this discussion, five characteri­
stics of minorities enumerated by Waggly and Harris may 
be noted: i) minorities are subordinate segmentsfcof a 
complex state society; ii) they have special or cultural 
traits held in low esteem by the dominant segments of the 
society; iii) they are self-conscious units bound by the 
special traits which their members share and by the spe­
cial disabilities which these bring; iv) membership in 
a minority is transmitted by a rule of sescent; and vO
minority peoples, by choice or necessity, tend to marry
36within the group. It should be noted, though, that 
these characteristics are alwaps subject to variation 
according to local conditions.
^  J. S. Roucek, op. citt p. 236.
36J C. R. Wagley & M. Harris, Minorities in the Hew World. 
(Reissue, 1964), p* 10.
Types of minorities
Minorities have been sought to be classified
by a variety of criteria by different writers. Thus,
there are bloc minorities and diffused minorities, border
minorities and enclosed minorities, minorities by will
37and minorities by force. ' Ruth Glass mentions extreme 
minorities (those stigmatised, exploited, and segregated), 
hidden minorities (because discrimination against them 
is not overtly institutionalised and the status differen­
tiation to which they are submitted is not crude); and 
potential minorities.^ The Memorandum submitted by the 
Secretary General of tee United Rations to the Sub-Commi­
ssion on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities contemplated classification from such view­
points as quantity, contiguity, citizenship, national
characteristics, origin and situation, territorial juris-
39diction and desires of minorities. ^
Louis Wirth proposes a classification of minority 
groups in terms of their ultimate objectives. He suggests 
that there can be four aims: i) a minority can have
5*? J. A. Laponce, op. cit., pp. 8-12.
0p » cit.. p. 41.
59 Definition and Classification of Minorities. (1950),
pp. 16—^2.
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pluralistic aims, —  it may seek to preserve its own 
identity and culture on a basis of tolerance of differen­
ces and equality of opportunity; ii) it may seek to be 
assimilated, ultimately to lose its separate identity and 
merge with the dominant group; iii) it may be secessionist 
in its aims, and seek to achieve political as well as 
cultural independence from the dominant group; and iv) it 
may be a militant minority with a goal of political domi­
nation over the majority and other minorities in the
4.0
society. However, the two last mentioned are relatively 
rare. Most minorities tend to favour some kind of pluralism.
Minorities and minority interests in India
There are three principal categories of minori­
ties in India: religious, linguistic, and socio-economic 
(or what are known as 1 backward classes1). Each of these 
categories consists of several groups which quality for 
minority status in different degrees according to the 
characteristics of minorities discussed above. Some of 
these groups are easily ascertained, others are not. Their 
identification must be postponed, tobe discussed in appro­
priate chapters. Por the present we must confine ourselves 
to considerations ojf a general nature relating to the
^  Louis Wirth, "The Problem of Minority fao/pps", (n. 26 
supra), pp. 354-63*
37
definition of minorities in India.
On account of the existence of a large number 
of minority groups of various kinds it would be quite 
impossible to deal with each of them individually within 
the scope of the present work." Uor would such a treat­
ment be particularly advantageous in view of the fact that 
the Constitution does not make any special provision for 
any specific group as such. Hence in each chapter minori­
ties of the same category have been dealt with collectively 
with regard to the interests common to all of them.
The three groups of interests mentioned above 
are the foremost factors of stratification of Indian 
society. These are factors, which have been described 
as those that are "perhaps a little more explosive in our 
country.11 ^
It will be noticed that two of the traditional 
grounds of minority status, viz., race and nationality, 
are conspicuously absent among those mentioned above, and 
that a new factor, socio-economic interests, has been 
added. As noted above, the factor of nationality in the 
context of minorities has no relevance in India. Although 
racially India is a "patchwork and a curious mixture",
^  Report of the Committee on Emotional Integration. (1962), 
IP. 2. “
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no racial problems have arisen or can arise in India.4^
The problems of Indian minorities are different from
those generally associated with "ethnic minorities".
Ethnic minorities are, "groups bound together by common
ties of race, nationality or culture living together in
an alien civilisation but remaining culturally distinct.
While India has many distinct cultures, there is none
which at present can be described as "alien". Indian
culture is a composite culture. The component units are
integral parts of it and despite their distinctiveness,
have much in common^ ; Thus, Indian Muslims, in spite of
differing from the majority community in institutional
religion, have much in common wilth it in fundamental,
religious and moral consciousness, social structure,
family life and in the general way of living.44 It has
been suggested that in India cultural distinctiveness is
the result more of the geographic factor than that of
race or religion. It is pointed out that the Muslims
of Bengal are culturally closer to the Hindus of Bengal
4.6than their counterparts in Punjab. ^
^ Jawaharlal Webru, Discovery of India. (4th ed., 1956),
p. 386.
4.6^  Caroline P. Ware, quoted in J. S. Roucek, on. cit.tp.239.
44 s. Abid Husain, Rational Culture of India. (1961), p.176.
4^ Constitutional Proposals of the Sanrn Committee.(Sa-prn 
Report), 11945), pp. 1&3-29; Also, victor B'Souza, 
op. cit..(n. 34, supra).
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The inclusion of the new factor of socio­
economic interests is justified on the ground that the 
particular circumstances obtaining in India have led to 
the formation of many backward groups in the population 
endowed with minority characteristics. It may be noted 
that caste is a major factor of stratification of Indian 
society. There are said to be approximately three thou­
sand castes and tribes in I n d i a I t  has been suggested 
that under the present circumstances, when caste is losing 
its former significance, each caste group may be conside­
red a separate minority.^ There is a great degree of 
inter-relation between social and economic status in India. 
This factor is of greatest importance in view of the 
special measures adopted by the Indian Constitution to 
remove social and economic backwardness.
The other two factors, viz., religion and lang­
uage, need no apology for inclusion. The former would 
surely be the first to spring to mind at the mention of 
the word Minorities' in the Indian context; nor would 
this be surprising in the historical context of communal 
tension in India. In fact, some writers are wont to regard
^  D. R. Majumdar. Races and Cultures of India, (4th ed.,
1961), p. 281. !
^/Victor D'Souza, op. cit., (n. 34* supra).
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religious minorities as the only minorities in India.
It may also he mentioned that in the context of the 
deliberations in tee Constituent Assembly of India, the 
reference to minorities was, by and large, a reference 
to religious minorities. The question of the role of 
religious minorities is particularly relevant in the 
context of a secular state in India. As to the question 
of linguistic minorities, it is relatively a new problem, 
which came into existence with the reorganisation of 
States on a linguistic basis in 1956. Language has become 
a highly emotional issue in India, giving rise to much 
heat an passion. The problem of linguistic minorities 
becomes particularly significant against this background. 
In scale and proportions it is a vast problem affecting 
such practical aspects of minorities' life as education, 
employment, and culture, and for which adquate Constitu­
tional measures are yet to be formulated.
The task of defining minorities is particularly 
complex in India on account of the vastness of the coun­
try, its tremendous diversity, and its peculiar social 
structure. The problems faced elsewhere are aere multi­
plied and enlarged in proportion* The factors of diffe­
rentiation are found overlapping and inextricably inter-
Jawaharlal Nehru, Discovery of India, (4th ed., 1956), 
p. 386; Taya Zinkin, India Changes,""(1958), p. 152.
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mixed. Ho single factor can finally mark out a distinct 
minority group. A person may belong to more than one 
minority group orinay belong to one or more minority groups 
and at the same time be a member of another majority 
group. Reference to any single divisive factor would 
indicate not one group, but several groujps with distinct 
identities of their own and qualifying for the minority 
status in varying degrees, as for instance, in the case 
of religious minorities. Another factor of differentia­
tion would indicate groups capable of being both the 
majority and minorities depending on their geographical 
location, as for instance in the case of a linguistic 
group which is in the majority within a linguistic State, 
and a minority outside it.
In terms of size, minority groups in India can 
range from several million strong to a few thousands or 
even hundreds. Thus, among religious minorities Muslims 
number over 50 millions, while Parsis (who are both a 
religious and ethnic minority) are to be counted in thou­
sands. The figures relating to linguistic minorities 
can never be static due to freedom of movement and reside­
nce guaranteed in the Constitution, and, therefore, are 
not easily ascertainable. Thefbackward classes1 are an 
indefinite mass of people, whose numbers are highly 
flexible and vary according to the criteria of backward­
ness current for the time being.
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Finally, the Indian Constitution does not 
recognise minority status, except within the limited con­
text of Articles 29 and 30, which deal with cultural and 
educational rights. The objective of the Constitution 
is an egalitatian society, where group differences shall 
not count, and where there will he an equality of status 
among all citizens irrespective of such differences. 
However, it cannot be denied that for the present at 
least the ideals of the Constitution and the facts of 
the situation are at variance with each other. It would 
be unrealistic to ignore that Very real differences exist. 
Non-recognition of the existence of minorities in the 
legal sense does not automatically solve the problem.
There are many instances where actual minorities recog­
nised as such do not exist in the legal sense at all.
Yet despite the Constitutional guarantees of all the 
rights of full Citizenship, there are groups, such as 
Negroes and other minorities in the United States of 
America, who are excluded from the enjoyment of these
4.Q
rights through social pressure.  ^ To ensure equality 
among all citizens it is, therefore, necessary to recog­
nise the special needs of different sections of the
^  F. J. Brown, ••The Meaning of Minorities*, in F. J. 
Brown & J. S. Roucek (ed.), Our Racial and National 
Minorities. (1937), p« 3, at p. 5.
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people. It is relevant to note that though the Indian 
Constitution apparently seems to have overlooked the 
question of minorities, in fact it has been greatly 
influenced by it. As we shall see later, though the 
Constitution does not expressly deal with minorities,
& great many of its important provisions have been desig- 
ned in answer to the question of minorities.
III. The Protection of Minority Interests
A. The role of law
Perhaps it is necessary to caution at the outset 
against the danger of over-emphasising the role of law in 
the protection of minority interests. The realisation 
of rights and freedoms is not a problem to be solved by 
a priori legal definitions, but by creating better condi­
tions of life for the individual and the society. It 
would be unrealistic to claim that law alone can provide 
adequate protection of minorities or that it can do so 
regardless of circumstances.
Having said this, it cannot be denied that law 
has a vital role to play in society and consequently with
Infra, p.68 et, seq.
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regard to the question of minorities. TJje term flawf is 
used here in its wider sense to include both the positive 
law and natural law. In all modern societies social control 
is exercised under and in the name of the positive law 
of the state. In the present organisation ofsociety the 
interests of the individual and society have to be recog­
nised, protected and enforced by the state. A system of 
priorities has to be worked out to resolve a conflict of 
interests depending on the resources and advancement of 
the society. The law in this sense is a "collective name 
for what is perhaps the most important set of institutions
by which man has fought to reinforce his reason against
51his passions."^ According to the positivists, all norms
in a society are derived from an ultimate legal order as
personified by the state. In the theory of natural law,
on the other hand, human rights are anterior and superior
52to positive law. While its rules are not certain and 
it lacks sanctions I its abstract and moral justice is 
beyond dispute. The positive law ought to have its philo­
sophical basis in natural law. The actual rules of law 
in a society would depend on the genius of its people, the
^  Percy Corbett, quoted in P. R. Scott. Civil Liberties 
and Canadian Federalism, (Reprint, 1961), P*27.
P. N. Drost, op. cit., p. 168.
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social conditions, and its present and future needs. It 
is necessary to strike a balance between the two poles 
of realism and idealism, between "what is" and "what 
ought to be". This is not an easy task.
According to P. IT. Drost, in the protection of 
minority interests the law has a dual role.  ^ Its primary 
role is to protect the very foundation of society itself. 
Liberty has no meaning outside society and the exercise 
and enjoyment of human rights can be achieved only in 
society. The law should therefore first secure the stru­
cture of society by laying down a minimum code of conduct 
for all members to follow, and require the observance of 
it. Minority rights have little meaning, if the basic 
rights of the individual ate not honoured. Therefore the 
competitive aspirations towards political freedom and 
social security of the individual in society should be 
first adjusted and merged in a general system of human 
rights in the first instance.
Having performed this function, the role of law 
becomes secondary till other conditions have been ful­
filled:. The realisation of interests depends upon the 
degree of political maturity and economic welfare in a
53 Ibid. p. 12.
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given country and these in turn are dependant on the 
moral and educational standing of the society. A high 
level of general, political and moral education on the 
one hand, and a high standard of living on the other are 
two indispensable conditions for the achievement of the 
high ideals expressed in declarations of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. In the absence of willingness, 
however promoted, on part of the majority to respect the 
minority rights, there is little that can be done under 
the coersion of the law. law can play a better role where 
the political, social and economic conditions of life have 
advanced. It can then provide a framework to translate 
and interpret public demand as expressed in political, 
economic and social terms into the language of the law. 
Fundamental freedoms belong more to the fields of politics 
and economics, but they need legal implementation for 
their effective existence.
It is proposed to consider briefly three issues 
concerning minority interests and the role of law.
Individuals interests and group interests
Interests are said to be the needs, demands, 
expectations, desires, hopes and aspirations which are 
sought to be satisfied.^ Such of them as are made legally
^  For a general discussion on "interests", see J. Stone, 
Social Dimensions of Law and Justice, (1966), Chapter 4, 
p. Ib4 fiJ; Also, Koscoe found, jurisprudence, vol.Ill, 
(1959), chapters 14 and 15, generally.
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enforceable are called rights. Interests are therefore 
of a wider nature, though, in the context of minorities, 
the term frightsf is very often used in this wider sense.
The effectiveness of any legal measure depends
on how best it meets the needs for which it was designed.
In seeking to protect minority'.interests, therefore, It is 
necessary first to ascertain how it affects individuals 
and groups in society.
The individual being the basic unit of the
society, it is essential to afford him opportunities for
the full development of his personality. People can have 
collective rights only when the basic freedoms and rights 
of the individual have been accepted. A people cannot 
develop their collective personality, if the individual 
members cannot preserve their cultural characteristics. 
Hence 1jhe Minority Treaties, (infra), even when they were 
chiefly concerned with the protection of national, lingui­
stic, and religious minorities, in their definition of 
rights to be accorded to minorities enunciated standards 
which were based on the acceptance of certain fundamental 
rights of the individual. In the development of human 
rights, thus, the rights of the individual are fundamental.
55 Moses Moskowitz, Human Rights and World Order» (1959)* 
p. 15.
48
However, the danger of over-emphasis on the 
individual should be avoided. It may seem that a univer­
sal system of human rights, complete in geographical and 
substantive scope and adequately enforced, would cover 
all possible rights and basic freedoms of a group or people 
and there might seem to be no necessity to formulate and 
implement the rights and freedoms of groups separate and 
distinct from the rights and freedoms of individuals. But, 
as P. H. Drost has pointed out, this reasoning does not 
take into account the essential differences between indivi­
dual needs, desires and ambitions on the one hand and 
collective exigencies, propensities and aspirations on the 
other. The psychology of the individual is something 
totally different from the psychology of a group. The 
protection of religious, racial, linguistic and cultural 
groups against political and economic oppression requires 
legal measures entirely dissimilar from those necessary 
for the protection of the individual. T&e liberty of the 
people signifies something intrinsically different from 
the freedom of the individual. The security of the nation 
depends on conditions, which are not essential for the 
security of the person. Recognition and observance of 
human rights has not satisfied peoples or nations, which
*56&re either minorities in or dependencies of "alien" lands.
56 P. H. Drost, op. cit.»p. 197.
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It has therefore been suggested that provision of human
rights alone would be inadequate for minorities and that
it is necessary to rethink of minority rights in terms 
57of groups.
The distinction between individual’s interests 
and group interests should not e carried too far. Socio­
logists remind us that a separate individual is an abstra­
ction unknown to experience and so likewise is society, 
wheji regarded as something apart from individuals. It 
is not a matter to be stated as "either/or". neither the
individual nor the group is by itself adequate to comprise
58all the aspects of life of man in society. Human rights 
and minority rights have little that is not common. It 
lias been suggested that special provisions should be restiL- 
cted only to specific groups, such as national communities, 
and that other groups such as racial or religious mino­
rities, who merely seek equality with the majority, could
59be protected under an effective system of human rights. ^
The Indian Constitution makes a compromise in 
that it is said to be at the same time both an individua-
57 V. A. Werck, "The Minority Problem and Modern Inter­
national Law", VII, World Justice. (1965).
5Q Louis Wirth, Community Life and Social Policy, (1956),
p. 22.
59 p. if. Drost, op. cit., p. 201.
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60listic and collectivist document* The fundamental 
and other rights vest in the individual citizen, irrespe­
ctive of his group affiliation. The emphasis throughout 
is on him. At the same time it takes note of the existence 
of many differences in the population and provides for 
the collective rights as well. This has been done.in gene­
ral terms, as in the case of freedom of religion in Articles 
25 and 26, and linguistic and cultural rights in Articles 
29 and 30. But the most significant of its attempts in 
dealing with ; collective interests are the provisions rela­
ting to the backward classes, dealt with in Chapter V, below.
Constitutional guarantees and minority interests
The incorporation of a Bill of Rights is a 
common phenomenon in recent Constitutions. It is particu­
larly relevant in the context of minorities.
But the attitudes to written.:: guarantees differ.
The traditional British view is to look upon them with 
6lsuspicion. The Indian Statutory Commission dismissed 
the suggestions put forward before it that the future Con­
stitution of India should contain definite written guarantees
(Lr\
Sir W. I. Jenningsf Some Characteristics of the Indian 
Constitution. (1953), pp. <22-23*
6lAmong the Constitutional lawyers holding this view are,
A. Y. Dicey, (Law of the Constitution, Papermac ed., 1961, 
p. 207); K. O', tfheare, IModern Constitutions. Reprint 
1958, pp. 54-57); and Sir W. I. Jennings, n. 60, pp.49-50,54.
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to the minorities. They said that they were aware that
such provisions had been inserted in many Constitutions,
notably those of European states formed after the War,
but that experience had not shown them to be of any great
practical value. In their view, "abstract declarations
are useless, unless there exists the will and the means
62to make them effective." More recently, Jennings, dra­
wing from his experience of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, 
has concluded that "one hould not attempt to deal with 
the problem of minorities by Constitutional guarantees in 
Bills of Rights. One should try to find out where the 
shoe is likely to pinch and to provide the necessary flexi- 
bility at that point."  ^ His view is that such provisions 
are difficult to interpret, difficult to enforce, and 
limit parliamentary freedom to act.
The case for written guarantees, however, is 
very strong. In a country comprising minorities of every 
kind the necessity of an agreed set of fundamental free­
doms is paramount. Granville Austin notes that in the 
Indian instance a declaration of rights was thought to 
be as necessary as it had been for the Americans when they
62 Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. II, 
Cmd. 35&9, (l^O;, Part I, Chapter V.
^  Sir W. I. Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government,
(1956), p. 110.
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established the first federal Constitution.The case 
for written guarantees is well stated by the Mgerian 
Commission which recommended the inclusion of fundamental 
rights in the Constitutions "Their presence defines belief 
widespread among democratic countries and provides a stan­
dard to which appeal may be made by those whose righbs 
are infringed. A government determined to abandon demo­
cratic courses will find ways of violating them, but they 
are of great value in preventing a steady deterioration 
in standards of freedom and the unobstrusive encroachment 
of a Government on individual fights."6**
It is not surprising that great weight had 
always been attached to the question of written guarantees 
in India. In recommending the principles of a Constitution 
of India, the Committee appointed by jfche All Parties Confe­
rence stated —
It is obvious that our first care should be to have 
our fundamental rights guaranteed in a manner which 
will not permit their withdrawal under any circum­
stances. ... Another reason why great importance 
attaches to a declaration of rights is the unfortu­
nate existence of communal differences in the country. 
Certain safeguards and guarantees are necessary to 
create and establish a sense of security among those 
who look upon each other with distrust and suspicion. 
We could not better secure the full enjoyment of
The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation,(1966), 
p. 54.
65 Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into 
fears of Minorities and, the means of allaying them, 
bmnd. 505, US58J, p. 97.
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religious and communal rights to all communities 
than by including them among the basic principles 
of the Constitution.^
On the eve of Independence, the Sapru Committee 
once again reiterated the need to allay minority fears, 
"Having given the matter our best consideration," they 
said, "we have come to the conclusion that howsouver ina­
ppropriate the tabulation of fundamental rights may be in 
England and howsoever inconsistent it may be with the 
fundamental dogma of the British Constitution that the 
fundamental rights are incompatible with the sovereignty 
of Parliament, in the peculiar circumstances of India we 
are distinctly of the opinion that the framing of funda­
mental rights is necessary not only for giving assurances 
and guarantees to the minorities but also for prescribing 
a standard of conduct for the legislatures, government 
and courts."^ It would be sad, they said, if Constitu­
tional jurists or lawyers under the spell of English law 
treated fundamental rights as nothing more than moral 
maxims or adages.^
It is true that everybody cannot afford to go
66 Report of the Committee appointed by the Conference 
to determine the principles of the Constliution of 
India. (Nehru Report), (1928), p. 90.
^  Sapru Report, (1945)> P* 257 • 
68 Ibid.
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to court and in some circumstances it may not be practi­
cal to do so. But there is no denying the fact that the 
mere presence of the guarantees has the effect of restrai­
ning those tempted to tamper with them. The great amount 
of case law relating to fundamental rights that has come 
into existence since the commencement of the Constitution 
and a series of valuable decisions handed down by the 
Supreme Court and the High Courts have vindicated the in­
corporation of Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution.
There can be no doubt that in India the written 
guarantees have proved to be a success. Alan Gledhill 
has observed that India has taken the enforcement of funda­
mental rights more seriously than any other country and 
has provided the world with an object lesson.  ^ Even 
such a sceptic of written guarantees as Jennings has been 
led to reconsider his views on the subject in the light 
of the Indian experience. In a publication to commemo­
rate the Magna Carta, he recognises that the Bill of Rights
in the Indian Constitution has been a "considerable 
70success*.1
 ^"Fundamental Rights", in J. N. D. Anderson (ed.), 
Changing law in Developing Countries. (1963), p. 81, 
at p. 92.
^  Sir W. I. Jennings, Magna ChMta and its influence in 
the world today. (1965), p* 41.
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Law and social change
It is beyond dispute that in the present day 
society law plays a greater role than it did in the past. 
Ever increasing volume of legislation and overworked law 
courts are a characteristic mark of our age. The law 
assumes even a greater role in the welfare state.
Legislation is a powerful instrument by which 
the state seeks to exercise social control and cater for 
social needs. The importance attached to it by each 
society differs at different times. As A. V. Dicey has 
showjl,legislation could either be a mere formal enactment 
of the ideas already accepted by the society, or antici­
pate future needs and create necessary public opinion for 
71it. In a welfate state, and in developing countries 
generally, it is a characteristic feature of law to take 
this initiative in seeking to solve social problems. In 
such circumstances law, as it seeks to resolve the conflict 
between the need of safeguarding the freedom of the indi­
vidual and the necessityjDf imposing limitations on it in
the larger interests of the society, has a “dynamic* role 
72to play.'
71 A. Y. Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England.
(Reissue, 1962).
72 P. B. Gajendragadkar, “The Historical Background and 
Theoretic Basis of Hindu Law“, in S. Radhakrishnan (ed.), 
The Cultural Heritage of India. Yol. II, (1962), at p.414.
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India provides a fascinating example of what is 
sought to he done through legislation in dealing with 
social problems. One outstanding example is the reform 
of the Hindu society itself. Social disabilities, which 
have acrued for centuries, have been removed by one stroke 
of the lawj and a series of enactments has been passed to 
streamline Hindu social institutions. It is true that 
legislation alone cannot bejthe answer to social ills and 
that it cannot succeed, unless it finds social acceptance. 
There are many^.instances in history where ambitious legis­
lative schemes have failed, or have yielded only partial 
results. Yet, as K. M. Panikkar argues, it is of signi- 
ficance that society has never been the same again.  ^
Legislation is a powerful instrument and much good can 
come through it, if used properly. Caution is, however, 
necessary, particularly in countries like India, where the 
law tends to be "the expression of the aspirations of the 
most articulate and Advanced1 groups, which hope to juse 
its educational as well as its coersive powers to improve 
the unenlightened."^ It must also be realised that, 
under the political conditions obtaining in India, there
^  Hindu Society at Cross Roads. (3rd ed., 1961), pp. 86-91.
7 A
Marc Galanter, "Hindu Law and the Development of the
Modern Indian Legal System", (Mimeographed typescript).
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is nothing to stop the majority community from imposing 
its notions on minority communities quite legally, if it 
chose to do so.
The role of the judiciary is of paramount impor­
tance. Its role, particularly in countries like India, 
is more than the mere interpretation of the law passed 
by legislatures. In interpreting the Fundamental Rights, 
the questions of public good, resonableness of restrictions 
and those relating to policy, propriety or wisdom under­
lying legislative or executive action may come to be con-
75sidered by the judges. Where a nation1 s fundamental
law envisages a far-reaching reconstruction of society,
the judiciary is inevitably engaged in the delicate task
of mediating between social actualities and avowed goals
of the polity* They are both authoritative interpreters
of these goals and assessors of the changing actuality in
76which these are to be realised. Thus, Marc Galanter 
would have the courts see that the experiment of protecting 
and advancing the backward classes does not ossify in a 
scheme of communal quotas and thus postpone the achievement
^  P. B. Gajendragadkar. Law, Liberty and Social Justice. 
(1965), pp. 11-13.
^  Marc Galanter, "The problem of Group'Membership: some 
reflections on the judicial review of Indian Society", 
4, J. I. L. I., (1962), p. 331.
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77of equality it is designed to promote.
It is necessary to realise that the law is a
double edged weapon, which, if used properly, is capable
of much good, and, if used wrongly, is bound to cause much
harm. The ends and means of the Ian must, therefore, be
subject to a continuous review by society, especially in
a society which includes minority groups. In this context
some of the issues raised by Harold laski merit a serious
consideration of all concerned —
... To say that the law is useful is to ask at once 
to whom it is useful; and that is always a question 
to which the most various answers can be given. To 
say that it embodies reason is merely to raise the 
enquiry of whose reason it embodies. To say that it 
expresses the general ends of the society is to ask 
as conveived by whom? At every point in short, the 
ideal purpose of law is not necessarily identical 
with the|actctal purposes of law as these are experi­
enced by those who receive the law.^g
The Indian Supreme Court has pointed out that mere honesty
of purpose is not sufficient to sustain a law enacted in
contravention of any of the Constitutional guarantees.
A law which apparently infringes the fundamental rights
of citizens cannot be upheld merely because the law maker
was satisfied that what he did was right or that he
believes that he acted in a manner consistent with the
7711 Marc Galanter, "Protective Discrimination for Backward 
Classes in India®, 3, J.I.L.I., (1961), p. 39, at p. 69.
A Grammar of Politics, (4th ed., 1937), p. vii.
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contitutional guarantees of the citizen. The test of 
validity of a law alleged to infringe the fundamental 
rights or any act done in the execution of that law lies 
not in the belief of the maker of the law ar of the person 
executing it, but in the demonstration by evidence and 
argument before the courts that the guaranteed right is 
not infringed.*^
B. A brief historical background of the protection of 
minority interests
general background
A discussion of the general historical back­
ground does not need an apology, when it is realised that 
there is an essential unity and continuity in the deve­
lopment of human institutions* K. M. Panikkar has obser­
ved how India has been influenced by wsstern ideas in the 
past and how Indians are in fact inheritors of the tradi­
tion of both India and the world, and how they can legiti­
mately claim as their own what they have assimilated from 
80others. The same can be said of all countries. The 
developments in individual countries and in the inter-
79 State of A. P. v. P. Sagar. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1379. at 
pp. 1364-8$. -----
88 The State and the Citizen. (2nd ed., I960), p. 42.
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national eomnnjuaity have always had a mutual influence 
on each other, and at present more so than ever before.
In tracing the development of human rights it 
is necessary to consider two levels: municipal law and 
international law. In the municipal positive law, signi­
ficant developments started in the 17th century and the 
process is still continuing. For whatever reasons, (e.g. 
the Renaissance and canons of the church), this process 
began in the western hesisphere and made early progress 
there. In England the onslaught of the common law had 
paved the way for the enlarging of the subjects1 rights 
and dimunition of the royal prerogative, which process 
received a sound legal basis hy the end of 17th century.
The Petition of Right of 1672, the Habeas Corpus Act of 
1679 and the Bill of Rights of 1689 are fundamental. In 
America the Pilgrim Fathers expressed the princiljpes of 
human rights in the Charter of Hew Plymouth drawn in 1620. 
The Charter of Providence came in 163&. In the 18th 
century the idea of the traditional rights of man took 
shape, aided by the developments in England, America and 
France. The idea of fundamental rights received expre­
ssion in the declarations and constitutional developments 
of the American states of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
North and South Carolina, New Jersy and Delaware —  all 
in 1777; Massachusetts in 1780, and New Hampshire in 1783. 
But by far the most important Constitutional development
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is the American Declaration of Independence (1776) and 
the Bill of Rights (1791) in the first ten Amendments.
On the European continest the Erench declaration des 
droits de lfhomme et du citoyen" (1789) has "been an epoch 
making document. It became part of the Erench Constitu­
tion in 1791 and of all subsequent Constitutions. In 
the 19th century the idea spread gradually over most 
European and South American countries, which one after 
another incorporated some fundamental rights of the indi­
vidual in their Constitutions. These ideas spread with 
western civilisation, following trade and colonisation 
and more countries followed the European and American 
experiments. About the beginning of the first World War, 
the classic human rights had appeared in nearly all the 
wsitten Constitutions of the world. These rights were 
directed against encroachment of the state. The modern 
human rights embodying the concepts of social equality 
and economic security are of recent origin.
In the international law, three stages in the 
development are apparent. In the first period isolated 
ad hoc provisions were incorporated in various treaties; 
in the second, a concerted attempt was made by the League 
of Nations in the creation of a minority tr^ty system; 
and in the third, commencing from the end of the second 
World War, various international organisations^ such as 
the United Nations and the European Commission^ have carried
on the task*
International concern for the human rights 
began with the stipulations of religious liberty incor­
porated in various treaties in the period following the
81Reformation. There has been no systematic evolution 
of minority law and its general development can be traced 
only through often unconnected and isolated treaty provi­
sions in the western hemisphere. They were often a matter 
of convenience to the powers involved and were often dicta­
ted by the victor to the vanquished. Their aim was to 
shield minorities from the danger of oppression by the 
majority. They did not concern themselves with the posi­
tive rights of the groups involved but sought protection
82on humanitarian ground only. The history of international 
law shows a number of treaties which included similar mino­
rity provisions: the Treaty of Augsburg 1555, the Treaty 
of Wymengen 1678, the Peace Settlement of Westphalia 1648, 
the Treaty of Ryswyck 1697, the Treaty of Oliva 1660, the 
Treaty of Kutchi Kainardji 1774, the Congress of Vienna 
1815, the Treaty of Paris 1856, the Treaty of Vienna 1878,201(1 
the Treaty of Paris 1898. Their implementation was politi­
cal in nature. The so called human rights provisions were
^  Moses Moskowitz, Human Rights and World Order. (1959),p.14*
82 P. de Azcarate, op. cit., p. 14.
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only obligations binding on the signatory powers and the 
individual did not derive any rights from them.
The minority system created by the League of 
Nations is the first attempt on such a scale at the inter­
national level. The principal powers decided to establish 
an international system of guarantees, which would impose 
certain obligations on the new or enlarged states for the 
protection of minorities in the interests of peaces The 
system was conceived on the basis of a number of conventions 
and other binding instruments laying down certain princi­
ples of government. The stipulations, affecting persons' 
belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic liJinorities, 
constituted obligations of international concern and placed 
under the control of the League, with the Council of the 
League as supervising body. Disputes on minority clauses 
were to be referred to the Permanent Court of International 
Justice. These stipulations may be divided into three 
categories: i) five special “minority* treaties signed 
during the Paris Peace Conference by Poland (June, 1919)9 
Yugoslavia (September, 1919), Czechoslovakia (September, 
1919), Rumania (December, 1919), and Greece (August, 1920). 
The Polish Treaty was considered to be a model; ii) special 
chapters inserted in the General Treaties of Peace, and 
other treaties: the Treaty of St. Germaine (signed by 
Austria, September 1919)> Neuilly-sur-Seine (by Bulgaria, 
November, 1919), Trianon (by Hungary, June, 1920),
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Lausanne (by Turkey, July, 1923), the German-Polish 
Convention on Upper Silesia (May, 1922), and the Conven­
tion concerning the Memel Territory (May, 1924); and 
iii) declarations made before the Council of the League 
of Nations by Albania (October, 1921), Estonia (September, 
1923), Finland (June, 1921), Latvia (July, 1923) and 
Lithunia (May, 1922).
It may be pointed out that this attempt was 
almost exclusively concerned with national minorities.
Save in very exceptional circumstances, (e.g. Jews), the 
minorities belonged to the same nationality as that of 
the majorities in other states. For a number of reasons, 
which it is not possible to discuss here, the above system 
eventually proved a failure. But, as Moses Moskomitz has 
pointed out, despite its shortcomings, it constituted the 
first major systematically implemented effort to limit 
the absolute power ;of the state over its citizens or 
subjects.8^
The creation of international organisations 
since the second World War marks the third stage of deve­
lopment. Their efforts in seeking to achieve a universal
 ^Report of the League of Nationas.See Appendix in P. de 
Azcarate. op. cit.« pp. 164-165; also, United Nations, 
"The International Protection of Minorities under the 
League of Nations", E/ CN.4/ Sub.2/6 of 7th Nov., 1947•
Op * cit., p. 15.
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system of human rithts have met with a large amount of
success and the process continues the world over. The
principal among these is the United nations Organisation,
whose present membership includes 126 countries.8  ^ Its
Charter contains most ideal aspirations for the promotion
of human rights. Its aim is "to achieve international
co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character and
in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as
86to race, sex, language or religion"; it seeks to promote 
"universal respect for an observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
87race, sex, language or religion"; and "all members 
pledge themselves to take joint and several action in
co-operation of the Organisation for the achievement of
88the purposes set forth in Article 55 •" It works through 
a number of organs on a wide front. In the context of 
our discussion mention may be make of its Commission on 
Human Rights and its Sub-Commission on Prevention of
list of Member States and the dates of their admission 
are to be found in "Membership in the United Nations", 
published by the Office of Public Information, (March, 1969) •
Article 1 of the U. N. Charter.
87 Ibid, Article 55.
88 Ibid. Article 56
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Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, the Trustee­
ship Council, and the UNESCO.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted on the 10th December, 1948, has been an epoch
making document. Whatever is its legal status and effect,
it has made a tremendous impact on both the international
and municipal law. Its principles have been adopted in
the Bills of Rights of most Constitutions which have been
written since its proclamation, including the Indian Consti- 
8q
tution. * Along with the Universal Declaration two Inter­
national Covenants, one on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, and the other on Civil and Political Rights, were
90also proposed. These were visualised as instruments 
which would legally bind the States acceding to them. But 
the progress on these was slow. The draft Covenants were 
under consideration by the General Assembly since 1954, 
and were finally adopted by it on 16th December, 1966.^
They require State parties to them to implement the rights 
and freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of
 ^Por a discussion on the Fundamental Rights of the Indian 
Constitution in the light of the Universal Declaration, 
see A. (xledhill, "India1 s Fundamental Rights", in the 
Indian Year Book of International Affairs. 1952.
90 T. P. IT.. 1947-48, p. 573.
91 J. U. N., 1966 (published 1968), p. 406.
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92Human Rights. So far each of the Covenants have been
q *
signed by 44 countries."  Further, reference may also
be made to two Conventions: the International Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,
94adopted by the General Assembly on 21st December, 1965,
and the draft * International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination
based on Religion or Relief" which is at present under
95consideration by the General Assembly. ^
Another outstanding achievement has been the 
European Convention on Human rights, adopted by the Commi­
ttee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in Rome in 
November, 1950. Its significance lies in the fact that 
it represents an advance on the work of the United Nations. 
It was the realisation that the Universal Declaration had 
no binding effect which led the countries of western 
Europe to work for the conclusion of the Convention. It
9^ The text of the two Covenants is to be found in Y. U. N ., 
1966, ^p. 419-432.
95 Press Releases l/T/518 and l/T/519 dated 17th September 
1969, United Nations, Office of Public Information. (Not 
official records).
^  Y. U. N .. 1965, p. 433; the text is at pp. 440-446 of 
the same.
95 The draft Declaration and the draft Convention have been 
under consideration since 1964. At its 24th Session on 
16th December, 1969, the General Assembly, owing to lack 
of time, decided to defer consideration of this item to 
the 25th Session: Press Release GA/4165 dated 17th Decem­
ber, 1969, Part Y, p . 64 (Not official record).
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deals with rights of a personal, civil and political 
nature. It is implemented by a European Commission for 
Human Rights and a European Court of Justice.
Today, more than ever before, there is increa­
sing awareness of human rights throughout the world thanks 
to the efforts of numerous official and non-official orga- 
nisationa. Mention may be made of civil rights movements, 
activities of groups of pacifists, church, educational and 
other groups, and organisations such as the International 
Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International. Establi­
shment of national committees on human rights is encouraged. 
All modern Constitutions, including those of the sociali­
stic bloc, now include a Bill of Rights, by whatever name 
called. Whatever be the political ideologies and methods , 
today there is a professed desire on part of all nations 
for the promotion of human rights. Their realisation in 
fact is, however, a matter which can be considered only 
with reference to particular circumstances in each case.
A brief historical background of the Indian Constitution
The Indian Constitution is the outcome of a 
compromise in which considerations of minority interests 
have played an important part. According to B. R. Ambedkar, 
among the many problems that the Constituent Assembly of 
India had to face, there were two which were admittedly
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most difficult. The problem of minorities was one of 
them, the other being the problem of Indian States.^ 
Various safeguards for the protection of minority interests 
have been built into the Constitution, although it does 
not specifically refer to minorities.^ For an appreci­
ation of the provisions of the Constitution it is nece­
ssary to see them in an historical perspective. For, 
every Constitution is a product of history, a product of 
the manner in which the country concerned emerged as an 
independent state, of the conflicts haich preceded that 
emergence and of the forces that have played on it.^8 
This is very true of India.
The development of the rights and principles 
incorporated in the Indian Constitution can be traced in 
a series of documents sice the founding of the Indian 
National Congress and the struggle for independence. This 
is also a period during which the western idea of civil 
rights gradually took toot in India. It may be mentioned 
that ancient Hindu polity never recognised 1 civil liberty^ 
as meaning the protection of the rights against the King 
or the state but only sought to protect the rights of an
^  B. R. Ambedkar, States and Minorities. (1947), preface.
^  Except in Articles 29 and 30.
98 Sir W. I. Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government. 
(1956), p. 2. ----- ----------------------
70
individual against the encroachments of another indivi­
dual. The King was viewed as deriving his authority 
from dharma and not from the people.^ The rights in the 
Constitution, therefore, have a relatively recent history 
in India.
Perhaps the first explicit demand for funda­
mental rights appeared in The Constitution of India Bill, 
1 8 9 5 . At this time for a people under foreign rule the 
question of minority interests was of a much lesser impor­
tance than ensuring the interests of the country as a 
whole. The primary demand, therefore, was for equality 
with the rulers. A series of Congress resolutions between 
1917 and 1919 repeated the demand for iivil rights and 
equality with Englishmen. The mid-twenties gave rise to 
a new tone and form of demand, the purpose of which was 
to assure liberty to Indians. The seven fundamental 
rights in Mrs. Besantfs Commonwealth of India Bill of 
1925 mark an important development; several of these have 
found expression in the present Constitution.
The appointment of the Nehru Committee to draft 
a swara.i Constitution on the basis of a declaration of
^  B. B. Naik, Ideals of Ancient Hindu Politics. (1932), 
pp. 39-40.
^ Por a detailed discussion of the historical background, 
see Gr. Austin.The Indian Constitution, p. 52ff.
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rights marks a most significant development. This Commi­
ttee was set up at the instance of the Madras Session of 
Congress in 1927, following the announcement of the appoint 
ment of the Simon Commission. The Committee dealt with 
the question of minorities and emphasised the need for
the incorporation of guarantees of Fundamental Rights in
2
the Constitution. The Rights of the Nehru Report are 
remarkably similar to the Fundamental Rights in the present 
Constitution;^ ten of the nineteen sub-clauses are materi­
ally unchanged and three of the Rights are included in the 
Directive Principles. The preoccupation of the Committee 
with the protection of minoritits is particularly relevant: 
it thought that it was essential to guarantee certain 
fundamental rights to prevent "one community domineering 
over another.
The Congress Resolution on Fundamental Rights 
and Economic and Social Change adopted by Congress at its 
Karachi Session in 1931, and known as Karachi Resolution, 
added a new dimension. For the first time it emphasised 
the positive obligations of the state in social and
2 Supra, pp. 52-53*
 ^Gr. Austin, op* cit.. p.55.
^ Nehru Report. (1928), p. 29.
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economic matters, in addition to its prohibitions. The 
Karachi Resolution has made an unmistakable imprint on 
the Constitution, particularly in the Directive Principles.
The Sapru Committee's Report, which came in the 
eve of independence, is a major document. The standing 
committee of the Non-Party Conference, meeting in Delhi 
in November, 1944, set up a committee to n ... examine the 
whole communal and minorities question from a Constitutional 
and political point of view, put itself in touch with diffe­
rent parties and their leaders, including the minorities
5
interested in the qu e s t i o n . T h e  Report suggested a 
Constitutional scheme for Indid, and paid special attention 
to placating minority fears.
The deliberations of the Constituent Assembly 
of India are of great significance in understanding the 
Constitution it adopted. The Assembly, though indirectly 
appointed, was a highly representative body and included 
every shade of public opinion. For the purpose of dealing 
with the Fundamental Rights the Assembly created an Advisory 
Committee in January 1947 on which all minority groups were 
represented. The Advisory Committee appointed three 
Sub-Committees, one each on Fundamental Rights, Minorities
 ^Sapru Report. (Reprint, 1946), p. 1.
c
For details of membership, see C. Austin, op. cit.. 
pp. 13-14 and Appendix.
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and on Tribal and Excluded Areas.
The Rights Sub-Committee having arrived at 
its tentative conclusions passed them on to Minorities 
Sub-Committee for suggestions, and after considering 
the suggestions received on the minority provisions, sent 
its Report to the Advisory Committee.. The Rights Sub-Commi­
ttee had sent a questionaire on the minority provisions 
in March 1947 to leaders of minority communities to deter­
mine what political, economic, religious, cultural and 
other safeguards they believed should be incorporated in 
the Constitution. Using these replies the Sub-Committee 
framed a list of minority rights and included it in its 
Report to the Advisory Committee. The Minorities Sub­
committee having considered the minority provisions and 
made few changes, sent its own Report to the Advisory 
Committee which incorporated the changes suggested by it.
The Interim Report of the Advisory Committee on the sub­
ject of Fundamental Rights was submitted to the Consti­
tuent Assembly on 29th April, 1947. The Assembly debated 
it during the third Session, and again in November, 1948.
The Rights appear in the Constitution in substantially 
the same form as they appeared in the Interim Report.
The scheme of minority protection in the Consti­
tution is two fold. The first is the inclusion of a
guarantee of a wide range of civil liberties in the chap­
ter on Fundamental Rights. These include such provisions
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of particular minority interest as non-discrimination, 
equality, the freedom of religion, and the protection of 
script and culture. The Directive Principles of State 
Policy in Part IY of the Constitution provide for an wel­
fare ideal which the state ought to seek to achieve. The 
second is a scheme of political organisation which seeks 
to ensure the equality of political rights of all sections 
of the population and their adequate representation in 
national life. As will he seen in the next chapter, this 
includes special arrangements for the representation of 
certain backward classes in legislatures, the civil ser­
vices, and other forms of special administration. The 
Preamble of the Constitution expresses its spirit and 
declares its objectives: viz., the achieving or all its 
citizens, majorities and minorities alike, justice, 
liberty, equality and fraternity.
IY. The principle of equality as a basis for the protection 
of minority interests
The subject of equality is of great relevance 
in any discussion minorities. In a great majority of 
cases the principal demand of minorities is for the remo­
val of discrimination and for equal treatment with the 
majority. This is certainly true of the Indian minorities. 
Even in cases of minorities with militant views, equality 
with the majority is the minimum acceptable condition and
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a primary stage in the realisation of their objectives. 
This principle is of special significance in the context 
of the Indian minorities, in view of the fact that the 
Indian Constitution has adopted it as the sole hasis for 
the solution of the problem of minorities, and is the key­
note of the entire Constitution.
It was noted in the previous section that in 
the Indian Constitution the protection of minorities was 
sought to be achieved by a guarantee of the Fundamental 
Rights and a scheme of political rights. It is important 
to note, however, that these are not special provisions 
for the minorities (who are not even defined), but are 
available to all persons equally. A remarkable feature 
of the Indian Constitution is that, despite the many 
divisions in the country, it does not categorise the popu­
lation into groups. There is one common citizenship and 
no section of the population will be discriminated against 
or given a privileged position. The Constitution is an 
egalitarian document, which has for its goal the attain­
ment of equality of status ahd opportunity for all its 
citizens.^ It contemplates political, social, and econo­
mic equality for all citizens. The objectives of the 
Constitution are well-stated in the words of the Sapru
7 Preamble of the Constitution.
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Committee, which anticipated the declaration of the 
Fundamental Rights. The rights of the Constitution would 
he, it said,
... not only a standing warning to the vested inte­
rests or to the privileged classes hut also a stan­
ding invitation to the governments, administrators 
and guardians of the law that the period of privileges 
and inequality is over and that what the Constitution 
demands and expects is perfect equality between one 
section of the community and another in the matter of 
political and civic rights, equality of liberties, 
and security in the enjoyment of the freedom of 
religion, worship and the pursuit of the ordinary 
avocations of life.g
The principal provisions concerning equality 
are to be found in the chapter on Fundamental Rights.
Article 14 states that "the State shall not deny to any 
person equality before the law or the equal protection of 
the laws within the territory of India." Article 15 bars 
discrimination against any citizen on grounds only of 
reiigion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, 
and this prohinition extends also to private acts with 
regard to public amenities. Article 16 provides for equa­
lity of opportunity in the matter of public employment, 
and bars discrimination on similar grounds. Articles 17 
and 18, abolishing "untouchability" and "titles" respecti-
q
vely, togeter with the Directive Principles of State Policy;
^ Sapru Report, (Reprint, 1946), p. 258. 
® Part IY of the Constitution.
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and the provisions for "protective discrimination"10 form 
the basis for socio-economic equality. A common citizen­
ship for the whole country, universal adult franchise, 
and opportunities for representation in the services of 
the state provide for equality in the political sphere.11
In the present context, it is noteworthy that 
India has chosen to be a democracy. Its implications on 
the problem of minorities dt!e two fold. First, as Humayun 
Kabir has noted, there is no question of minorities except 
in a democracy. Democracy implies the recognition of the 
right of individuals and groups not to be regimented, not 
to be assimilated in the general mass against their will.1  ^
It is only when personal rule or group yule of a class is 
replaced by rule by the will of the majority, and only 
when all members fo the community participate in the fun­
ctions, duties, and rights* as in a democracy, that the 
question of minorities assumes importance.1  ^ Secondly, 
the idea of equality is inherent in such a political sys­
tem. There cannot be democracy without equality.1^ Ho
10
Articles 15, 16 and Part XVT of the Constitution. See 
Chapter V, infra.
11 See Chapter II, infra.
12 Humayun Kabir, Minorities in a Democracy. (1968), p. 33.
13 Ibid. pp. 2-3.
14
Jawabarlal Nehiu, Glimpses of World History, p. 825, 
quoted by D. E. Smlih in Nehru and Democracy. (1958).p. 59.
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doubt there is great controversy as to the extent of
equality which is essential in a democracy. There are
those who argue that all thjt is required is the equality
of status of the individual, and others,to whom esuality
is never real unless it extended to the socio-economic 
15sphere.  ^ The Indian Constitution has laid this contro­
versy to rest hy prescribing for equality in the wider 
sense. The equality that it seeks is not merely a nega­
tive equality, in the sense of an absence of discrimina­
tion or an equality of status, but positive equality, with
what R. H. Tawney calls "equal opportunities of becoming 
16equal" through the active support of the state. Eor, 
equality of opportunity is not simply a matter of legal
j
equality* its existence depends not merely on the absence
17of disabilities, but also on the presence of abilities. 1 
The establishment of a democratic system contained in 
the Indian Constitution and the regime of equality that 
it envisages is an assurance to the minorities of the 
protection of their interests.
However, it should not be imagined that the 
problems of minorities can be solved by a simple declara-
^  J. A. Corry and J. E. Hodgetts, Democratic Government 
and Politics. (3rd ed,;, 1959), p. 31 •
^  Equality. (4th ed., 1952), p. 105.
17 Ibid, p. 106.
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tion of equality. While it may serve as a fundamental 
basis in securing minority interests, in its practical 
working there are difficulties of great magnitude, the 
most important of which is the difficulty in ascertaining 
the true meaning of "equality". There is no certain
T O
guide; the variables of its interpretation are endemic.
Those who have made a historical study of the concept of
equality point out that the concept has become inoperative
and ineffective when obliged to adhere to a fixed meaning.^
20Equality at best is a coherence of ideas, or an attitude
21shared by men in different circumstances. In applying 
it, a number of factors have to be taken into account.
Thus, it has been observed that in the process of levelling 
up or down a highly heterogenous community as in India, 
it is not enough merely to declare all citizens ejial in 
the eyes of the law. It was essential to enact, apart 
from the general provision of Article 14, a number of 
detailed provisions specifying the attributes of equality 
and permitting a degree of discrimination in certain
18 J. Stone, Human law and Human Justice. (1965), p* 326.
19^ Richard McKeon, "Practical uses of a Philosophy of 
Equality", in L. Bryson and others (ed.), Aspects of 
Human Equality. (1956), p. 5.
20 H. laski, A Grammar of Politics. (4th ed., 1937),P* 153.
21 Richard McKeon, op. cit., p. 6.
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instances to speed up the process of real equalisation.
The principle of equality does not work in a 
vacuum; it is necessary to harmonise it with the deals 
of justice and of liberty. Equality is not an end in it­
self hut a means to secure the full development of human 
personality. The idea of justice gives it a sense of 
direction in its working. Equality must mean that the 
limited resources of the society are made available to 
all members of the community in a fair manner, according 
to need and merit. Harold laski brings out this idea of 
equality effectively. To him equality meant —
that no man shall be so placed in society that he 
can overreach his neighbour to the extent which 
constitutes ;a denial of the latterfs citizenship. 
...It means such an ordering of social forces as 
will balance a share in the toil of living with a 
share in its gain also. It means that my share in 
that gain must be adequate for the purposes of citi­
zenship. It implies that even if my voice be weighed 
as less weighty than that of another, it must yet 
receive consideration in the decisions that are made. 
The meaning, ultimately, of equality surely lies in 
the fact that the very differences in the nature of 
men require mechanisms for the expression of their 
wills that give to each its due hear in g.gj
Equality means ... that adequate opportunities are 
laid open to all.g^
22 C. H. Alexandrowicz, Constitutional Developments in 
India. (1957), pp.
A Grammar of Politics.p. 153.
24 Ibid. p.154.
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However, 'justice* itself is an abstract concept which
is susceptible of varied interpretations in different
societies, and also within the same society at different 
25times.  ^ For some, it seems sufficient to establish 
formal or legal equality, and practical or positive equa­
lity would follow in due course; but according to others, 
equality can never be real until it is achieved in fact.
The need for harmonising ewqality with liberty 
arises from the fact that men are not equal in natural 
endowment, whether it be.health, stature or intelligence. 
Consequently, they are bound to differ in the growth of 
their personalities. The same is true of communities of 
men. A dead level of equality can be achieved only by 
severely restricting the freedom of some. It is, there­
fore, necessary to achieve a balance between equality and 
liberty. The ideal type of equality is not a regimented 
equality but one which allows maximum freedom for the 
development of all, while supporting the weak. The con­
cept of equality must, therefore, take into account the 
existence of natural inequalities and differences.
25^ For an interesting example , see the interpretation 
of racial equality by the U. S. Supreme Courts i) 
Plessy v. Ferguson. (163 U.S.)567), (1896), which laid 
down the rule of "separate but equal"; ii) Cumming v. 
Board of Education. 1175 U.S. 528), (1899), which 
enunciated the doctrine of "substantial equality" and 
iii) Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U.S. 483, 
which declared the principle in (i) to be illegal.
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Accordingly, equality consists of treating people
alike in so far as they are alike, as well as treating
them differently so far as they differ. Social equality
thus construed would have three implications:
... first, that so far as individuals share a 
common experience in life, they shall enjoy an equal 
opportunity for the formation and expression of 
public opinion, whether in political or any other 
field; secondly, that the occupations, sects, parties 
or other social divisions into which they fall shall 
have equal opportunities for making effective expre­
ssion of their interests, knowledge, and valuations; 
thirdly that the unique personal needs shall be able 
to transcend the barriers of 1 class1 and make their 
distinctive contribution through personality to public 
policy. 27
Thus, there is in each individual a unique personality, a 
member of a class or group, and a member of the wider 
community, of which the classes or other groups are sections.
The law-giver, therefore, needs to know fully
the social circumstances and needs of all sections of the
people before he can legislate for them in keeping with
the principle of equality. A law is not necessarily equal
28 abecause it applies to all equally. I^ jbmud Ahmad, commen­
ting on the minority proposals of the Nehru Report, points 
out that in India the mere uniformity of laws cannot 
ensure justice between communities, as in a number of
J. A. Hobson, Towards Social Equality. (1931), p. 26.
27 Ibid, p. 5.
28 R. H. Tawney, qt>. cit., p. 106.
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cases the effect of such laws would not he the same on 
all communities * A particular law may affect one commu­
nity most, while it may not affect another community at 
all, or affect it only nominally• As an instance he cites 
the case of the legislation on cow-slaughter and points 
out that though apparently this may apply to both the 
Muslim and the Hindu communities, in fact it affects only
the Muslim community adversely, and the Hindu community 
29not at all. Hence, in seeking to achieve equality both 
the legislator and the judiciary must constantly be aware 
of the existence of differences among various sections of 
the population. They should keep in view the distinction 
between equality in law and equality in fact; for, as
Gt
Mobffimad Ghouse, citing Aristotle, has pointed out, "inju­
stice arises not only whe equals are treated unequally,
30but also when unequals are treated equally."
It is significant that few Articles of the
Indian Constitution have been' more heavily drawn upon
than those providing for equality, especially Article 
3114. This is not the place for entering upon a discu­
ssion on the maze of technicalities which inevitably
^  M. Ahmad, Hehru Report and Muslim Rights, (1930),pp.61-62. 
30 ^ Mohammad Ghouse, "Minority Rights under the Indian 
Constitution", (1967) I S.C.J.. p.67, at p. 78.
^  H. M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India. (1967), p.188.
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surround its interpretation and it would also be quite
impossible to consider here the innumerable decisions
handed down by the courts; this task is best accomplished
32by textbooks. But a reference must be made to|a predomi­
nant factor in the application of the rule of equality: 
the rule of classification.
The rule of classification assumes great impor­
tance because, as we have seen above, all people are not 
similarly situated, and therefore, for the purpose of 
legislation it is necessary to distinguish between various 
gruups of people. The principles governing •classifica­
tion* have been laid down by the Supreme Court in a mumber 
of decisions. These were summarised by the Court in 
Ramakrishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar^  when it condi- 
dered the meaning and scope of Article 14. The following 
propositions were established in that case:
a) Article 14 forbids class legislation but does 
not forbid classification;
b) Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by 
substantive law, but by a law of procedure;
c) Permissible classification must satisfy two 
conditions, namely,
i. it must be founded on an intelligible 
differentia which distinguishes persons 
or things that are grouped together from 
others left out of the group, and
^  See, Seervai, Ibid, pp. 188-281; D. D. Basu, Commentary 
on the Constitution of India, Vol. I (5th d., 1965).
pp. 267-505:----------------
33 A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 538.
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ii. the differentia must have a rational 
relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the statute in question;
d) The differentia and object are different elements
and it follows that the object by itself cannot
be the basis of the classification;
e) In permissible classification mathematical nicety 
and perfect equality are not required. Similarity, 
not identity of treatment, is enough;
f) The classification may be founded on different 
bases, namely, geographical or according to object 
or occupations or the like;
g) Even a single individual may be in a class by 
himself on account of some special circumstances 
or reasons applicable to him and not applicable
to others; a law may be constitutional even though 
it relates to a single individual who is in a 
class by himself;
h) The legislature is free to recognise degrees of 
harm and may confine its restriction to those 
cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest;
i) There is always a presumption in favour of the 
constitutionality of an enactment and the burden 
is upon him who attacks it to show shat there has 
been a clear transgression of the constitutional 
principles;
j) In order to sustain the presumption of constitu­
tionality the court may take into consideration 
matters of common report, the history of the times 
and may assume every state of facts which can be 
conceived;
k) It must be presumed that the legislature under­
stands and correctly appreciates the need of its 
people, that its laws are directed to problems 
made manifest by experience and that its discri­
minations are based on adequate grounds; and
1) While good faith and knowledge of the existing 
conditions on part of a legislature are to be 
presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the 
law or the surrounding circumstances brought to 
ipie notice of the court on which the classifica- 
n may reasonably be regarded as based, the
presumption of constitutionality cannot be 
carried to the extent of always holding that 
there must be some undisclosed and unknown 
reasons for subjecting certain individuals or 
corporations to hostile or discriminatory 
legislation. The principle must be borne in 
mind in deciding whether a law violates 
Article 14-
However, though the theory of classification appears to 
be simple, in its application it is beset with many diffi­
culties. To appreciate the task faced by the courts one
need only glance through a list of classifications which
34they have had to adjudicate upon. ^
The efficacy of the scheme of equality envisa­
ged in the Constitution depends on the spirit in which it 
is operated. It presumes the presence of good faith at 
all times on part of the government and at all levels of 
administration. Eor, the governmental powers are so exten­
sive that it can legislate, quite legally, on any matter 
touching any group or community. The rule of classifica­
tion is weighted in favour of the Constitutionality of 
statutes and it would not be a big hurdle in the path of 
an unscrupulous government. Eurther, inequalitycan result 
not only in the enactment of laws, but also in their admi­
nistration. legislation just on the face of it can yet 
be unequally administered.^ It is often the abuse in
34^  An exhaustive list is to be found in H. M. Seervai, 
op. cit., pp. 205-225.
35 H. E. Groves, Comparative Constitutional law: Cases 
AMD Materials, (1963). p. 51.
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the exercise of administrative discretion that is likely
36to tilt the scales of justice.
Finally, for minorities in India the equality 
of civil and political rights is an assurance that their 
interests will be protected. The present work is an 
attempt to consider the position of minorities in that 
light by reference to the relevant provisions of the Con­
stitution. It is not intended to discuss the entirely 
of their rights which they share with their fellow citizens. 
Attention is focused, in Chapters III, IV and V, on issues 
of special significance in areas of religious, linguistic 
and socio-economic interests to the respective minorities. 
This is preceded, in Chapter II, by a consideration of 
equality in the political sphere, which is a fundamental 
aspect of the Indian Constitution.
^  For a discussion on the law relating to the use of
discretionary powers, see H. M. Seervai, op. cit.. p.225ff*
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Chapter II
EQUALITY Off POLITICAL RIGHTS
Any scheme for the protection of minorities 
must "begin at the fundamental stage of political orga­
nisation. Where the interests of different minority 
groups are sought to be protected on the basis of the 
principle of equality, that equality must derive from, 
and extend to, the basic level of political interests. 
Citizens1 rights can be broadly divided into two cate­
gories: civil rights and political rights. The former, 
in whose sphere most minority issues arise, are those 
which ensure for citizens freedom from the interference 
of the state in the private sphere. The latter pertain 
to the more basic issue of political organisation, on 
which the efficacy of all civil rights ultimately de­
pends, and in that sense are of a higher order. The 
state is a political society for the preservation of 
social order and the promotion of common interests and 
common purposes of its members. The relative standing 
of all the members in terms of participation in the
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life of that society, tiLe rights they possess and the 
duties they owe, is, therefore, a matter of great impor­
tance. The general political situation in a country is 
thus a primary indicator of the status of minorities 
therein.
Definition of political rights
Political rights are commonly defined as those 
rights which give their possessors an influence in the 
formation of the will of the state and which afford them 
the legal possibility of participating in the creation 
and extension of legal norms.**' These are restricted to 
persons who are citizens. They give the adult citizen 
the right to franchise, qualify him to hold public office,
2
and entitle him to direct participation in political life. 
This involves the process of government of the country in 
its various aspects.
An act of government is said to consist in the 
conversion of the desires or will of individuals and 
groups into the behaviour of others or all in the society 
in which they dwell. It falls roughly in two parts, defi­
nable, if not completely severable —  i.e., the process
 ^Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, (3rd imprint, 
1949)9 p. 235.
2
J. A. Corry and J. E. Hodgetts, Democratic Government 
and Politics. (3rd ed.,1959), p. 440.
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of politics and the process of administration. The first 
comprises the origin, development and maturing of social 
will so that popular loyalties are marshalled in such a 
way as to establish a law or convention, socially accepted 
or simply acquiesed in. Administration is the use of this 
reservoir of social will and power by appropriate personal, 
mechanical, territorial and procedural methods, in order 
to render specific governmental services to those entitled 
to them and to enforce duty where tbewill or ability is 
lacking.
The mode and extent of participation in the poli­
tical life must necessarily vary according to place and 
system of government. In a democracy, a citizen is said 
to participate in this process by “practical politics" and 
"pressure politics". The former comprises such direct 
participation as activities involving political parties, 
elections, campaign propaganda, etc.; and the latter com­
prises the infinitely complex and varied activities of 
organised groups which represent interests of various types 
and which seek to influence the action of officials who 
achieve power through practical politics.^ However, it
 ^H. Finer, The Theory and Practice of Modern Government, 
(4th ed., l9bl), p. 7.
^ J. E. Russell, "Citizenship Responsibility of the Public 
School", in F. C. Gruber (ed.), Education and the State, 
(I960), p. 89. --------------------- -
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should he noted that the latter is a feature which is 
peculiar to the Amrican type of democracy, and has rela­
tively less significance in the British type with its 
reliance of a permanent civil service, which is the case 
in India.
Democracy and minorities
Democracy and the representative form of govern­
ment works on the basis of the rule of the majority. How­
ever, the principle of the majority rule is by no means 
identical with absolute dominion of the majority, and the 
dictatorship :of the majority over minority. As Kelsen 
points out, a majority presupposes by. its very definition 
the existence of a minority. The right of the majority 
thus implies the right of existence to the minority. The 
principle of majority in a democracy is observed only if 
all citizens are permitted to participate in the creation 
of the legal order, although its contents are determined 
by the will of the majority. It would be undemocratic 
and against the rule of the majority to exclude any mino- 
rity from the creation of the legal order. The conse­
quences of such exclusion are grave, as Harold laski has
 ^Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (3rd 
imprint, 1949j, p. 287.
92
pointed out:
Unless I enjoy the same access to power as others,
I live in an atmosphere of contingent frustration.
It does not matter if I shall probably not desire 
to take full advantage of that access. Its denial 
will mean thtt I accept an alloted station as a 
permanent condition of my life; and that in turn is 
fatal to the spontaneity that is the essence of 
freedom, g
Where the minority is allowed to participate in the pro­
cess, there is always a probability of its -influencing the 
will of the majority and thus preventing action opposed to 
its interests.
The above reference to the majority and the 
minority is, of course, a reference to the political majo­
rity and minority as understood in western democracies.
In the context of the present chapter, however, the refe­
rence to minorities is made not in that sense, but is a 
reference to various minority groups considered in subse­
quent chapters. These are communal groups principally 
based on religion, language and caste. The important 
thing about them is that they have been, and still tend 
to be, included in permanent political minorities. The 
reason for this is obvious: whereas a political majority 
is changeable in its class composition and its doors are
® Op. cit., p. 149*
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always open, a communal majority has its doors closed.
This factor has been one of great concern to the minori­
ties in India in the pre-independence days. Thus, B. R.
I
Ambedkar spoke of the fear of minorities that, in the 
absence of a suitable compromise, they might be relegated 
to the position of ’subject races' in the face of an
Q
overwhelming permanent majority. The communal aspect 
is something which could not be ignored in any scheme of 
minority protection in India.
The Congress Party was fully aware that in the 
circumstances obtaining in India, a simple type of demo­
cracy, giving full powers to the majority to curb or 
overrule minority groups would not be satisfactory or 
desirable, even if it could be established.^ The answer 
obviously lay in removing certain areas of minority inte­
rests from the sphere of ordinary political majorities, 
and incorporating them as fundamental rights in a written 
Constitution. Various institutional checks and balances 
had to be built into the democratic system so as to achieve 
a balance of interests.
n
1 B. R. Ambedkar, Thoughts on Linguistic States. (1955), 
p. 35.
® Thoughts on Pakistan, (1941), pp. 40-41.
o
Jawaharlal Rehru, The Unity of India, p. 406, cited in 
P. E. Smith, Rehru and ^Democracy. (T958). p. 52.
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The Indian Constitution establishes a democra­
tic system of government, designed to operate on the 
pattern of western democracies. The political power is 
derived from the people and is sought to be exercised in 
their name without having regard to their particular 
group affiliations. In the matter of participation in 
the political life of the country no distinction is made 
between one section of the people and another. It is 
sought to protect the interests of minorities, as indeed 
of all citifenSj by the basic equality, which characterises 
the whole range of political rights. To evaluate the 
efficacy of this principle in safeguarding the political 
interests of minorities, it is proposed to examine three 
principal areas of political interests: citizenship, 
franchise and representation, and public services.
I. Citizenship
The concept of citizenship is firmly embedded 
in the Indian Constitution and is essential to it.^ The 
Constitution draws clear distinctions between the rights 
of citizens and those of non-citizens. Certain rights 
are conferred only on the former, from which the .latter
^  H. M. Seervai, op. cit., p. 125.
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are excluded. Certain Fundamental Rights are available
only to citizens;1'*' only citizens can hold certain
12public offices; and only citizens have the franchise 
which entitles them to fully participate in the political 
process of the country. Only citizens quality for the 
totality of the rights available unjer the Constitution.
The law relating to Indian citizenship is 
contained in Part II of the Constitution and the legisla­
tion enacted thereunder. Articles 5 to 8 thereof deter­
mine the acquisition of citizenship at the commencement 
of the Constitution; after that date the provisions of 
the Citizenship Act, 1955, apply. Under Article 5, at 
the commencement of the Constitution, every person domici­
led in India, and a) who was born in that territory; or 
b) either of whose parents was born in that territory; 
or c) who has been ordinarily resident in that territory 
for not less than five years immediately preceding, became 
a citizen of India. Articles 6 and 7 determine the 
citizenship of persons who have migrated from Pakistan
11 e.g., Articles 15, 16, 19 and 29.
^  The Office of the President of India (Article 58); the 
Attorney-General of India and the Advocate Generals of 
States (Article 76(1) read with Article 124(3); Article 
165 read with Article 217(2) ); Judges of the Su^ pjjeme 
Court (Article 124(3) ) and of the High Courts (Article 
217(2) ); and Governors of the States (Article 157).
96
to India, and vice versa, at the dates appointed. Article 
8 confers citizenship on Indian nationals residing abroad 
on their complying with the registration formalities requi­
red under it. Article 10 provides that every person who 
is or is deemed to be a citizen of India under Part II of 
the Constitition shall, subject to the provisions of any 
law that may be made by. Parliament, continue to be such 
citizen.
Article 11 enables Parliament to legislate with
regard to the acquisition and termination of citizenship
after the commencement of the Constitution, and generally
to regulate the right of citizenship by law. Under entry
17, List I of the 7th Schedule, Parliament has exclusive
power to make laws on "citizenship, naturalisation and
aliens." However, this power has to be exercised "subject
13to the provisions of this Constitution."
In exercise of its powers Parliament has enacted 
the Citizenship Act, 1955, which provides for the acqui­
sition of citizenship by birth, descent, registration 
and naturalisation. Section 3 provides that, subject to 
limited exceptions, every person born in India on or after 
the 26th of January, 1950, shall be a citizen of India.
^  Article 245 (l).
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A person born outside India on or after that date shall 
be a citizen of India by descent if his father is a citi­
zen of India at the time of his birth.^ Certain persons, 
who are not already citizens, can acquire citizenship 
by registration, in accordance with the rules laid down 
in that behalf, if they belong to one of the prescribed 
categories: viz., persons of Indian origin; women who ar$, 
or have been, married to citzens of India; minor children 
of persons who are citizens of India; and persons who are 
citizens of certain specified counties.^ Section 6 pro­
vides for citizenship by naturalisation of foreign nation­
als, who are not qualified to be registered as such under 
Section 5.
Por our purposes it is not necessary to go into 
the technical details pertaining to citizenship. To rea­
lise the nature and full implications of Indian citizen­
ship it is necessary to look beyond the legal |Erovisions 
into the general scheme of the Constitution. Some of its 
aspects may briefly be looked into.
^  Section 4. 
^  Section 5.
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The citizen and the state
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Indian 
citizenship is the guarantee of fundamental rights in 
the Constitution. This ensures for the citizen the prote­
ction foom the interference of the state in the private
sphere of his life. The state cannot legislate so as to
16take away or abridge these rights, nor can this be done 
by means of a Constitutional amendment.^ The 1 state1 is 
defined so as to include the Government and Parliament of 
India and the Government and legislature of each of the 
States and all local or other authorities within the terri­
tory of India or under the control of the Government of 
18India. It is intended to include "every authority which 
has been created by law and which has got certain powers 
to make laws, to make rules or make bye-laws.^
Indian citizenship is conveived on a basis of 
equality of status and opportunity for all its members.
The individual citizen is the centre of attraction znd 
the Constitution regards all citizens to be of equal
16Artiele 13.
^Golak Hath v. State of Punjab. A.I.E.1967 S.G. 1643* 
18Aiticle 12.
19Dr. Ambedkar, C.A.D.. Vol.Til,p. 610.
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political value. In the scheme of the Constitution, there­
fore, minorities as minorities do not exist. In the matter 
of citizenship such factors of diversity as race, religion, 
language or caste are of no consequence, and neither privi­
lege nor discrimination attaches to any of them. Of course, 
as we shall see later, there is a scheme of protective 
discrimination1 in favour of the backward classes1 in the 
Constitution; hut its purpose is not to afford a privilege 
to that section of the population hut rather to elevate 
them to the same level of equality of status and opportu­
nity as the rest of the general public.
Structural aspect of the state
India is a Union of States of a quasi-federal 
nature. The administration of the country is carried on 
through Governments at the Centre and in each of the Sta­
tes. In 1956 the States were reconstituted on a linguistic 
basis. Despite this duality of government, the Constitu­
tion has achieved unity of authority. The legislative
power is divided between the Centre and the States by
20means of Legislative Lists. But provision has been 
made for enpowering Parliament to legislate with respect
20 Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.
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to any matter enumerated in the State list in certain
circumstances. Residuary powers of legislation rest with 
21
Parliament. The Centre has power to intervene in the
&£fuirs of a State in the event of a Proclamation of Emer— 
22
gency. There is an unified judiciary for the whole 
country with Supreme Court at the Centre and High Courts 
in each of the States.
Despite the federal structure of the state, 
there is no dual citizenship, as in the United States of 
America. The Constitution recognises only one form of 
citizenship for the whole country; there cannot be double 
citizenship, one for the Union, and the other for a State?^ 
A citizen is entitled to move freely throughout the terri­
tory of India, reside and settle down in any part of the 
country, acqi^ ce and hold property, and carry on any trade, 
profession or calling.^ However, a common Indian citizen­
ship should not be confused with a common Troian domicile: 
it is possible to have a State domicile and legislation 
enacted on that basis would be valid.^
21Article 248.
22Article 250.
23
''Hem Chandra v. Speaker, legislative Assembly. A.I.R. iq>56 
(Jal. Vjb (381-827: —
^Article 19.
25
D. P. Joshl v. State of M. B.. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 334; 
also, Radhabhal v. State of Bombay. A.I.R.1955 Bom. 439.
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In the present context, the view expressed
by the States Reorganisation Commission underlines the
truth of the matter:
Whether the States are reorganised or not, they are 
and will continue to be the integral parts of a 
Union which is far and away the more real political 
entity and the basis of out nationhood. The Consti­
tution of India recognises only one citizenship, a 
common citizenship for the entire Indian people with 
equal rights and opportunities throughout the Union.
Secular democracy
In the religious context it is very significant 
that, despite the overwhelming majority of the population 
professing Hinduism, India has chosen to be a secular 
democracy, —  a fact which is most reassuring to religious 
minorities. As we shall see later, it is not a legalistic 
secularism, but a liberal one. It does not say that diffe­
rences based on religion should not exist, but that they 
should not count in the matter of citizenship. The secu­
larist nature of the state is certainly an important 
aspect of Indian citizenship, and is not without its appeal. 
It has been suggested that, in the present circumstances 
of the world, and especially in India, there can be no 
better political organisation from the Muslim point of view
^  Report of the States Reorganisation Commission. (1955)9 
p. z£*T.
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than a secular state, and that they should instead of
merely tolerating it in a passive way, actively and
27zealously support it. 1
The foregoing consideration of coursb relates 
to the idea of a single citizenship, as envisaged in 
the Constitution. The vital question which now arises 
is whether this ideal coincides with the reality offche 
Indian situation.
Single citizenship and communalism
The greatest stumbling block in the attainment 
of the ideal of single citizenship in India, and conse­
quently in the protection of minority interests, would 
undoubtedly be the growth of the very communalism wiich 
the Constitution seeks to eschew from the body plitic. 
Communalism1 is something quite different from the pro­
motion by a community of its legitimate interests, and 
can roughly be described as the seeking by a group to 
promote its self-interest at any cost, without having 
regard to, and often to the detriment of, the interests 
of others. The Constitution envisages that the issues 
of the Indian public life would be decided on their merit, 
without extraneous considerations influencing them, and
^  S. Abid Husain, The Destiny of Indian Muslims. (1965), 
p. 175.
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therefore deliberately overlooks differences such as of 
class, race, religion, language, and caste.
However, ideals do not become facts the moment 
they are incorporated in a Constitution, irrespective of 
the past and present course ofeevents. As Jennings has 
cautioned, where such differences exist, there is always
a danger that the communal aspect may at times predominate,
28to the consequent detriment of the communal minorities.
It would be idle to imagine that it has been, and is, not 
so in India. One hopes that it would be a temporary and 
passing phase, but its existence cannot be ignored.
It is evident to anyone who has followed the
course of events in India that communalism of various
kinds does exist in the public life of the country. Though
29democracy is said to ae a nagation of the caste,  ^caste
30nevertheless plays a predominant role in elections.
It cannot be denied that, in the demand for the formation 
of linguistic States, among the legitimate grounds there 
were also elements of fanaticism and intolerance of other 
linguistic groups. In certain areas there was “a kind
Sir ¥. I. Jennings, Indian Constitution, (1953), pp. 
92-93? K. B. Krishna, on the other hand, views the 
Indian situation as being not a communal problem, but 
one of class struggle: The Problem of Minorities. 
(1939), pp. 296-297.
K. M. Panikkar, Hindu Society at Cross Roads, (3rd ed.,
1961), p. 88.
^  M. N. Srinivas, Caste in Modern India, (1962), p. 72.
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of border warfare" assuming the form of a dispute between 
31alien powers. Over a decade after the States reorga­
nisation, border disputes are still a regular feature of 
the linguistic scene, and some State governments are 
dilatory in implementing the agreed proposals in respect 
of linguistic minorities therein. Religious communalism, 
particularly the Hindu—Muslim conflict, has had a profound 
influence on India. It is noted that this problem does 
not admit of rapid solution and will still have to be 
faced for a considerable time. It would take a careful 
and continuous policy calculated to convince Muslims that
their religion, culture and economic prospects are in no 
32danger. There is reason for disquiet among Muslim and 
Christian communities at the hostility shown by certain 
political parties and organisations advocating the cause 
of Hindu nationalism.^^ It is clear that despite what the 
Constitution seeks to achieve, there are signs of strain 
on the idea of single citizenship.
31 Report of the States Reorganisation Commission, (1955), 
p. 2&9*
^  A. Gledhill, The Republic of India. (2nd ed., 1964),p. 2.
^  See, "Chavan deplores doubts about loyalty of minority 
groups11, The Hindustan Times. March 29, 1968, p. 8; 
"Swastika casis a shadow in Delhi", The Times, October 
3, 1968. ---------
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But, despite the shortcomings of the system 
visible at present, it is hard to find a better alterna­
tive to the scheme of single citizenship. If communalism 
exists, it is not as a result of the Constitution, but 
in spite of it. The Constitutional scheme has merit in 
that it is an ideal which, though not fully realised at 
present, provides a goal to be achieved when conditions 
improve. Social and political conditions in India are 
changing and with the improvement in education and econo­
mic conditions it is hoped that a broad-based nationalism 
will replace the narrow communal outlook. To the minorities 
of all kinds the mere fact that the Constitution envisages 
a single citizenship, is in itself a reassurance and a 
matter for hope. To have provided them with special gua­
rantees (as for instance, communal electorates) would have 
alienated their interests, and would have resulted in 
their isolation and stagnation. Isolation, whether forced 
or voluntary, is full of psychological and spiritual dajgers
to the minorities, as it creates a feeling of inferiority,
34a complex of persecution and a habit of self-pity.
Citizenship is not a static, but a dynamic
thing. The state is not an amorphous mass but an organic
^  S. Abid Husain, The Destiny of Indian Muslims, (1965),
p. 163.
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entity with free play for the individual and collective 
freedoms condusive to the maximum good of all. The Con­
stitution cannot make good citizens. It can only provide 
the ideals and the machinery hy which the democratic pro­
cess can produce good citizenship. This the Indian 
Constitution has done.
II. Political participation
A. Universal franchise
The best way to protect a democracy, it is said,
35is to ensure democratic elections. One of the greatest 
experiments in democracy is being carried out in India 
by universal adult suffrage, involving the largest electo­
rate in the world. It is observed that the most striking 
feature of the Indian Constitution is "undoubtedly its
acceptance of the fullest implication of democracy by
36basing it on adult franchise."
The law relating to elections is contained in 
Part XV of the Constitution and the laws enacted there­
under. Article 326 provides that elections shall be on
^  Sir W. I. Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government, 
(1956), p. 105.
^  K. M. Panikkar, Hindu Society at Cross Roads, p. 96.
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the basis of adult suffrage, with every citizen over 
the age of 21 years entitled to be registered as a voter. 
Originally, the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee of the 
Constituent Assembly had recommended that the right to 
vote should be included in the chapter of Fundamental 
Rights. But the Assembly took the present course on the 
recommendation of the Advisory Committee.^ Article 325 
provides that there is to be only one general electoral 
roll for every territorial constituency and no person 
is to be ineligible for inclusion in any such roll, or 
claim to be included in any special electoral roll, on 
grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or any of
70
them. Any law which provides for elections on the
basis of separate electorates for members of different
religious communities offends against Article 15(1), and
39is void as being repugnant to the Constitution.
The superintendence, direction and control of 
the preparation of electoral rolls and the conduct of 
all elections to Parliament and to the Legislature of
Interim Report of the Advisory Committee on Minorities. 
Fundamental Rights, etc.. (presented on £9ih April.
1947). in Reports of Committees, (First Series, 1947)*
38 Article 325.
3^ Fain Su..tdiDas v. State of U.P.. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 384(385).
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every State, as also elections to the offices of President 
and Vice-President is vested in the Election Commission.^ 
The Commission also appoints election tribunals for the 
settlement of election disputes.
Two issues deserve consideration with respect
to the conduct of elections. It is evident that the
intention of the makers of the Constitution was to create
an independent and autonomous Election Commission which
would he ftee from the control of provincial governments,
"to prevent injustice being done to people of minority
4-1community, racially, linguistically and culturally."
£. 7. Rao suggests that the objective of an autonomous 
Commission has completely failed. He suggests that it 
is neither free from the influence of the States nor free 
from the control of the Central Executive. It does not 
have an independent staff and therefore it borrows perso­
nnel from the State Governmebt, which can exert its 
influence upon it. In matters of appointment, removal
and emoluments, the permanent staff of the Commission is
4-2under the control of the Central Executive.
40 Article 324(1).
4^ Dr. Ambedkar, O.A.D.. Vol. VIII, p. 905.
K. V. Rao, Parliamentary Democracy of India. (2nd ed., 
1965), pp. 101-102.
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The second concerns powers of Parliament and 
of the legislatures of States under Articles 327 and 328 
respectively to legislate with regard to electoral matters. 
It is surprising that a matter of such grave importance 
as the delimitation of constituencies is a subject of ordi­
nary legislation, passed by an ordinary majority. Where 
there are divisions caused by such factors as race, reli­
gion, caste and language, delimitation is a most delicate 
task with almost infinite possibilities for abuse.^ In 
the hands of a unscrupulous majority this would indeed be 
dangerous. In this, and in other election matters, such 
as the holding of bye-elections, and the checking of the " 
electoral rolls, the Constitution makers have reposed 
too much confidence in the fidelity of the majority and 
have created more possibilities of abuse than in any other
A A
part of the Constitution. ^ There is a strong case for 
reconstituting the Election Commission on a more autono­
mous basis and entrusting it with the task of delimiting 
constituencies.
There can be no doubt that adult suffrage has 
had a far-reaching effect on Indian political life. The 
wisdom of enfranchising the nilliterate masses was at
^  Sir W. I. Jennings, Indian Constitution, (1953), p. 28. 
^  K. 7. Rao, op. cit., p. 103.
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first in doubt. But successive elections have vindicated 
its wisdom. Prom the point of view of minorities of all 
kinds the vote is bound to be a very significant thing 
in the future, when a sort of parity develops between the 
political parties. The minority vote may then tilt the 
scales, as happens in the United States where Jewish votes 
exert considerable influence. It has already made a tre­
mendous impact on the backward classes of India. Many 
social groups, previously unaware of their strength and
barely touched by political changes, have suddenly reali-
4.5sed that they are in a position to wield power. It is 
now a common practice among political parties in India to 
set up candidates from different groups in the population 
to attract votes. It is to be hoped that a party system 
along western lines, where ideology of the party and not 
communal considerations count, will gradually develop, 
for minority groups are beginning to realise that their 
votes have value.
B. Representation in government
The only government which can fully satisfy the 
exigencies of the state is, according to J. S. Mill, that 
in which the whole people participate. Participation
^  K. M. Panikkar, Hindu Society at Cross Roads.-pp. 96-97.
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should be as great as the circumstances permit, and nothing 
less can be ultimately desirable than the admission of all 
to a share in the sovereign power of the state. But since 
this cannot be, on practical grounds, "the ideal type of 
a perfect government must be representative."^ The idea 
of a representative government has found full expression 
in the Indian Constitution, whereby the business of the 
government is carried on by representatives elected by the 
people on the basis of the adult suffrage. The representa­
tive thus elected represents the entire constituency and 
not merely the people who voted for him. For the voter 
acts as a citizen, and not as a member of a sect, profession, 
or class; by defining constituencies on the territorial
principle, it is seen that no sectional interest predomi-
47nates the polls.
Membership of the Legislatures is open to all 
citizens. No one is subject to disqualification on grounds 
of his community, nor is any special representation pro­
vided for any section of the population, apart from cer­
tain temporary measures for the *backward classes1. Under 
Article 84, membership ;of Parliament is open to any
46T J. S. Mill, On Liberty and Considerations on Represen­
tative Government. R . B . McCalum (ed..}. (1948 h  p . 1^1.
47 Karl Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, 
(1951), p. 151.
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citizen who is of the prescribed age, and who possesses 
such other qualifications as may be prescribed by Parlia­
ment. The conditions of membership of State Legislatures 
are contained in Article 173, and are similar.
Thus, no provision has been made for any special 
representation of minority groups under the Constitution, 
apart from the representation they are able to secure 
through;the normal political process. Quite understanda­
bly, quite a few voices have been raised calling in question 
the wisdom of such an arrangement. In view of the recog­
nition of communal representation during the British period, 
the present arrangement seems to some as a bold venture 
into the unknown. Jennings is surprised that the reality 
of the communal problem in India should have been treated 
as unimportant, and not provided for in the Constitution.^"8 
K. 7. Rao feels that the Constitution has solved the prob­
lem of minorities by ignoring it. According to him the 
existence of minorities in India is a political fact 
requiring the provision of positive safeguards, and the
Aq
Constitution has failed in this respect.  ^ B. R. Ambedkar, 
as we have seen earlier, was convinced th&t voting in
^8 Sir W. I. Jennings, Indian Constitution, pp. 27-29. 
^  Op . cit., p. 231.
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India would always be on a communal basis, and therefore,
the communal minorities are destined to remain as perma-
50nent political minorities.
The full implications of the Constitutional 
scheme of representation are yet to be manifest. For an 
appreciation of the ideal sought, it is necessary to con­
sider the developments that led to the adoption of the 
scheme and the alternative methods of minority representa­
tion which were available. The latter may be taken up 
first.
The system of proportional representation
A system of proportional representation has 
the greatest attraction in this context. It is said to 
reflect better the diversity of views of the electorate 
and to be more sensivive to public opinion than the system 
of majority voting. Kelsen views this system as the grea­
test possible approximation to the ideal of self-determi­
nation within a representative democracy and hence ®the
51most democratic electoral s y s t e m . I n  a system of majo­
rity voting with single member constituencies the effect
B. R. Ambedkar, Thoughts on Linguistic States, (1955), 
p. 34.
H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State. (3rd Printing, 
1949), p. 2 ^
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is “invariably to give a preference to the prevailing 
52majority.Proportional representation, on the other 
hand, is based on multi-member constituencies and ensures 
that each minority community receives representation in 
proportion to its population.^ Because of its tendency 
to multiply political parties it has an edge over the 
majority systems when the party structure is communal,not 
only from the minorities1 point of view but also in the 
interest of the state. There are two main advantages of 
this system: first, by breaking the dominant groups into 
different political parties, it increases the bargaining 
position of the minorities and the chances of their colla­
boration with the dominant groups; secondly, by giving 
the minority political representation proportional to its 
numerical size, it avoids the ill-effects of majority 
systems which, by over-representing the largest groups,
increase the feeling of oppression among minorities, par-
54.ticularly when they are small and diffused. ^
It is therefore not surprising that the Nehru 
Committee recommended its adoption in the circumstances
52 ^ Sir ¥. I. Jennings, Indian Constitution, p. 28.
^  J. A. laponce, The Protection of Minorities, (I960), 
see pp. 118-127*
54 Ibid. pp. 117-118.
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then prevailing in India. It said that this was —
the only rational and just way of meeting the fears 
and claims of various communities. There is a place 
in it for every minority and an automatic adjust­
ment takes place of rival interests. We have no 
douht that proportional representation will in future 
be the solution to our problem.^
However, this recommendation was not accepted.
In the Constituent Assembly the representatives 
of the minorities tried to secure its adoption, but without 
success. The reasons for the rejection of this apparently 
attractive system were stated by B. R. Ambedkar. Accor­
ding to him this system was unacceptable for a number of 
reasons. In a country with a low percentage of literacy, 
he said, people would have difficulty in using a compli­
cated ballot paper. Moreover, as India had adopted a 
system of parliamentary government, there should be a 
majority party to support the Ministry. Proportional
representation would lead to fragmentation of the legis-
56lature and would make stable government impossible.
Sardar Patel opposed the introduction of any such system
on the ground that it amounted to introducing communal
57electorates through the back door. 1
55 Nehru Report, p. 36.
^  0«A.D.. Vol. VII, p. 1262; C. H. Alexandrowicz,
Constitutional Developments in India. (1957)» p. 205.
57 C.A.D.. Vol. VIII, p. 352.
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It should he pointed out, however, that not 
all systems of proportional representation necessarily 
ensure proper minority representation. IT. A. laponce 
has illustrated how, under the method of the single trans­
ferable vote, a member of a minority community may in fact
lose the seat to a member of the majority community in
58certain circumstances. C. H. Alexandrowicz opines that
the system of -majority voting may in fact have an edge
over the former. Whereas the system of majority voting
acts as a mechanism of integration, the former helps to
intensify diversity and contributes to political frag- 
59mentation. ^
The system of proportional representation did 
not find a place in the Constitution except in its appli­
cation to a limited extent to the Upper Houses.
Separate communal electorates
Communal electorates were first introduced in 
India in 1909 on the insistence of the Muslim minority, 
which maintained that its interests could be adequately 
safeguarded only by this constitutional device. The
^  Op . cit., p. 119.
^  Constitutional Developments in India, (1957),p. 208.
117
principle was later extended to other communities and 
formed a predominant feature of the 1935 Act. Under 
"kkis system a provision is made that a particular commu­
nity shall be represented in a popular legislature solely 
by the members of its own body, with a guarantee as to 
how many communal seats there shall be. Thus Muslim candi­
dates could only be elected by sepatate Muslim electorates 
to seats rserved for Muslims.
The important thing to note with regard to this 
system is /that it was not favoured even by the British, 
who conceded the demand. This is evident from the Reports. 
The Montagu-Chelmsford Report emphasised the dangers inhe­
rent in the communal electorates:
Division by creeds and classes means the creation 
of political camps organised against each other, 
and teaches men to think as partisans and not as 
citizens. ... We regard any system of communal 
electorates, therefore, as a very serious hinde- 
rance to the development of the self-governing 
principle. 6o
The Indian Statutory Commission concurred with all the 
objections raised in the above report and felt that commu­
nal electorates would be an "undoubted obstacle in the 
way of the growth of a sense of common citizenship."^
60 Quoted in D. E. Smith, Rehru and Democracy. (1958),p. 161.
6l Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. II,
(Iy30j, Omcl. 5 5 p. 56.---------------
118
It is needless to say that the general opinion 
in the country was against communal electorates. The 
Nehru Committee considered separate electorates had for 
the growth of a national spirit and still worse for a 
minority community. For, under such a system the chances 
were that a minority would always have to face a hostile 
majority, which could always by the sheer force of its 
numbers override the wishes of the minority. The Commi­
ttee opined that separate electorates must be completely 
discarded as a condition precedent to any rational system 
of representation. According to K. B. Krishna, the 1930 
proposals provided an artificial protection to communities, 
whereas the real problem was that of a class struggle
between the professional classes of different faiths and 
63communities. ' Most people would agree with him as to the 
effect of the separate electorates, though not with his 
view of the problem.
The case against communal electorates has been 
stated by the former Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.^
He has based it on four grounds: first, they tend to iso­
late the minority communities from the rest of the country
^  Nehru Report, (1928), p. 30.
63
The Problem of Minorities. (1939), p. 296.
64 D. E. Smith, Nehru and Democracy, pp. 160-161.
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and thus impede the development of national unity; the 
system gives ’protection1 at the cost of fellow-feeling 
with the majority; second, they tend to weaken the mino­
rities hy enabling them to lean on artificial props 
instead of developing self-reliance; third, they tend to 
divert attention from the real economic problems of the 
country; and finally, they are opposed to the basic prin­
ciples of democracy. This analysis has led Hehru to con­
clude that communal electorates have caused prodigious
65harm to every department of Indian life.  ^ According to
Jennings, the difficulty with communal representation
is that it encourages the very defect that it seeks to
remedy. There is little doubt that communal representa-
66tion in India before 1947 encouraged communalism.
Kot surprisingly, the idea of communal electo­
rates did not find any favour with the Constitution
makers. The Advisory Committee rejected this proposal
67with an overwhelming majority. '
Reservation of seats
The issue of reservation of seats for minorities 
in the legislatures and on the Executive reveals a conflict
65 Ibid. p. 161.
66 Sir ¥. I. Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government, 
(1956), p. 87.
 ^G. Austin, Indian Constitution. (1966), pp. 149-150.
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faced by the Constitution-makers• It shows an anxiety 
that the minorities should be adequately represented, 
and a fear of the dangers such a policy of reservation 
might bring in.
While the Minorities Sub-Committee recommended 
against separate electorates, it wanted reservation of 
seats for the minorities. This idea found support with 
the Advisory Committee and the Constituent Assembly. 
Accordingly, in the First Report, dated 8th August, 1947, 
it was proposed to provide for reservation on the basis 
of the total population of each community in the country. 
Muslims, the Scheduled Castes and Indian Christians got 
representation on the basis of their population. Anglo- 
Indians were to be nominated for some seats if their
representation was inadequate. Parsis and Sikhs got no
representation.68
/
In the Second Report, however, reservation for 
all minorities was dropped, except the reservations for 
the Scheduled Castres and Tribes, and nomination of Anglo- 
Indians. This was achieved by a compromise and with the
concurrence of the minorities, who realised that it would
68 Report of the Advisory Committee on the subject of 
certain political safeguards for minorities, dated 
8th August, 1947.
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69be in the national interest*
The question of minority representation on the 
Executive deserves some consideration. It may be recalled 
that the Sapru Committee had recommended statutory repre­
sentation for minorities on the Executive, as it was not
easy to suggest an alternative method to achieve the same 
70end* Under the British parliamentary system, the majo­
rity is under no obligation to bring the representatives 
of minority communities into the Cabinet. It was thought 
that in the Indian conditions this would be "full of 
menace to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness of mino­
rities in general and Untouchables in particular. ... It
would malce the majority community a governing class and
71the minority community a subject race."
This issue was raised by the minority represen­
tatives before the Minorities Sub-Committee. It rejected 
the idea of reservation of seats and thought Athat their 
interests would be better served by including an Instru­
ment of Instructions in the Schedules of the Constitution, 
enjoining the President and the Governors, as far as
^  Report of the Advisory Committee, dated 11th May, 1949> 
in Reports of Committees, (3rd Series» 1950), pp. 240- 
242.
Sapru Report, pp. 178-179. 
n t* R. Ambedkar, States and Minorities,pp.56-37♦
' Quoted in (?.* Austin, The Indian Constitution. (1966), 
p. 131.
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possible, to appoint members of the important minority
72communities to the ministries. The Advisory Committee 
concurred with this. But later this Instrument was remo­
ved from the Constitution and minority representation 
was left to convention. In the Assembly it was suggested 
that the posts of Governors and Chief Ministers should
go by rotation to all communities, but this was not consi-
73dered seriously.
The most heartening thing in this context was 
the spirit of compromise and understanding that prevailed 
in the deliberations. The Report of the Advisory Commi­
ttee (dated 11th May, 1949)> indicates that leaders of 
the minority communities gave notices of resolutions see­
king to recommend to the Constituent Assembly that there 
should be no reservation of seats in the Legislatures for 
any community.7^ Sardar Patel, Chairman of the Committee, 
felt that "if the members of a particular community genui­
nely felt that their interests were better served by the 
abolition of reserved seats, their views must naturally 
be given due weight." But this should be done after gau­
ging public opinion among the minorities and full refle-
72 Report of the Minorities Sub-Committee to the Advisory 
Committee,' dated 28th July, 1947*
73 C.A.D., Vol.V, p. 222.
7^ Report of the Advisory Committee, dated 11th May, 1949> 
in Reports of Committees, (3rd. Series, 1950), p. 241.
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ction, "so that the change would be one voluntarily sought
by minorities themselves and not imposed on them by the 
75majority."'^ At the meeting of the Committee on 11th May,
1949, Dr. H. C. Mookerjee, a minority leader moved the
resolution "that the system of reservation for minorities
other than Scheduled Castes in Legislatures be abolished",
76which found the overwhelming support.' When later the 
Assembly took up the Committeefs Report, there was almost 
complete support for the Committe’s decision. Some:; diffe­
rence of opinion expressed by some Muslim members on this
77issue should not, however, go unnoticed.'
This arrangement was seen as a matter of trust
between the majority and the minorities and amicable
78sentiments found expression on both sides. Dr. H. C. 
Mookerjee noted that the Report was "very generous to 
every one of the minorities."7^ Prime Minister Rehru 
thought of it "as an act of faith" for all, above all for 
the majority community, "because they will have to show
after this that they can behave to others in a generous,
80fair and just way." The Constitution as it finally
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 K. V. Rao, op. cit.. pp. 216-218.
78 Sardar Patel, C.A.D., Vol. VIII, p. 353.
79 Ibid. p. 289.
80 Ibid. p. 332.
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emerged from the Constituent Assembly thus contained no 
special scheme for the protection of the political inte­
rests of the minorities, with the exception of certain
provisions in respect of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes,
81and Anglo-Indians.
The working of the compromise
One view of the performance of this scheme is
that it has worked “reasonably well1*. Complaints by
minority groups have not been, generally speaking, because
they were under-represented, but because their represen-
82tatives were creatures of the party in power. This is 
a matter of political expediency against which there can 
be no Constitutional remedy. One point should, however, 
be made as regards judging the success or failure of the 
scheme by reference to the complaints made by minority 
groups. While the complaints may provide an index to 
the grievances, they do not necessarily reflect the whole 
situation, as there exists no machinary for ventilation 
of grievances, to which all groups can resort and because 
all minorities are not equally prompt in vocalising their 
grievances.
81 Considered below, see p. 128 et seq.
G-. Austin, The Indian Constitution, p. 126.
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The weight of opinion, on the other hand, is 
towards regarding the minorities as being not adequately 
represented. Factual studies are based, not unnaturally, 
on the Muslim community. Several writers have pointed 
out the fact that Muslims are not to be found in the 
Parliament and in State Legislatures in proportion to the 
percentage of their population.8*^ This is generally true 
also of other minorities.8^ The position, however, is 
better in the indirectly elected Upper Houses.
One important feature of the Indian political
scene hitherto has been the predominance of one political
party, Congress. It has sought to serve as a common
platform for all groups by its policy of trying to secure
the representation of diverse interests. It has tries to
"reconcile and aggregate" different interests by "balancing"
the party ticket with sufficient mumbers of Muslims, other
85minorities, women, and Untouchables. v It has provided
See for instance, T. P. Wright, Jr., "Muslim Legisla­
tors in India", XXIII, Journal of Asian Studies, (1964), 
pp. 256-257; D. E. Smith, and S. K. Gu^ j$a, cited in 
T. P. Wright Jr., "The effectiveness of Muslim repre­
sentation in India", in D. E. Smith (ed.), South Asian 
Politics and Religion, (1966), pp. 102-103? C. Sarkar, 
^'Growth Towards Secularism", in G. S. Sharma (ed.), 
Secularism: its implications for Law and Life in India.
I1966), pp. 215-217; Humayun Kabir, Minorities ina 
Democracy. (1968), p. 40ff.
84^ Humayun Kabir, Ibid. p. 40.
85 Myron Weiner, "The Politics of South Asia", in G. A. 
Almond and J. S. Coleman (ed.), The Politics of the 
Developing Areas. (I960), p. 153, at p. 2l9.
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for the sharing of important political positions, such 
as Governorships, membership of the Central and the 
State Cabinets and the Office of the President of India, 
with the representatives of minority groups. Even so, as 
Humayun Kabir, a long standing Muslim member of the Central 
Cabinet, has pointed out, even within Congress itself the 
minorities were not always fully or effectively represen­
ted. A Minorities Sub-Committee set up by the Congress 
indicated that, in spite of a general directive by the 
Congress Working Committee that minorities should get 
proportionate, and in any case at least 15 per cent of 
nominations for Parliament and State Assemblies, many 
States did not carry out this directive. The same was
the position with respect of District Boards, Municipali­
seties, Corporations and other local bodies. These findings 
are still largely valid.
The effectiveness of minority representation 
has to be judged not only by a quantitative test, but 
also by a qualitative one. This depends on the quality 
of leadership that different communities are able to 
produce, which in turn depends on their relative stage of 
advancement. Further, as T. P. Wright has pointed out,
86 Humayun Kabir, op. cit., p. 42. 
87 Ibid, p. 43.
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a group1s wishes may he as well or .better fulfilled by 
politicians of the majority community, if the outcome of 
closely contested elections is heavily dependent upon 
the marginal effect of the minority1s votes. Representa­
tives of the minority1s own community, on the other hand, 
may be discounted on the grounds of obvious partiality.88
The political scene in India has, of late, been 
changing rapidly through the loss of hegemony of Congress 
and the growth of other parties. The position at the 1952 
General Elections, when all the minorities implicitly 
supported the Congress, has changed in the 1957 and 1962 
General Elections. In the 1967 General Elections, the 
Congress was defeated in a majority of the States through 
a shift in the overall minority vote.8  ^ The causes of 
this shift apart, this is a development in the right dire­
ction. There is no reason why all the members of a commu­
nity should hold the same political opinion or support 
one particular political party. The distribution of the 
vote according to the political platform, and not accor­
ding to communal allegiance, is the development envisaged 
in the Constitution. However, at the same time, the
OQ
T. P. Wright Jr., "The effectiveness of Muslim repre­
sentation in India", in D. E. Smith (ed.), South Asian 
Politics and Religion. (1966), p. 103.
89 Humayun Kabir, op. cit.. p. 39.
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growth of communal parties in several States is bound to 
cause concern among the minorities. For, if communalism 
grows, it is they who are bound to suffer. This fear is 
particularly strong among the religious minorities, who 
are apprehensive of the militantly religious attitudes 
expressed in some quarters.
To sum up, in the present scheme of represen­
tation there is no Constitutional guarantee for securing 
adequate representation of minorities. It is a matter 
of trust between the communities and rests on the hope 
that true democratic precess will eventually be esta­
blished. Whether, and when this will be fully achieved, 
only time can tell.
C. Special arrangements
The picture of political representation in 
India would not be complete without the mention of certain 
special arrangements which have been made in respect of 
certain backward classes of people. Though the Consti­
tution, in general, does not distinguish between majori­
ties and minorities, in this regard an exception has 
been made in respect of the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled 
Tribed, and Anglo-Indians. This proceeds on the basis 
that 'special disabilities deserve special consideration', 
especially when such disabilities are the result, not of
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any innate or intrinsic defect but of social conditions
beyond the control of the individuals nnd groups con- 
90cerned. It was obvious that, without some special 
franchise concession, they would not be able to secure 
adequate representation of their political views. These 
measures are in no way a privilege created in their favour 
but are the means to secure for them the very equality 
which the Constitution seeks to achieve for all the 
citizens.
Three methods have been employed for this 
purpose: first, the provision for the reservation of seats 
for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes; second, 
special administration of tribal areas; and third, nomi­
nation of Anglo-Indians. The Constitutional provisions in 
this respect are contained in Part XTI, and in Schedules 
T and YI thereof. These may briefly be considered.
i. Reservation of seats
Article 330 provides for the reservation of 
seats in the House of People, and Article 332 in the 
Legislative Assembly of every State, for the Scheduled 
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. The seats so reserved
90 ^ Humayun Kabir, op. cit., p. 47.
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are to be, as nearly as may be, in proportion to their 
population in relation to the total population* Reser­
vation is intended to guarantee a minimum number of seats
to these Castes and Tribes, and it does not preclude their
91members from contesting elections from general seats.
The above provision for reservation is subject 
to Article 334, which puts a time limit on it. The initial 
provision was made for ten years, with double member con­
stituencies. In I960 this was extended by another ten 
92years, and in the following year the double member con­
stituencies were abolished. The present provision for 
reservation will lapse in 1970, unless further extended by 
Constitutional Amendment.
Scheduled Castes account for roughly one seventh
of the electorate. But their geographical distribution
is such that in so Lok Sabha constituency do they form
more than a fourth of the voters, and at the legislative
Assembly level it is only in a few urban constituencies
93that their percentage goes much higher than this. Row 
that all the reserved constituencies have single members, 
it is yet to be seen whether they can build up a strong
^  Y. V. G-iri v. D. S. Bora, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1318 (1323- 
1327).
^  Constitution Eighth Amendment.
93 lelah Bushkin, "Scheduled Caste Policy in India", Mimeo­
graphed typescript (1966).
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enough base among general voters and are able to stand 
on their own in a contest with other candidates, when 
reservations have ceased.
Although the Constitutional provisions regarding 
reservations touch only the Parliament and the State legis­
latures, in actual practice the reservations for them are 
made down to the lowest level of political organisation.
In most of the States, where Tillage Panchayats are orga­
nised, provision is made by legislation for the reserva-
94tion of seats. Arrangements are made for reservations 
in Panchayat Samitis, Zila Parishads and other bodies.
According to the 14th Report of the Commissioner 
for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the number of 
Scheduled Caste and the Scheduled Tribe Ministers, Deputy 
Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries in the Union Cabi­
net was 7 and 2 respectively. Among the State Cabinets, 
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Mysore and Uttar Pradesh had 3 Sche­
duled Caste members each, Madras and Punjab had two each, 
and most of the other States had one each. J
In the last general Election out of a total of 
521 seats in Lok Sabha, 77 and 37 seats were reserved for
^  Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and 
ana Scheduled Tribes, l4th Report, (Published 1967): 
see Chapter 2, p. 7 et seq.
95 Ibid. p. 144.
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the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes respecti­
vely. In Rajya Sabha there is no provision for reserva­
tion. But there were 10 Scheduled Castes members and 
2 Scheduled Tribes members out of a total of 240. In 
the States out of a total of 3,563 seats in State legis­
latures and legislatures of Union Territories, 503 and
262 seats were reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
96Tribes respectively under Article 332.
ii. Special administration
The case of the Scheduled Tribes called for, a 
different approach. Unlike the Scheduled Castes, who 
are spread throughout the country, the Scheduled Tribes 
are compact social units who inhabit in contiguous regions, 
forming compact pockets in different States, often in hill 
regions. They have a social organisation and culture 
of their own, differing among different Tribes and from 
that of the rest of the country. They are in varying 
stages of development.
The Constitution has put the administration of 
all such tribal areas on a different footing. Under 
Article 342, the President in enpowered to specify the 
tribes or tribal groups, which, for the purpose of the
Ibid. 16th Report, (Published 1968), p. 26
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Constitution, are deemed to be Scheduled Tribes. Article 
244 provides a scheme of administration. A distinction 
is made for this purpose between various tribes. The pro­
visions of the Fifth Schedule apply to the administration 
and control of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes in 
all States other than the State of Assam. In exercise of 
the powers conferred by this Schedule the President has 
declared Scheduled Areas in the States of Andhra Pradesh,
Bihar, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab
97and Rajastan. Provisions of the Sixth Schedule apply 
to the State of Assam.
The Fifth Schedule provides for the administra­
tion on the lines of Sections 91 and 92 of the Government 
of India Act, 1935, relating to "Excluded Areas" and 
"Partially Excluded Areas". Section 5 of the Schedule 
enpowers the Governor to exclude the application of laws 
made by Paliament and the State Legislature to the whole 
or a part of such Area, or permit its application subject 
to any exceptions or modifications that he may specify. 
Also, in consultation with the Tribes Advisory Council 
and subject to the President’s assent, the Governor may 
make regulations for the peace and good government of 
such an Area.
97 Ibid. p. 28
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A Tribes Advisory Council is provided for in 
ejch State having a Scheduled Area therein and, if so 
directed by the President, in any State having Scheduled 
Tribes (but not Scheduled Areas) therein. This is to 
consist of not more than twenty members of whom, nearly 
as may be, three fourths shall be the representatives of 
Scheduled Tribes in the Legislative Assembly of the State. 
Their duty is to advise the Governor on such matters of 
Tribal welfare and advancement as are referred to them 
by the Governor.
The Sixth Schedule deals exclusively with the 
Tribal Areas of Assam. It gives them the greatest possible 
autonomy. The Tribal Areas are divided into autonomous 
districts, and where there are different Tribes in such
Q Q
districts, they are divided into autonomous regions. ^
The administration is carried on through the District, 
and the Regional Councils, who have powers to make laws 
with respect to wide-ranging subjects (Section 3). The 
laws of the Legislature of the State on matters on which 
District and Regional Councils have power to make laws 
do not apply to such .Areas, or apply subject to such exce­
ptions or modifications as are thought fit by the Councils.
^  Section 4, Fifth Schedule. 
^  Section 1, Sixth Schedule.
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The Governor is enpowered, with regard to Acts of Parlia­
ment and State laws not coming in the above category, to 
direct that they shall not apply or apply with such excep­
tions or modifications as he may specify (Section 12).
There are other Articles in the Constitution 
which generally form part of the provisions for special 
administration. Thus under clause (2) of Article 339, 
executive power is reserved to the Union to give dire­
ctions to a State as to the drawing up and the execution 
of schemes declared in the direction to be essential for 
the welfare of the Scheduled Tribes in the State. The 
Commission appointed under this Article to report on the 
administration of the Scheduled Areas and the welfare of 
the Scheduled Tribes in the States submitted its report 
in 1961.1 Under Section 3 of the 5th Schedule, Governors 
of States having Scheduled Areas are required to report 
to the President annually, or whenever required to do so, 
and the executive power of the Union extends to the giving 
of directions to the State as to the administration of 
such areas. Under Article 338, a special officer is put 
in charge of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. 
It is his duty to investigate all matters relating to the
X
Report of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes 
Commission, (196l).
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safeguards provided for them and report to the President 
at intervals; such reports are to be laid before the 
Houses of Parliament. Article 164(1) provides that in 
certain States there shall be a Minister in charge of 
tribal welfare.
ili. domination
Under the Constitution, nomination is limited 
to the Anglo-Indian community. Article 331 provides that 
the President may, if he is of the opinion that the Anglo- 
Indian community is not adequately represented in the 
House of People, nominate not more than two members of 
that community. Article 333 makes similar provision with 
regard to the Legislative Assemblies of States, with the 
difference that no number is prescribed in this case and 
it is left to the discretion of the Governor to nominate 
such number of members as he considers appropriate.
Accordingly, during the year 1966-67 there were
two Anglo-Indian members in the Lok Sabha and one each
in the Vidhan Sabhas of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Kerala,
Madras, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Mysore, Uttar Pradesh
2
and four in West Bengal.
p
Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes, 16th Report (1968), p. 29*
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As in the case of reservation of seats, this 
measure is also intended to be of a temporary nature* 
Though initially it was meant for ten years, it has been 
extended for another ten by Constitutional Amendment, and 
will lapse in 1970 unless further renewed.
III. Public Services
This last area of our investigation is of the
greatest importance, both with regard to participation in
administration and from the practical viewpoint of the
ordinary citizen. We have already referred to the former
aspect earlier in the Chapter. In a British type of
democracy the scheme of government requires an established
Civil Service, for it is not only an indispensable part
of government, but "indeed, it is the really operative
part of it."^ It enables the participation of a far
larger number of people compared with the limited number
«
of elected representatives and in a sense affords greater 
leverage of power at all levels in the day to day admini­
stration. To the practical citizen a post in the Civil 
Service means power, prestige and economic gain.
 ^See p. 89ff, supra.
^ Ramsay Muir, quoted in P. A. Bland, Planning the Modern 
State. (2nd ed., 1945), p. 152.
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In the Indian context, the great attraction
of the Public Services to all sections of the population
is well known. They exert a disproportionate pull on the
youth of the country. It is noted that whatever may be
said about the pursuit of higher education or its own
sake, most students do so in the hope of securing govern-
ment appointments. The scale of pay in government service,
security of employment, power and prestige, and patronage,
have all combined to make government services attractive
7
and consequently desired.
The provisions of Part XIV of the Constitution, 
together with certain fundamental rights, govern the 
recruitment and the conditions of service of the Services 
under the state. Some of these may briefly be looked into.
To remove the suspicion of any bias among 
different sections of the people, it was essential to 
provide for an autonomous and impartial agency to recruit 
the personnel for the Public Services. This has been 
done by the creation of a Public Service Commission for 
the Union, and a Public Service Commission for each of
 ^Report of the Official Language Commission, (1956), p.186.
S. Harrison, India: the most dangerous decades, (i960),
p. 72.
 ^Report of the Backward Classes Commission, (1956), p. 139.
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O
the States. It is possible for two or more States to 
have a Joint Public Service Commission, if they so desire; 
the Union Public Service Commission may also agree to
Q
serve the needs of a State, if requested to do so. The
10Commissions, for the most part are autonomous bodies.
The Union, and the State Public Service Commissions conduct 
examinations for appointments to their respective services 
and they are to be consulted on a number of issues concer- 
ningjthe Civil Services, including all matters relating to 
methods of recruitment, principles relating to appoint­
ments, promotions and transfers, disciplinary matters, 
legal costs incurred by civil servants and claims relating 
to p e n s i o n s T h e  President and the Governors in certain
circumstances may waive such consultation, but such dire-
12ctives are subject to legislaive approval and amendment.
The President and the Governors are also required to sub­
mit memoranda giving instances, if any, where the advice 
of the Commission was not accepted and the reasons for 
such non-acceptance, when the annual reports of the
8 Article 315 (1).
 ^Clauses (2) and (3) of Article 315.
■^8Por a discussion on the extent of their autonomy and 
and the efficacy of their recruitment, see K. Y. Rao, 
op. cit., p. 334ff.
^Article 320.
12Article 320, proviso to Clause (3), and Clause (4).
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Commissions are placed before the appropriate legislature.^
The power to regulate recruitment and tbe condi­
tions of service of persons appointed to public services 
of the Union or of any State is vested in the appropriate 
legislature, but its exercise is subject to the provisions 
of the Constitution,^ which lays down the principle of 
equality. All service posts are held subject to the doct­
rine of pleasure (Article 310) but certain procedural safe­
guards have been provided. Thus, under Article 311> a 
person cannot be dismissed or removed from service by an 
authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed, 
nor can he be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank, except 
after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the 
charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of 
being heard.
The provisions referred to above provide a 
framework for disciplinary rules of the Services under the 
State. But the most important provision in this respect, 
and particularly in the context of thejpresent chapter, is 
the fundamental right to equality contained in Article 16.
15 Article 323- 
Article 309-
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Clauses (1) and (2) thereof state —
There shall he equality of opportunity for all 
citizens in matters relating to employment or appoint 
ment to any office uri^ er the State.
No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, 
caste, sex, descent, place of hirth, residence or 
any of them, bh ineligible for, or discriminated 
against in respect of, any employment or office under 
the State.
The principle enunciated by this Article is 
very clear, and the technicalities of interpretation need 
not detain us here. Briefly, the above two clauses confer 
a right on each individual citizen.^ Article 16(1) does 
not confer a right to obtain public employment but confers 
a right to equality of opportunity of being considered 
for such employment. It covers not only the initial appoi­
ntment but also its duration and includes all matters of
16employment such as the conditions of service and promotion.
Article 16 does not exclude selective tests or the laying
17down of qualifications of office. ' Further, in matters
of employment, as in other respects, the principle of equa­
lslity is subject to the rule of reasonable classification.
Devadasan v. Union of India. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 179(187).
"I c
Bri.jlal Croswami v. State of Punjab. A.I.R. 1965 Punj.
401 (404,405);Madhusudan Nair v . State of Kerala,
A.I.R.1961 Ker. 203 (205,206); Ram Rattan Bakshi v.
State of Punjab. A.I.R.1968 Punj.436; It also includes 
promotion to selection posts: General Manager.S.Rly. v. 
Rangachari, A.I.R.1962 S.C. 36.
^  H. M. Seervai, op. cit., p. 268ff.
18 All India Station Masters and Asst. Station Masters1 Assn. 
V. General Manager, 0. Riy., a.i.R.I960 S.U. 384.
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The principle in Article 16 is subject to three 
exceptions. By Clause (3), power is reserved to Parlia­
ment to make laws regarding residence qualifications for 
appointment to a public Service in a State or Union Terri­
tory. It is designed to prevent parochialism in public 
employment by the Government of a State or by any local 
or other authority within a State or Union Territory. By 
virtue of this power the Parliament has enacted the Public 
Employment (Requirement as to Residence) Act, 1957.^  Arti­
cle 16(5) is an exception to the rule of equality in the 
religious sphere; though discrimination on religious grounds 
is generally forbidden, this Clause enables the appoint­
ment to an office in connection with the affairs of any 
religious or denominational institution or any membership 
of the governing body thereof, of a person professing a 
particular religion or belonging to a particular denomi­
nation. This is a logical consequence of the communal
20autonomy granted to religious denominations in Article 26. 
But there is a more important exception in Clause (4) of 
Article 16^ which provides for the reservation of seats 
in favour of the backward classes in the Public Services.
^  See Chapter IV, p.29& ff, infra.
20 See Chapter III, p.166 ff, infra.
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The scope of this Clause is very wide and it has been 
frequently challenged in courts. Protective discrimi­
nation vis a vis the right to equality of the individual 
citizen has given rise to difficulties in interpretation.
This issue has been discussed in greater length in a
21subsequent Chapter.
The Constitutional provisions with respect to 
public services provide a legal framework within which 
every citizen may claim his share in the power and the 
benefits of the state according to merit. But, though 
this is sound in principle, In India at present there is 
still a gap between the ideal and the reality. The fact 
is that all individuals are not so placed as to be able 
to take advantage of the equal opportunity in employment. 
There exists a gap between different communities, accor­
ding to the relative stages of their advancement. Though 
the scheme of appointments is not based on communities, 
where equality is assumed, the appointments from each 
community should ultimately reflect roughly the propor­
tion of its strength. The Constitution does not seek to 
prevent fair and adequate representation of all commu­
nities, but only the making of appointments on irrele­
vant communal grounds.
See Chapter V, p.350 ff, infra.
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The Sapru Committee saw the fair and adequate
representation of all communities in the Services of the
country as a necessity on economic, social and political 
22grounds. This is still valid today. But the feeling 
among minorities is that this has not yet happened. The 
same feeling of discrimination is expressed with regard 
to licences, permits, and other matters relating to trade, 
commerce and indutry. 23 The verification of this grie­
vance is not an easy task, as the relevant figures are 
hard to come by. Humayun Kabir has suggested that the 
Central Government should institute a scheme of annual 
returns to clear the picture, and if need be, provide for 
reservation, pending improvement in the situation.2 "^
The long term solution of course lies in the 
educational and social advancement of the communities, 
and in the general increase of economic opportunities 
in the country. But, for the present, though actual 
appointments directly touch only a small proportion of 
each community, they nevertheless still remain a matter 
of great communal interest and prestige.2^
22 Sapru Report. (Reprint, 1946), p. 123.
23 Humayun Kabir, op. cit., pp. 42, 43.
24 Ibid. p. 4-Off.
D. E. Smith, "Patterns of Religion and Politics", in
D. E. Smith (ed.), South Asian Politics and Religion, 
(1966), p. 23.  *---
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To sum up, the Constitution has set up the 
political equality of all citizens as an ideal and has 
provided a framework for its achievement in all vital 
spheres of public life. The principle itself leaves little 
to be desire, but its full realisation in all aspects of 
the public life still remains a matter for expectation. 
Political equality can only be real if it exists hand in 
hand with equality in social, economic and other spheres. 
Por, political equality is not an end itself, but a means 
to achieve the equal advancement of all the people. These 
conditions do not as yet fully exist in India. The consi­
deration of whether, or what type of, democracy will best 
suit India is outside the scope of this work. The rele­
vant point here is that the Constitution has provided for 
ascheme which, if worked in its proper spirit, should 
achieve the equality of all citizens•
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Chapter III
RELIGIOUS INTERESTS
I. Equality through secularism
In the religious sphere the principle of 
equality operates through secularism. The term 'secula­
rism1 is used here in a broad sense and as a convenient 
expression for denoting the church-state relationship 
obtaining in India.
Before proceeding to consider the aspects of 
Indian secularism, it is essential to contrast it with 
its western counterpart. The idea of a secular state 
originated in Europe in the context of religious intole­
rance in the post-Reformation era. The rule then pre­
vailing was cu.ius regio, e.ius religio, with an establi­
shed church as the official religion of the state. The 
treatment of groups professing other faiths differed 
from country to country and ranged from mere toleration
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to active encouragement of emigration.^ In some cases 
certain powers obtained a measure of religious freedom 
for their co-religionists in countries where they were 
in a minority by means of treaties. 2 With the growth of 
social and political liberalism a gradual trajb format ion 
took place and a tendency towards separating the church 
from the state arose. This led to religious pluralism 
within a political community and the coexistence of groups 
with incompatible views. The civil and political rights 
were thus no longer subject to a religious test.
Secularism in its strict sense implies a rigid 
fwall of separation1 between the state and religion. Where 
this distinction is carried to the extreme, this gives rise 
to odd situations as the American experience shows. Under 
the Non-establishment Clause of the U. S. Constitution, 
the state is barred from aiding schools or providing trans­
port to school children, if the school happens to be run 
by a religious society. Secularism in a liberal sense 
means the neutrality and impartiality of the state towards 
religion. D. E. Smith’s definition indicates this type 
of secularism. According to him, a secular state is a
 ^D. E. Smith, India as a Secular State. (1963), pp. 20-21.
2
See p. 62ff, supra; As to different types of these 
treaties, see M. S. Bates, Religious Liberty : an Inquiru. 
(1945), p. 485.
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state which guarantees individual and corporate freedom 
of religion, deals with the individual as a citizen 
irrespective of his religion, is not constitutionally 
connected to a particular religion and does not seek 
either to promote or interfere with religion. The princi­
ples underlying this idea have found acceptance in many 
nations around the world.
In seeking to apply the theory of the secular 
state to India great caution in necessary. Due to dissi­
milarities in background and prevailing conditions, compa­
risons are difficult, though attempts have been made.^
In trying to judge the nature of the Indian state in the 
light of his definition, Donald E. Smith has found discre­
pancies which he hopes will be resolved in future. Marc 
Galanter, in a review of D. E. Smith’s book, has pointed
out the inadequacies if the theory of the secular state
15
in its application to India, and Ved Prakash luthera 
has sought to disprove that India is a secular state.®
 ^D. E. Smith, India as a Secular State. (1963), p. 4.
^ e.g., 0. H. Alexandrowicz, "The Secular State in India 
and in the United States", 2, J.I.L.I., (I960), p. 273.
 ^"Secularism, East and West", VII, 2, Comparative Studies 
in Society and History, (1965), p. 13TI
£
The Concept of the Secular State and India. (1964).
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The debate as to whether India is a secular 
state is irrelevant to the interpretation of the Consti­
tution. The Constitution itself does not say anything 
on the issue; it would not make much difference if it did. 
It is to be interpreted by what its provision say, and
they are clear enough to be understood without reference
7to outside material or concepts, and without having to 
define the nature of the state.
Leaving aside the theory of the secular state, 
the term Secularism1 is generally used in India as des­
criptive of a tolerant and liberal attitude towards reli­
gion. In relation to the Constitution this attitude was 
clearly revealed in the Constituent Assembly during dis­
cussions on the provisions concerning religious freedom 
and by the amicable compromise arrived at between the
Q
communities. India was to be a secular state. The
working of Indian secularism in its comtemporary setting
has been discussed at length in a seminar held by the
q
Indian Law Institute some time ago. According to J. D. M. 
Lerrett, the important thing to be borne in mind in this 
regard is .that whatever Indians accept, or think they
 ^The Commissioner, H.R.E. v. Lakhsmindra, 1954 S.C.R.
r o c s  a ' l s r s . — --------  ---------------
o
e.g., see Pandit Lakshmi Kanta Maitra, VII, C.A.L. p.831.
Q
Secularisms its implications for Law and Life in India, 
ed. &. £T. Siiarma.
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accept, nothing will emerge which is inconsistent with 
India’s ancient and traditional values, and these are 
consistent with ’secularism’ in a unique, Indian sense.10
Two hroad aspects of this secularism may briefly 
be considered with reference to the Constitution.
Nature of the state in India
It is very significant that, although an over­
whelming percentage of the population belong to a single 
religion, India does not have a state religion or a state 
favoured religion. Profession of any particular religion 
does not give anyone an advantage as regards membership 
of the state or in the enjoyment of civil liberties. At 
the same time, while being religiously neutral, the state 
is not hostile to religion. Indian secularism recognises 
the fact that religion cannot always, and need not nece­
ssarily, be banished from public life. What is required 
of the state is to observe neutrality with regard to 
religion and to treat all religions of a basis of equality. 
V. P. Luthera calls this ’jurisdictionalism’, denoting 
a ’religiously impartial’ or ’non-communal’ (non-denomina- 
tional) state.11. Thus discrimination solely on religious
1(1 J. D. M. Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India, 
(1968), p.
H  On. cit.. p. 155
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12grounds is barred; the state is restrained from levying 
taxes with the specific purpose of promoting or maintaining 
any particular religion;^ and is prohibited from imparting 
religious instruction in educational institutions wholly 
maintained out of state funds, making it voluntary in 
others.^
The important features of Indian secularism have
been summarised by P. B. Gajendragadkar, the former Chief
Justice of India, thus:
•.. The essential basis of the Indian Constitution 
is that all citizens are equal, and this basic 
equality (guaranteed by Article 14) obviously pro­
claims that the religion of a citizen is entirely 
irrelevant in the matter of his fundamental rights.
The state does not owe loyalty to any particular 
religion as such; it is not irreligious or anti­
religion; it gives equal freedom for all citizens 
and holds that the religion of a citizen has nothing 
to do in the matter of socio-economic problems.
That is the essential characteristic of secularism 
which is writ large in all the provisions of the 
Indian Constitution*-^
Extent of religious freedom
The Constitution seeks to guarantee the greatest 
possible religious freedom to individuals and religious 
denominations. Tl^ is includes freedom of conscience and
^  see Articles 15, 16, and 29(2).
13 Article 27.
^  Article 28.
Inaugural address, in G. S. Sharma (ed.), Secularism, p.4-
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the right freely to profess, practise and propagate reli- 
-> £
gion. Article 26 secures to the religious denominations 
and sections thereof autonomy in religious affairs, the 
right to establish and maintain institutions for religious 
and charitable purposes, and acquire and hold property.
By Article 30(1) the religious minorities are given the 
right to establish and maintain educationaliinstitutions 
of their choice and the state must not discriminate in 
granting aid on religious grounds.
The significance of the words !,all persons are
equally entitled" in Article 25 should not be missed.
This, as P. K. Tripathi has pointed out, brings out the
attitude of state neutrality in matters of religion without
17importing the doctrine of the "wall of separation". It 
excludes the possibility of special status being given to 
any particular religion, or any community claiming one.
This is relevant in the historical context, as the obser­
vations of the Nehru Committee would show. The Committee 
was convinced of the need to exclude any possibility of 
one community domineering over another, and to prevent 
the harrassment and exploitation of any individual or 
group by another. The answer to the communal problem was
16 Article 25.
' "Secularisms Constitutional provision and Judicial 
Review", in G. S. Sharma (ed.), Secularism, p. 172.
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to grant the fullest religious freedom and provide for 
cultural autonomy.^*
The religious freedom guaranteed hy the Consti­
tution, is however subject to regulation and restriction 
by government on certain grounds. These powers fall into 
three categories. In the first category are those which
are sought to be exercised in the interests of public
19order, morality and health.  ^ These are generally known
as the ’police powers1 and may be said to be inherent in
the state. The powers in the second category seek to
regulate so-called ’secular activities’ associated with
religion, which include activities of an economic, finan-
20cial and political nature. Those of the third type
are unique. They enable the government to intervene in
religious affairs in the interest of social Welfare and 
21reforip.. The actual scope of religious freedom, therefore,
depends on the interpretation./ by the courts of the extent
of these powers and also the manner in which the authorities 
would exercise them. In this chapter an attempt is made 
to consider various aspects of the freedom of religion 
as it concerns different minority groups.
Fehru Report (1928), p. 29.
19 Article 25(1).
2® Article 25(2)(a).
21 Article 25(2)(b).
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The concentration of vast powers in the hands
of the government is, no doubt, disquieting, particularly
when one realises that it can reform any religion beyond
recognition without infringing the principle of equality.
But where the legalistic principle of equality is of
little avail, the minorities have reason to expect that
their interests will be protected in consonance with the
equality, which is inherent in the concept of justice
and tolerance. For, as Ernest Barker has observed, the
tradition even of a secularist nation can never entirely
lack the presence of religious ideas which have largely
shaped its character in the past and are not enitely gone
22from it in its present. In these circumstances all 
religious communities in India are free to go along their 
own path, unhindered so long as their actions do not affect 
others. Indian secularism assures this, for, as various 
contributors to the seminar on secularism have pointed 
out, Indian secularism has at its basis the philosophy 
of tolerance, equality and non-discrimination which are 
condusive to co-existence and a certain measure of spiri­
tualism;2  ^it adopts a pragmatic approach2 "^ and humane
22 Sir Ernest Barker, National Chracter and the Factors 
of its Formulation. (4th ed., 1948). p. i4
2  ^S. S. Nigam, ’Uniform Civil Code and Secularism11, in
G. S. Sharma (ed.), Secularism (1966), pp. 159-160.
2  ^P. B. Gajendragadkar, see n. 15 at p. 151, supra,at p. 6.
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26impartiality.  ^ Above all it can be used as an all-inclu­
sive ideological symbol to unite all sections for mutual
26progress in the larger community.
II. Definition of Religious Minorities
The need to differentiate among people might 
not be obvious to a casual observer on account of the 
general nature of the guarantee of religious freedom in 
the Indian Constitution. But it must be realised that 
though all persons and religious denominations are 'equally1 
entitled to the enjoyment of this freedom, its practical 
implications differ widely among them. The existence of 
a multiplicity of religious communities side by side, 
with differences of "background, size, stages of advancement 
and outlook, is a factor which must not escape notice.
The need of having to define a religious 
minority, however, has been eliminated, except for the 
purposes of Article 30(1), by the terminology of the 
Constitution. The words "every religious denomination 
or any section thereof" used in Article 26 have a wider
^  G. S. Sharma, "Rule of Law, Legal Theorv and Secularism", 
in G. S. Sharma (ed.), Secularism (1966), p. 195, at 
p. 197.
26 A. R. Blackshield, "Secularism and Social Control in tbe 
Wests The Material and the Ethereal", in G. S. Sharma 
(ed.), Ibid, p. 9, at p. 67.
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connotation than the term ’minority1 and as such include 
minorities. For the purpose of Article 30(1), which 
concerns the educational interests of religious and lingui­
stic minorities, in the absence of any definition supplied 
by the Constitution, the courts have held that any commu­
nity which is numerically less than fifty percent of the’; 
population of a State is a minority.2  ^ Thus Christians 
in Kerala, being less than 22 per cent of the population, 
are a minority and the Roman Catholic section of that
28community comes within the contemplation of Article 30(1).
It would seem that so long as denominational lines are
clearly recognisable, the courts would be inclined to
extend the benefit of this Article to any denomination
that claims it, notwitstanding the fact that it may be
a section of the majority community within the State.
It has been held that the Brahmo Samaj in Bihar is a mino-
29
rity based on religion for the purpose of Article 30.
It was probable that in the instance cited above, the 
Roman Catholics in Kerala would still have been regarded 
as a minority, even if the Christian community as a whole 
were to be in excess of fifty per cent of the population 
of that State.
2^ Re Kerala Education Bill, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 956, at p.976.
2^ Aldo Maria Patroni v. E. C. Kesavan, A.I.R. 1965 Ker.
75 at p. 76.
29 Dipendra Rath Sarkar v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1963 Pat. 
54, PP. SV-59.
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The population according; to the Census
According to the Census of India, 1961, five
numerically important religions other than Hinduism are,
Buddhism, Christianity, Jainism, Islam and Sikhism. The
adherents of the remaining faiths have been collectively
listed as ’’others". Hindus account for 83.5 percent of
the total population, being 367 millions out of a total of
30440 millions. The following survey lists individual 
religions in the order of their numerical importance.
Muslims, who number 47 millions, are the second
largest community in India and account for 10.69 per cent
of the population. They are to be found in strength in
all parts of India. Statewise figures of their population
in the order of numerical strength are: Uttar Pradesh 108 
31lakhs. West Bengal 70, Bihar 58, Maharashtra and Kerala
30 each, Assam 28, Andhra Pradesh 27, Jammu & Kashmir 24, 
Mysore 23, Madras 16, and Madhya Pradesh and Rajastan 13 
lakhs each. This community has to be considered in the 
historical perspective of Hindu-Muslim tension, the creation 
of Pakistan, the Islamic concept of the church-state rela­
tionship, and its attempts to adjust as a minority commu­
nity in the post-Indepencence era. According to A. Gledhill,
Census of India, 1961, Part I, Paper I - Religion (1963); 
The figures cited in this chapter have been rounded up 
and do not include those of the Union Territories.
31 The expression ’lakh1 signifies 1,00,000.
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this is the only minority community in India which is 
likely to raise significant minority issues, the others 
being satisfied with mere religious toleration.^2
Christians come next with a population of 
11 millions and a percentage of 2.44* Of this, roughly 
6 millions are Roman Catholics and the remainder is made 
up of various Protestant denominations. The largest 
concentration is in the south, with Kerala accounting for 
40 lakhs, Madras 18 and Andhra Pradesh 14. Of other States, 
Assam has 8 lakhs, Maharashtra 6, Bihar and Mysore 5 each, 
and Orissa, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh 2 lakhs each.
This is a well-organised community, the Catholics having 
a well-established episcopal hierarchy and the Protestant 
denominations being federated in the Church of South India.
Relative size of the Sikh, the Buddhist, and 
the Jain communities is small. Sikhs number 8 millions, 
which is 1.79 per cent of the total. It is noteworthy 
that most Sikhs are found in one State, Punjab, which alone 
accounts for 68 lakhs. Among other States, Uttar Pradesh 
and Rajastan have 3 lakhs each, and Delhi has 2 lakhs.
They are also found in small numbers in Jammu & Kashmir, 
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Bihar, but are well below 
one lakh in each of them.
^2 A. Grledhill, Constitutional Protection of Indian 
Minorities11, I, J.I.L.I. (1959), p. 403, at p. 405.
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Buddhists number just over 3 millions and 
constitute 0. 74 per cent of the total population. As in 
the case of the Sikhs, they are also mostly concentrated 
in one State. Maharashtra accounts for 30 lakhs of them. 
Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal have one lakh each. They 
are also found in Jammu & Kashmir, Assam, Punjab and 
Uttar Pradesh, but in each of these States they are below 
50 thousand in number. It may be mentioned that their 
unusual strength in Maharashtra is due to the Ueo-Buddhist 
Movement of mass-conversions among Harijans started by 
Dr. Ambedkar.
Jains constitute only 0.46 per cent of the popu­
lation and two millions in number, largely concentrated in 
the States of Maharashtra, Gujarat and Rajaslan. The first 
has 5 lakhs and the latter two have 4 lakhs each. Among 
other States, Madhya Pradesh has 3 lakhs, Mysore 2, and 
Uttar Pradesh 1 lakh.
All those who have been collectively designated 
as "others” in the Census together constitute 0.37 per cent 
of the population and two millions in number. Among these, 
a special mention must be made of the Zoroastrians and 
Jews. These are very small and regionally concentrated, 
but are nevertheless thriving and vigorous communities.
The former are known as Parsis, and are to be found princi­
pally in Gujarat and Maharashtra. They are a religious
160
as well as an ethnic community. With an estimated popu­
lation of 120 thousand, they are **a drop in the sea of
77
Indian humanity.*1. The Jewish community is to be found 
in Kerala, Maharashtra and West Bengal.
The implications of the definition of 1Hindu*
In ascertaining whether or not a group is a 
religious minority it would simplify matters if a distin­
ction is made between religions of Indian origin, and those 
of non-Indian origin. Of the latter, there can hardly be 
any dispute as to whether Muslims, Christians, Parsis and 
Jews are religious minorities. The position with regard 
to the former is, however, different and has to be consi­
dered in the light of the definition of ’Hindu*.
The most interesting aspect in this regard is 
that the term 1Hindu* is not capable of precise definition* 
In the Constitution it is sometimes an all-embracing desig­
nation, while in other contexts its constituent sections 
are regarded as religious minorities*
Thus, Explanation II to Article 25 (which guaran­
tees religious freedom, subject to state control of secular
^  P* K. Irani, "The Personal law of the Parsis”, in
J. H. D. Anderson (ed.), Pamily Law in Asia and Africa, 
(1968), p. 273, at pp. 275, 300.
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activities and social welfare and reform) defines a Hindu
as including persons professing the Buddhist, Jaina and
Sikh religions. Though these religions are distinct in
doctrine and practise among themselves and from orthodox
Hinduism, their inclusion for the above purposes is sought
to he justifies on the ground that they have been always
considered as Hindus and have been governed by Hindu law
34.for many centuries. ^ So wide is the construction of the
term that a person may be a Hindu for legal purposes
though he is not a Hindu by religion. He may not believe
in the religious efficacy of adoption, in Hindu rituals
and scriptures, the existence of atma and salvation. But,
as the Supreme Court has held, 11 the fact that he does not
believe in such things does not make him any less the
Hindu. ... He was born a Hindu and continues to be one
until he takes another religion. .. Whatever may be his
personal predelections or views on Hindu religion and its 
35rituals.” J. D. M. Derrett points out that the real test,
for the purposes of codified law, is to ascertain whether
a person born in India is a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or
36Jew, and if he is not one of these, he is a Hindu.
34- Report of the Hindu Religious Endowments Commission,iww), P. s.----------- -----------------------
35 Chandrasekhara Mudaliar v. Kulandaivelu Mudaliar, A.I.R.
1963 sTcT 165(260).
^  "The definition of a Hindu", (1966), II S.G.J.. p. 67.
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On the other hand, this wider meaning is restri­
cted to the pecial purposes set out in sub-clause (b) of 
Article 25(2) and for no other.^ This means that though 
Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs are Hindus for some purposes, 
they are considered non-Hindus for othrrs. Thus, they
are not Hindus for the purposes of protective discrimina- 
38tion. A Buddhist is not a ’Hindu1 for a purely social
39 4-0purpose,  ^or in the matter of preferences. Jains are
not Hindus for purposes of the temple entry legislation.^
Even as Hindus, their distinctive character can be a
basis for distinguishing between them for purposes of 
4-2legislation.
In matters of autonomy in religious affairs and 
the rights of religious minorities, the courts have accepted 
denominational lines within Hinduism once their distinctive 
character is proved. Various denominations of Hinduism 
and its off-shoots such as lingayats, Kabirpanth, Brahmo
Manak Chand v. The State of Rajastan, I.l.R. (1961) 11 
Raj. 63; Pun.jabrao v. Meshram, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1179(1134)*
Marc Galanter, "The Religious Aspect of Caste", in D. E. 
Smith (ed.), South Asian Politics and Religion, p. 277 
at pp. 300-30TI
^  Narayan Waktu Karwade v. Pun.jabrao Hukam, (i960) 60 Bom.
I. R. 776.
40 I.l.R.(1961) 11 Raj.63; A.I.R. 1965 S.C.1179 (see n.37).
4  ^State v. Par an chan A. A.I.R. 1958 M.P. 352; PeTara.iiah u
iPadmanna, A.I.R. 1958 Mys.84*
42 Moti Das v. S.P.Sahi, A.IR. 1959 S.C. 942 (946,947).
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Samaj, Prarthana Samaj, Arya Samaj and Hirmals could
accordingly claim the benefit of rights under Articles
26 and 30, among others. Thus in a temple entry case
involving the Gowda Saraswat community it was held that
it was within their right to exclude the untouchables who
did not belong to their own denomination or a section 
4-3thereof. The Brahmo Samaj is a minority based on 
religion and as such is entitled to claim the benefit 
of Article 30(1).44
The position with regard to the religious 
interests of the minorities, therefore is that all reli­
gious denominations and sections thereof are equally 
entitled to the rights guaranteed in the Constitution.
In the ensuing discussion references to minorities, in 
general, must be construed in this wider sense, except 
when the context requires it otherwise.
^  State of Keralav. Venkiteshwara Prabhu, A.1.1. 1961 
Ker. 55.
^  Dipendra Hath Sarkar v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1963 
Pat. 54.
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III. Religious interests of the minorities
The definition of freligious interests1
Religious liberty, M. S. Bates tells us, is not 
an isolated reality. It exists or is denied in the midst 
of a complex of institutions and practices; it is insepa­
rable from measures of liberty in general and from certain 
specific liberties such as those of free expression and 
free association. Religious liberty is always supported 
by related liberties. ITot only does it exist amidst 
others, it is often difficult to distinguish it from them. 
Bor, "freedom of religion is not an undifferentiated or 
undimensional condition or concept, but is a constellation 
of overlapping and sometimes conflicting claims for speci­
fic freedoms, each trying to borrow the immense prestige 
of the general notion of religious liberty." ^
An enumeration of what are considered to be 
religious interests has been attempted by some writers.^
^  M. S. Bates, Religious Liberty: an Inquiry. (1945), 
pp. 343-344.
^  Marc Galanter, "Religious Freedoms in the United States: 
A Turning Point?", 1966, Wis. L. Rev. 217, at p. 217.
^  See for example, Marc Galanter, Ibid. pp.220-264; M. S. 
Bates, oprjCit., pp. 301-305, also 130-131; T. P. Wright 
Jr., "The Effectiveness of Muslim Representation", in 
D. E. Smith (ed.), South Asian Politics and Religion, 
p. 102, at pp. 105-106.
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One soon realises how long such lists can he and also 
how thin the line separating the religious issues from 
secular issues is. It is obvious that the interpretation 
differs from one religion to another, in relation to time 
and place, and not infrequently within sections of the 
same religious community.
The task of separating religious issues from 
others is especially difficult in India, where the reli­
gious conceptions are so vast that they cover every aspect
of life from hirth till death. nThere is nothing which is
4-8not religion11. This situation is further complicated
by the fact that in India religion has been, and continues
to be, a predominant factor in determining community alle- 
4-9giance.  ^ Where religious minorities are also communal 
minorities, the separation of their religious interests 
from the secular interests is bound to be a difficult 
task.
In the following discussion it is proposed to 
examine the Constitutional position of the religious 
minorities with regard to some of their principal interests 
in the light of the case law.
B. R. Ambedkar, C.A.D., Vol. VII, p. 781 
^  See p. 222, infra.
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1. Autonomy in Religious Affairs
The greatest possible autonomy in religious 
affairs is undoubtedly the principal objective of every 
religious community. The term ’autonomy' in the context 
of a religious minority is capable of wide interpretation, 
so as to cover a multitude of activities having religious 
significance. In this sense all the issues discussed in 
this chapter form, in varying degrees, part of the que­
stion of autonomy. However, for the purpose of this 
section, the term is used in a narrower sense, in keeping 
with the distinction made in the Constitution between 
issues which are strictly religious and those which are 
merely associated with religion. Here it is sought to 
deal with the question of religious freedom in its most 
vital sphere as it relates to the issue of communal 
autonomy.
The specific Constitutional provision which 
provides for this autonomy is clause (b) of Article 26 
which guarantees the right of every religious denomina­
tion or any section thereof "to manage their own affairs 
in matters of religion." The clause is of comprehensive 
scope which extends to the totality of religious freedom 
guaranteed by the Constitution. It is often sought to 
distinguish between the rights of an individual under
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Article 25 and those of a denomination under Article 26, 
with emphasis on the former. While the merit of this 
emphasis in particular circumstances is not denied, too 
much should not be made of this iistinction. Religious 
freedom at both these levels is greatly interdependent. 
Religious liberty has three aspects —  i) individual 
autonomy in the choice of a creed, ii) autonomy of a reli­
gious body in its collective activities, and iii) the
SIlegal equality of religious bodies. The individual is 
almost always a member of a religious community, the tenets 
of whose doctrine he professes to follow, whose practices 
he performs and whose rules determining the conditions of 
his membership he observes. It is arguable, at least in 
the context of religious minorities, that the communal 
autonomy is of overriding significance.
The scope of the right of religious communities 
to manage their own affairs in matters of religion is 
determined by two inter-dependent factors: first, the 
meaning of the term ’religion1 itself, and second, the 
scope of the state powers to regulate or restrict religious 
practices. The former raises the problem of the definition
SO ^ Por instance, see, P. K. Tripathi, "Secularism: Consti­
tutional Provision and Judicial Review", in G. S. Sharma 
(ed.), Secularism, (1966), p. 165, at p. 170ff.
^  M. S. Bates, op. cit., p. 301.
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of religion and questions associated with it, such as 
who is the competent authority to decide as to what 
are "matters of religion", and on what criteria should 
sucha decision he based. The latter involves a deter­
mination of the particular circumstances in which the 
government should interfere in religious affairs in the 
interests of society at large.
The definition of religion
The Constitution does not define the term 
’religion' and no universally acceptable definition 
exists. Most definitions are either inadequate, as they 
tend to emphasise particular aspects of religion, or are 
so wide in scope that they are of limited help in inter­
preting the Constitutional provisions. An exhaustive
survey of such definitions has been carried out by P. H.
52Benson. He has defined religion as a system of i) belief 
in an unseen order of higher power, ii) activities to in­
fluence this higher power psycholigically to meet human 
needs, and iii) experience accompanying these things. The 
higher power is either a psychological component within 
personality or else a supernatural being to whom psycho­
logical traits are imputed. Since beliefs, aims, activities,
^  Religion in Contemporary Culture, (I960), pp. 124-163
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needs and experiences are simultaneously involved in 
whatever occupies human beings, they are included in the 
definition.  ^ Further, a religious movement must be 
organised to achieve its objectives, must develop a clear 
cut ideology and a practical programme of step by step 
procedures, must develop rules and regulations for orderly 
control of membership and its education and must develop 
procedures for worship and cultivation of spiritual growth 
of its members.*^
The working definition of religion arrived at
by J. D. M. Derrett is of special interest here as it is
meant to refer to religion in India in particular.
•Religion1 means merely —
Recognition (conscious or unconscious) of a force 
or power outside man or men, not subject to the 
control of a man or men, which is nevertheless in 
a constant relation to a man or men,
which recognition, as a fact, manifests 
itself in thought, action or abstention from action 
in order that a) a benefit may acrue, whether seen, 
unseen or both, whether in this life openly or 
secretly or in some other life of state of being, 
by reason of the thought, action, etc., or b) evil 
may be averted, whether seen, unseen or both, whether 
in this life, etc., or c) both benefit may acrue and 
evil may be averted.^
^  Ibid, pp. 162-163.
54 Ibid, p. 605.
Religion, law and the State in India. (1968), pp.36-37.
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According to him no system and no philosophy is a pre­
requisite, Ho priests, no ritual, no temples, no scrip­
tures are necessary. But the recognition can take many 
forms, and may, and usually does develop the aids supplied 
by all of these.^
Religion, as it is generally understood, has
two elements: belief, and acts done in pursuance of that
belief. The Constitutional guarantee contemplates both
of these elements. The first authoritative pronouncement
in this regard was made in 1954 by the Supreme Court when
it was called upon to determine the legality of the
Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Enoowments Act, 1951,
in Lakshmindra1s case. Although the Court did not attempt
to define religion, it indicated its scope for the first
time. It said:
A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system 
of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those 
who profess that religion as condusive to their 
spiritual well-being, but it would not be correct 
to say that religion is nothing else but a doctrine 
or belief. A religion may not only lay down a code 
of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it 
might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies 
and modes of worship which are regarded as integral 
parts of religion and rfchese forms and observances 
might even extend to matters of food and dress. The 
guarantee under our Constitution not only protects 
the freedom of religious opinion but it protects acts 
done in pursuance of a religion.^
56 Ibid, p. 37.
57
The Commissioner, HRE, v. Lakshmindra, A.I.R.1954 S.C. 
282 (289,290).
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The question as to what are “matters of reli­
gion" has come up before the Supreme Court on numerous 
other occasions and it has often reiterated the above 
view. Thus in Ratilal v. Bombay, in seeking to distin­
guish between religious practices and secular activities, 
it emphasised that religion is not merely an opinion, 
doctrine or belief but also includes its outward expre­
ssion as its essential part. The Constitution protects 
acts done in pursuance of religious belief as part of
religion, as practices and performances are as much part
58of religion as faith or belief in particular doctrines.
Article 26(b) clearly contemplates practices which are
regarded by a community as part of religion, or in terms
of Hindu theology, not merely its G-nana, but also its
59Bhakti and Karma Kandas. Bree exercise of religion 
means the freedom to entertain such religious belief as 
may be approved of by one’s Judgement or conscience and 
to exhibit that belief or ideas in such overt acts as are 
enjoined or sanctioned by his religion, including the 
right to propagate those views for the edification of
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 
1954 S.C. 388 (392).
Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1958 
S.C. 255 (264).
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others.^ The same line aas taken in later cases like 
the Durgah Committee,^ Saifuddin Saheb v. Bombay,^*2 and 
others. Religion in its broadest sense includes all 
forms of faith and worship and all the varieties of a 
manfs belief in a Superior Being or a Moral law transcen­
ding the things that are Caesarfs and demanding his affe-
6*5
ction and obedience.  ^ However, though religion often 
is theistic, it need not necessarily be so. As the
C.A
Supreme Court has pointed out in Lakshmindra1 s case ^ and
66again in Ratilal v. Bombay,  ^there are well-known reli­
gions in India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not 
believe in the existence of God or of any intelligent 
First Cause.
But the task of defining religion in the context 
of limitations placed on religious practices can never 
be simple. Whether on account of the lack of a body of 
doctrine or adequate organisation the religious sphere 
may be diffused and difficult to distinguish from the
60 Mohammed Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, A.I.R.1958 
S.O. 751 1759).
61 A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1402.
62 A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 853.
 ^P.M.Brimadathan Kamboorlpad v. Cochin Devaswom Board. 
A.I.R.1956 I.C. 19 122).
64 A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282 (289).
65 A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 388 (392).
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secular one. Obviously some line has to be drawn bet­
ween the two for the purpose of securing good govern­
ment of society. Hence we see that the Supreme Court 
has introduced an important qualification in defining 
religion by distinguisl^ig between the essentials of reli­
gion and its non-essential accretions. In Durgah Committee 
it said:
... in order that the practices in question should 
be treated as part of religion, they must be regarded 
by the said religion as its essential and integral 
part, otherwise even purely secular activities, 
which are not an essential or an integral part of 
religion, are apt to be clothed with a religious 
form and may make a claim for being treated as reli­
gious practices within the meaning of Article 26. 
Similarly even practices, though religious, may have 
sprung from merely superstitious beliefs and may in 
that sense be extraneous and unessential accretions 
to religion itself. Unless such practices are found 
to constitute an essential and integral part of a 
religion their claim for the protection under Article 
26 may have to be carefully crutinised; in other 
words the protection must be confined to subh reli­
gious practices as are an essential or integral part 
of it and no other.^
The effect of this principle, which is now firmly establi­
shed by numerous judicial pronouncements, is to create a 
limitation on the freedom of religion which the express 
provisions of the Constitution do not contain. The out­
come, as J. 3). M. Derrett points out, is to construe the 
guarantee as being "freely to profess, practise and
66 A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1402, at p. 1415
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propagate the essentials of religion.
The above exercise, however, involves an evalua­
tive element and hence must be approached with great cau­
tion. Too much care cannot be taken in seeking to separate
6ftreligion from superstition. Fo person or community
would follow a practice or perform an act if they considered
it a superstition. Except by the voluntary co-operation
of the persons involved, it should not be found necessary
to interfere with those practices save in exceptional
circumstances. It is also worth while to note that in the
opinion of some sections of the people all religion is
superstition. It would be unwise to impose the notions
of one section of the people on another section, or, as
Marc Galanter cautions, to make the majority’s notions,
in the context of increasing stste activity, into normative
standards which would collide with the religious commands
6Q
and prohibitions of the minorities. J The test of liberty 
is whether men are able to get along with[those with whom 
they differ.
^  Religion, Law and the State in India, (1968), p. 447-
68 For a discussion on this aspect in the light of relevant 
case law, see H. M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, 
(1967), pp. 483-484♦
^  “Religious Freedom in the United States: A Turning 
point?11, 1966 Wis. L. Rev. 217 at p. 268.
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In the process of determining the essentials 
of religion two more questions arises first, who is the 
proper authority to decide what is essential, and second, 
what criteria is to be adopted. The position that has 
evolved is a compromise: an individual or a religious 
body cannot make a private definition of religion and 
impose it on the community in all circumstances; but even 
so the decision whether or not a particular act is part 
of religious practice should be make with reference to its 
own doctrines and beliefs.
The only authority who can assume responsibility 
for deciding what is essential is the Judiciary, since 
such a question is not to be decided either by a majority 
of votes in the legislature or be subjected to the arbitrary 
powers of the Executive. But the courts themselves are 
human agents and axe subject to human imperfections. The 
need to establish a common standard and procedure is, there­
fore, clear.
The Court's attitude was revealed in Lakshmindra's 
case. It held that what constitutes an essential part of 
religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to 
the doctrines of that religion itself. Under Article 26(b) 
a religious denomination or organisation enjoys complete 
autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and 
ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the
176
religion they hold and no outside authority has any
jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in such
matters. In matters of religion, the right of management
given to a religious hody is a guaranteed fundamental
70right which no legislature can take away.
But before a practice can be accepted as reli­
gious, it must be proved to be so to the satisfaction of 
the courts. In arriving at its decision the court might 
examine the scriptures and doctrines of the particular 
sect, consult religious experts, probe into the histori­
cal background and take any other relevant evidence. 
Whether a particular practice, which has come into con­
flict with law, is essential, has to be decided in each
instance. The tendency of the Court, as evidenced in the
71cowslaughter cases,' appears to be to regard a practice 
as non-essential, where alternatives are available. It 
has been held that the sacrifice of a cow on Bakr-Id day 
is not an essential part of a Muslim’s religion, as there 
are alternatives of slaughtering other animals or making 
gifts in charity. Similarly social reform legislation
A.I.R.1954 S.C. 282 at pp. 290-291? see also Ratilal v. 
Bombay, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 388, at p. 391.
^  M. H. Quareshi v. Bihar, A.I.R.1958 S.C. 731? A. H . 
Quraishi v. Bihar, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 448; see the case 
comment on these by J. D. M. Derrett at (1958)8, I.C.L.Q. 
pp. 221-224, and (1961) 1.0, I.C.L.Q., pp. 914-916. On 
the subject, see S. P. Sathe, ^Cow-Slaughter: The Legal 
Aspect”, in A. B. Shah (ed.), Cow-Slaughter: Horns of 
a Dilemma. (1967), p. 69.
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cannot be impugned because it prevents a Hindu from 
marrying a second time in order to have a son to ensure 
his salvation, as it is open to him to adopt a son.^
The Court should, however, be constantly aware of the 
pitfalls inherent in the question of alternatives. It 
has a decided advantage in the choice of experts who 
can influence the decision and there is a possibility 
that the views of the community concerned may not have 
been effectively stated by their spokesmen. Also, alter­
natives in many cases may not be practical, or be costly, 
or just not as good as the practice in question.
Once a practice has been held to be essential 
to a community, the fact that the exercise of that right 
might adversely affect rights of some of its members is 
of no consequence. In Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin 
Saheb v. State of Bombay —  where the legality of the 
Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act, 1949, was in 
question —  it was pleaded on behalf of the respondents 
that the excommunication by the Head of the Dawoodi Bohra 
Community of a member has the necessary consequence of 
depriving the latter of the right of enjoyment of property. 
But the Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the
^  Ram Prasad Seth v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R.
1957"a i t: TIT. ' -------------------------
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73Bombay High. Court, held that, in so far as the statute 
took away the right of excommunication on religious 
grounds, it violated Article 26(b). It pointed out that 
the right given under Article 26(b) has not been made 
subject to the preservation of civil rights. Hence, the 
fact that the civil rights of a person are affected by 
the exercise of the fundamental right under Article 26(b) 
is of no consequence. As the Act invalidated excommuni­
cation on any ground whatever, including religious grounds, 
it did not come within the saving provisions of Article 
25(2).^ It must be admitted that opinion on this issue 
was divided and the decision was not unanimous.
Autonomy and state powers of regulation
In estimating the scope of communal autonomy,
it is helpful to define the scope of the governmnntal
powers to regulate or restrict the practise of religion,
as the two are related. Mention has already been made of
75the three categories of such powers. These may now 
be briefly considered.
73 A.I.R. 1952 Bom. 183.
74 A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 852, at p. 865ff.
75 See p. 153, supra.
179
It will clarify matters if we start by conside­
ring the inter-relationship of Articles 25 and 26 in the 
present context. It might seem that the freedom guaran­
teed in the former Article is subject to the whole range 
of limitations mentioned, while the autonomy guaranteed 
by Article 26(b) is subject only to ”public order, morality 
and health.” This in fact is not the case. While trying 
to reconcile the rights in these two Articles, where 
there was conflict, the courts have extended the limita­
tions contained in the former to the latter. Such a situ­
ation arose in Yenkataramana Devaru v. The State of Mysore?* 
The issue involved was how to reconcile the denominational 
right of autonomy in Article 26(b) with the right of temple 
entry conferred on Harijans by a statute —  the Madras 
Temple Eirtry Authorisation Act, 1947 —  which had the san­
ction of Article 25(2)(b). The Supreme Court followed 
the rule of harmonious construction, observing that, when 
there are two provisions of equal authority with apparent 
conflict, they should be interpreted, if possible, so as 
to give effect to both. It held that Article 25(2)(b) 
conferred an unqualified right and must be available, 
whether it is sought to be exercised against an individual
76 A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 255.
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under Article 25(1) or against a denomination under 
Article 26(b), It added that, though Article 25(1) deals 
with the rights of individuals, Article 25(2) is much 
wider in its contents and has reference to the rights of 
communities, and hence covers both Article 25(1) and 
Article 26(b).^
The first category of limitations —  on grounds 
of public order, morality and health (which will be referred 
to as 1public order1 for brevity) —  must be considered in 
the context of the philosophy underlying them. Civil liber­
ties imply, as the United States Supreme Court has pointed 
out, the existence of an organised society maintaining
ppblic order, without which liberty itself would be lost
78in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. No well ordered 
society can leave to individuals an absolute right to make 
final decisions unassailable by the State as to everything 
they will or will not do.'^ No freedom can be absolute; 
unlimited freedom will derogate into licence in the hands 
of the unscrupulous, threatening to subvert the whole of 
it. In order to safeguard the equal rights of all the 
citizens, therefore, the state is entitled to define the
^  Ibid, at p.
^  Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.569, at p. 1052.
^  Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.624* 87 Law ed.,
T U W . ------------------  -----------
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bounds of freedom which it guarantees. It is relevant 
to note that in the Indian Constitution these limitations 
are not in any way exclusive to the freedom of religion: 
they also frequently occur in Article 19 which guarantees 
the ’seven freedoms*. Their mention in the Constitution 
may even be regarded as superfluous, as even in their 
absence the state would undoubtedly have the implied 
authority to maintain them.
The concept of public order is variable with
time and place. As one Member of the Constituent Assembly
remarked, the full implications of this qualification are
not easy to discover: they would depend on the changing
80social and moral conscience of the people. For this 
reason no clear cut rules can be made to fit every occa­
sion. To realise the variety and the scope of situations 
that might arise, one might usefully refer to the numerous 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in this 
regard. Although the standards of public order differ
between the two countries, the grounds on which these
81powers are exercised are essentially the same. Parti­
cular reference may be made to what are known as the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses Cases. Members of this sect had to
^  Hon. K. Santhanam, C.A.P., Yol. VII, p. 834.
H. E. Groves, "Religious Preedom1*, 4, J.I.L.I., (1962), 
p. 191, at p. 195*
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appear before the Court time and again on charges of
8?insulting the religious feeling of others, contravening
85traffic regulations, distributing objectionable litera­
ture,8^ contravening child labour regulations,8  ^and such 
like. An indication of the attitude of the Court can 
be had from the observations of Roberts J., in Cantwell v. 
Connecticut:
The essential characteristic of these liberties is, 
that under their shield many types of life, character 
and opinion and belief can develop unmolested and 
unobstructed. Nowhere is this shield more necessary 
than in our own country for a people composed of 
many races and many creeds. There are limits to the 
exercise of these liberties. The danger in these 
times from the coersive activities of those who, in 
the delusion of racial or religious conceit, would 
incite violence and breaches of peace in order to 
deprive others of their equal right to the exercise 
of their liberties, is emphasised by events familiar 
to all. These and other trasgressions of those 
limits the state may appropriately punish.
The Indian Supreme Court has had occasion to 
consider the concept of public order rather elaborately in 
Ramesh Thapar v. State of Madras.8  ^It observed that 
fpublic order1 signified a state of tranquility which
8  ^Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.296; Chap1insky v. 
New Hampshire, 315 U.S.586.
8  ^Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.569.
84 Ibid.
85 Prince v. Massachussetts, 321 U.S.158.
86 310 U.S. 296.
87 1950 S.C.R. 594.
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prevailed among members of a political society as a result 
of internal regulations enforced by the government which 
they have established. It noted the existence of various 
degrees of public order and distinguished between serious 
and aggravated forms of public disorder which endangered 
the security of the state, and relatively minor breaches 
of a local nature. The term 1 public order1 applied only 
to the former. This opinion was, however, revised later
o o
in Superintendent v. Ram Manohar where it held that 
'public order' had to be understood in its new connota­
tions, including even disorders of only local significance.
The Indian Penal Code has provisions to deal 
with a variety of situations falling within the scope 
of 'public order' in chapters IV, VIII, XIV and XV. Among 
others, these include offences against the state; offences 
like unlawful assembly, rioting, affray, and the wounding 
of the feelings of any section of the people; and offences 
affecting public health, safety, convenience, decency 
and morals. Chapter XV specifically concerns offences
relating to religion. Section 295 forbids the injuring
/
or defiling of a place of worship with intent to insult 
the religion of any class. Section 296 punishes disturbance
88 A.I.R. I960 S.C. 641.
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of a religious assembly, Section 297 the tresspassing 
on burial places and places of worship, and Section 298 
forbids the wounding of the religious feelings by words, 
gestures or exhibitions. Section 295-A was added to meet 
the cases of outraging the religious feelings of a class 
of citizens. Besides the Penal Code, supplementary pro­
visions have been made in various other legislative enact­
ments such as the Police Act, Dramatic Performances Act, 
the Official Secrets Act, and so on.
The powers of the government to act in the inte­
rests of the public order are large, and are being exer­
cised on a big scale. Their necessity cannot be denied. 
However, as these powers are exercised, more often than 
not, by local officials, it must be ensured that decisions 
are not made arbitrarily. There is no definite yardstick 
which can be applied to all situations, but suchjactions 
should be capable of satisfying the test of 'clear and 
present danger' which the courts have evolved.
Regulation of secular activities
The power of regulating or restricting any 
economic, financial, political or other secular activity 
which may be associated with religious practice presents 
greater difficulties of interpretation. A modern state 
with welfare ideals tends to assume increasing responsi­
bility on almost every aspect of life. In order to secure
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the democratic freedoms it is necessary that the hounds 
of that action must he defined. This is not an easy 
task as it involves the necessity of defining religion. 
What is ’secular1 depends largely on the interpretation 
of what is ’essential1 to each religion, and as we have 
already seen, no definite standard can he laid down in 
this hehalf.
The courts are aware of how difficult it is 
to dissociate the religious affairs of an institution 
from its secular affairs. The secular affairs of an 
institution are almost always directed for the furthera­
nce of its religious affairs, for which alone the insti­
tution exists.^ It is inevitable that they are inextri­
cably mixed up.
Lakshmindra’s case provides a good illustration 
of the conflict between government policy which sought 
to regulate secular activities and the right of a denomi­
nation to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. 
In 1951, the Madras legislature passed the Madras Hindu 
Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, practically 
vesting the administration of religious and charitable 
institutions in a department of the Government, headed
^  Lakshmindra v. The Commissioner, HRE, Madras, A.I.R.
T952"TEa"""6i3 (535T------- ----------
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by a Commissioner, assisted by a hierarchy of Deputy, 
Assistant and Area Commissioners. Section 21 gave the 
Commissioner the power to enter the premises.of any 
religious institution or any place of worship for the 
purpose of exercising the powers conferred on him by the 
Act. Section 31 made it necessary for the trustee of an 
institution to obtain the permission of the Deputy Commi­
ssioner for the utilisation of surplus funds. Section 
55 required the trustee to keep accounts of the receipts 
and expenditure of personal gifts. Under Section 56 the 
trustee could be called to appoint a manager for the 
administration of the secular affairs of the institution; 
in default of such appointment the Commissioner could 
make the appointment himself. By a notification issued 
under Chapter IY of the Act, the administration of an 
institution could be taken over, and vested in an execu­
tive officer appointed by the Commissioner. The validity 
of these and other provisions was challenged. The Supreme 
Court struck down a number of them as being unconstitu­
tional. The attitude of the Court towards the inter­
pretation of ’secular activities1 is revealed in its 
following remarks:
If the tenets of any religious sect of Hindus 
prescribe that offerings of food should be given to 
the idol at particular hours of the day, that perio­
dical ceremonies should be performed in a certain 
way at certain periods of the year or that there 
should be daily recital of sacred texts or oblations
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to the sacred fire, all these would he regarded as 
parts of religion and the mere fact that they involve 
expenditure of money or employment of priests and 
servants or the use of marketable commodities would 
not make them secular activities partaking a commer­
cial or economic character; all of them are religious 
practices and should be regarded as matters of reli­
gion within the meaning of Article 26(b).
Similarly, in Ratilal v. Bombay it was held 
that the right of a denomination to manage its own affairs 
in matters of religion included the right to utilise the 
trust property or its income for the religious purposes 
and objects indicated by the founder bf the trust or 
established by usage obtaining in a particular institution. 
To divert the trust property or funds to such purposes as 
an authority created under a State Act or the court consi­
ders expedient or proper, although the original objects 
of the founder could still be carried out, was an unwarran­
ted encroachment on the freedom of religious institutions
91in regard to the management of their religious affairs.
On the other hand, autonomy in this respect is 
not absolute. Y/hereas religious ceremonies and observan­
ces may be matters of religion which cannot be interfered 
with, it is within the competence of the secular authorities
90 A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282, at p. 290.
91 A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 388, at p. 393.
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to regulate the scale of expenditure in accordance with 
the law laid down by a competent legislature. It cannot 
be the injunction of any religion to destroy the insti­
tution and its endowments by incurring wasteful expendi- 
92ture. The state can certainly enact legislation to 
secure the better management of institutions by religious 
denominations, and if, having regard to denominational 
autonomy, it is reasonable, the courts would uphold it. 
Thus in Grovindlal.ii v. Ra.iastan^  the Supreme Court 
upheld the validity of the Rajastan Rathdwara Temple Act, 
which sought to regulate the secular affairs of that 
institution. It may be mentioned that while Article 
26(b) gives the religious denominations autonomy in 
matters of religion, the other rights conferred by that 
Article are subject to regulation according to law.
In Sardar Saruu Singh v. State of Punjab it was held 
that the election of officers under the Punjab Sikh 
Grurudwaras Act, 1925, was not a matter of religion within 
the meaning of Article 26(b).^ A great deal of legis­
lation of this category has been enacted by the Union 
and the State Legislatures seeking to secure the better
92 A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282, at p. 291.
93 A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1638.
94 A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 860.
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management by the religious denominations, especially 
those of the Hindu Religion, of their religious affairs.
The distinction between matters of religion 
and those of secular administration may, at times, appear 
to be a thin one. In such cases of doubt, the Court is 
bound to take a common sense view and be actuated by
Q C
considerations of practical necessity. J Ho two instances 
can be exactly the same, and hence a decision has to be 
made having regard to the circumstances in each case.
Social welfare and reform
The powers vested in the government on this 
account are unique and bound to have far reaching conse­
quences. By these, the government is enabled to take 
the initiative in putting an end to those religious pra­
ctices and dogmas which it considers undesirable and 
which it thinks come in the way of progress. An outstan­
ding example of the state action in this behalf is undoub­
tedly the temple entry legislation which has been passed 
by various States. Another is the codification of the 
personal laws. These are discussed at a later staije. It 
may be relevant to note that much of the legislation in 
this category pertains to the Hindu religion.
95 Ratilal v. Bombay. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 388, at p. 392.
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96Venkataramana Devaru1 s case is an important 
decision in this respect and can serve to indicate the 
attitude which the courts are likely to adopt in cases of 
conflict between denominational autonomy and social reform 
legislation. In that case the Supreme Court held that 
the denominational right of autonomy under Article 26(h) 
must give way so as to give effect to the rights of indi­
viduals under Article 25(2)(h). At the same time an 
effort was made to respect the denominational rights 
without substantially affecting the rights of others, 
and to construe Article 25(2)(b) so as to give effect to 
Article 26(b). The result was a compromise, whereby 
Harijans would be entitled to enter the temple, subject
to limitations of time and place, so as to minimise the
effect on the right of the denomination to manage its 
own affairs.
Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State 
of Bombay^  provides another instance of this conflict, 
but with a different result. Here the Bombay Prevention 
of Excommunication Act, 1949, was challenged on the ground 
that it took away the right of excommunication from the 
Head of the Dawoodi Bohra Community, thereby interfering
96 A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 255.
9  ^A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 853; See the case comment hy J. D. M.
Derrett, "Preedom of Religion under the Indian Consti­
tution: Excommunication*1, in 12, Int. & Comp. 1. Q., 
(1963), p. 693.
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with the right of that community to manage its affairs 
in matters of religion. The Court held the Act to he 
invalid. Das Gupta J., speaking for the majority, said 
that the mere fact that the Act sought to prevent the loss 
of civil rights resulting from excommunication did not 
make it a law "providing for social welfare and reform.^
He said that, while the barring of excommunication on 
grounds other than religious ones might be a measure of 
social reform, its barring even on religious grounds
Q Q
cannot be considered as promoting social welfare. Ayyan-
gar J., held that the Act, by depriving the Head of the
power and the right to excommunicate struck at the very
life of the community by rendering it impotent to protect
itself against dissidents and schismatics. He added,
In my view, by the phrase "laws providing for social 
welfare and reform" it was not intended to enable 
the|legislature to "reform" a religion out of existence 
or identity. Article 25(2)(a) having provided for 
legislation dealing with "economic, financial, politi­
cal or secular activity which may be associated with 
religious practices", the succeeding clause proceeds 
to deal with other activities of religious groups 
and these also must be those which are associated 
with religion. Just as the activities referred to 
in Article 25(2)(a) are obviously not of the essence 
of the religion, similarly the saving in Article 25 
(2)(b) is not intended to rover the basic essentials 
of the creed of a religion which is protected by 
Article 25(1).gg
98 A.I.R. 1962 S.O. 853, at p. 870
99 Ibid. pp. 875-876.
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The points of distinction between the above 
two cases are perhaps that in the former the rights of 
a considerable section of the community, the Harijans, 
were involved, while excommunication as in the latter 
case would affect not more than a few individuals. In 
view of the emphasis placed on Harijan welfare in the 
Constitution, the Court was obliged to give effect to 
their claims. The second point is that in the latter 
case, but not in the former, it was successfully pleaded 
that the practice in question was an essential and inte­
gral part of religion. Between them, the above two 
cases may be said to represent the position with regard 
to communal autonomy and reform.
To sum up, the Constitution guarantees autonomy 
in religious affairs to every religious community or any 
section thereof. The '.interpretation of what is Religious1 
is left to each community, which alone has the right to 
decide what constitutes part of its religion and to act 
accordingly. But in certain cases the state is entitled 
to limit this autonomy by legislation authorised by the 
Constitution. In such circumstances the autonomy would 
be limited to the essential aspects of religion. It is 
for the courts to decide, after considering any relevant 
evidence, whether or not a practice in question is essential
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to religion. Though the autonomy at times may he limi­
ted, in so far as it seeks to protect essential practices 
of religion, it can nevertheless he said to he substantial.
2. The Propagation of Religion
It is said that there is a strong altruistic
dynamic in religion which seeks to help others hy sharing
with them the oppottunities and benefits of a new way of
life.^ The right to propagate one’s religion is now
generally accepted as part of the freedom of religion.
This right, including the right to change one’s religion,
has been incorporated in the Universal Declaration of 
2
Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Civil
3
and Political Rights. It has received legal recognition 
in many Constitutions of the world. In India, the right 
to ’propagate’ religion is guaranteed hy Article 25(1) 
of the Constitution.
In the Indian context, this right is of special 
significance to minorities. Although;it is expressed in 
general terms and is available to "all persons", in effect
1 P. H. Benson, Religion in Contemporary Culture, (I960), 
p . 607.
 ^Article 18.
 ^Article 18.
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it mainly concerns two of the minority religions, - 
Christianity and Islam. This is due to the fact that 
other religions in India, and especially Hinduism, are of 
a non-proselytising nature in the accepted sense of that 
term. There are exceptions like Buddhism, and conversions 
to oher religions are not unknown. But, as we shall see 
later, conversions in this class escape some of the conse­
quences which follow a conversion to either of the above 
"non-Indian” religions. The general Hindu attitude to 
propagation resulting in conversion from one religion to 
another is decidedly a negative one. While there is increa­
sing activity within Hinduism with regard to 'propagation1, 
this is concerned mostly with the expounding of the doctrines 
to the general Hindu public and with shuddhi movements 
aimed at bringing converts to other religions back to the 
Hindu fold. The attitude as regards the right to propagate 
religion is, therefore, of a mixed nature, ranging from 
the liberal to the extreme.^ A vast majority of Hindus 
subscribe to the former, while a number of extremist orga­
nisations are actively seeking to curtail this freedom.
The right to 'propagate1 religion was included in 
the Constitution as a result of pressure from the minorities,
 ^Por a discussion of various viewpoints on this subject, 
see D. E. Smith, India as a secular state, (1963), PP. 
163-176.
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especially the Christian community. The Christian 
community had voiced its interest in this regard on vari­
ous occasions and particularly just prior to Independence. 
Thus in October, 1945, a joint committee of the Catholic 
Union of India and the All India Council of Indian Chri­
stians passed a resolution declaring that, "in the future 
Constitution of India, the free profession, practise and 
propagation of religion should be guaranteed, and the
change of religion should not involve any civil or poli­
ty
tical disability". In the Sapru Report, which came on 
the eve of Independence, Mr• Ruthnaswamy, a Christian 
member, urged in a note the inclusion of the word 'propa- 
gate1 in the place of 'preach1. When the Constituent 
Assembly was established, Christian memers of the Assembly 
and of the Advisory Committee on Minorities and Fundamental 
Rights pressed for the inclusion of the word 'propagate' 
in the draft Article 19 and were successful.
The Constituent Assembly debates indicate that 
the passage of this provision was not a smooth one. There 
were misgivings and objections and several amendments were 
proposed.^ But the general mood of the Assembly was one 
of accommodation. The fears were allayed by speakers such
 ^Rational Christian Council Review, 1946, Vol.66, p.3, 
cited in Ibdi, p. 181.
6 At p. 339.
See O.A.D., Vol. VI, debates for 3rd and 6th July, 1948.
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as Mr, K. M. Munshi, whose speech sheds much light on 
the issue:
In the present set-up that we are now creating under 
this Constitution, there is a secular state. There 
is no particular advantage to a member of one commu­
nity over another; nor there is any political advan­
tage by increasing one's fold. In those circumstances 
the word 'propagate1 cannot possibly have dangerous 
implications which some members think it has. More­
over, I was a party from the very beginning to the 
compromise with minorities, which ultimately led to 
these clauses being inserted in the Constitution, 
and iknow it was on this word that the Indian Christi­
an community laid the greatest emphasis; not because 
they wanted to convert people aggressively, but 
because the word 'propagate* was a fundamental part 
of their tenet. Even if the word was not there, I 
am sure, under the freedom of speech which the Consti­
tution guarantees it will be open to any religious 
community to persuade other people to join their 
faith. So long as religion is religion, conversion 
by free exercise of the conscience has to be recog­
nised. The word 'propagate' in this clause is nothing 
very much out of the way as some people think, nor is 
it fraught with dangerous consequences.^
In the final form in which the Article was passed, the
word 'propagate' was included, made subject only to the ,
general limitations contained in that Article.
While the Constitution has now settled the legal 
position as to propagation, the debate has not entirely 
ceased. In some quarters of Hindus a distinction is still 
sought to be made between 'propagation' and the making of 
converts. Indian Christians, on the other hand, hold this 
distinction as artificial and believe that the right to
8 C.A.D., Yol.VI, 6th July, 1948, pp. 837-838.
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•propagate1 cannot be real if it did not include the 
right change one's religion. The weight of legal opinion 
is on the latter's side and the official position, in 
general, has been one of reassurance to the minorities.
The minority communities, however, have not 
been without some anxious moments since the Constitution 
was enacted. In 1954 a Bill entitled 1 Indian Converts 
(Regulation and Registration) Bill' was introduced in 
Parliament by a Congress member. Its basic provisions 
were: persons and institutions engaged in converting 
people should secure a licence from the district magis­
trate; a register of conversions should be maintained; 
the prospective convert should make a declaration of 
intent to the district magistrate one month before the 
actual date of conversion and that particulars of his 
conversion should be provided within three months. Its 
introduction was opposed by a Muslim member on the ground 
that making a conversion conditional upon the discretion 
of the district magistrate is tantamount to virtual de­
nial of the right, but his plea was not successful. 
Ho^wver, when the Bill came up for discussion it was 
opposed by the Government and the Prime Minister allayed 
the fears of the minorities. "We must not do anything," 
he said, "which gives rise to any feeling o^oppression or 
suppression in the minds of our Christian friends and 
fellow-countrymen in this country.” The Bill was rejected
198
by an overwhelming vote.
Another Bill, !the Backward Communities (Reli­
gious Protection) Bill1, introduced in I960 by a member 
of the Swatantra Party sought nto provide for more effe­
ctive protection of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes 
and other backward communities from change of religion."
The Bill sought to regulate conversions among these 
classes from Hinduism to "non-Indian religions". These 
were defined as Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Zoroastri­
anism. The Bill was, however, rejected.^
Perhaps the greatest storm was caused throughout 
the country on the appointment of the Christian Missionary 
Activities Inquiry Committee (known as Hiyogi Committee, 
after its Chairman) by the Government of Madhya Pradesh 
in 1954. The radical recommendations of its report‘d  were 
never implemented, but it has been noted that "this offi­
cial document is significant as an expression of the extre­
mist Hindu sentiment which is sometimes found where it 
would not be e x p e c t e d . T h e  Christian community as a 
whole was much agitated and protests were heard all over
 ^See, D. E. Smith, India as a Secular State, pp. 185-186.
^ Report of the Christian Missionary Activities Inquiry 
Committee, (1956), 2 Volumes.
D. E. Smith, op.cit., (n.9), p. 201. Por details of 
the Committee, eic.,see p. 207ff.
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India. The Catholic Bishops1 Conference of India pub­
lished a reply stating the Christian position on conver- 
12sions. Much support was also found in various sections 
of the Hindu public. Though the Report was finally cnnsig- 
ned to oblivion, it is not entirely forgotten by the Chri­
stian community. References to a "one sided, unfair" 
inquiry can be found in a publication of a decade later.^ 
However, it must be emphasised that this inquiry was limi­
ted to only one State in India and can be said to be an 
exception to the liberal official policy generally.
Conversions and civil rights
Any law which deprives a convert of any of the 
rights which he had before conversion would be discrimi­
natory and inconsistent with the guarantee of full reli­
gious freedom. The principle that a person should not 
lose his civil rights on conversion is generally accepted. 
Thus the Caste Disabilities Removal Act, 1850, protects 
a convert from the loss of his civil rights, and in parti­
cular, removes the disability to inherit property imposed 
upon him by his former personal law. A suggestion was
12 Truth Shall Prevail, (1957), Bombay.
13 Indian Catholic Reference Book, Catholic Assiciation 
of Bombay, (1964).
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made to the Sapru Committee that a guarantee to this 
effect should he incorporated in the future Constitution.^ 
However, the Constitution does not contain any such guaran­
tee and it is evident taat at least in two important areas 
conversions would adversely affect the rights of converts.
The first such area is the Hindu Code legislation
enacted in the mid-fifties, a number of whose provisions
have the effect, whether intended or not, of discouraging
conversions. Thus, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, makes the
conversion from Hinduism one of the grounds for divorce;
the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, deprives a
Hindu wife of the right to separate residence and mainte-
16nance on conversion; the Hindu Succession Act, 1956,
disqualifies the children of a convert, and his descendants,
from inheriting the property of any of their Hindu relati- 
17ves. ' These and other consequences which follow a conver­
sion under this legislation have been summarised by J. 3). M. 
Derrett, thus:
... the penalties for changing one's religion, not 
from Sikh to Jaina, or from Hindu to Sikh or from 
Hindu to Buddhist (for these are not distinguished) 
but from Hindu to Christian, are many and varied# The
^  Mr. Rallia Ram, Sapru Report, p. 339* 
Section 13(l)(ii).
^  Section 18(3).
^  Section 26.
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spouse may obtain a divorce; children of the convert 
cannot inherit from the latter*s relations; the 
convert is disqualified from being the guardian of 
his own child; he cannot give or take in adoption, 
nor prevent his wife from giving his child away in 
adoption or from taking a child in adoption; and 
he loses not merely all rights of maintenance which 
the Hindu law would otherwise give him but even 
alimony obtained in divorce proceedings, The * secu­
lar state* thus seems to take away with one hand the 
virtue of the apparently liberal Reliefs offered 
with the other.^g
The explanation for this discrepancy, according to him, is
that the system is a personal law and only those who belong
to the religious community can take advantage of it. But
still it remains odd that a system which has no roots in
Hinduism, and which does not claim to be a religious
legal system as such, should contemplate such drastic
effects in cases where persons subject to it by being
Hindus cease to be Hindus by conversion to another religion,
not accepted as 'Hindu* religion for the purpose of the
19application of these statutes.
The second area where converts have been at a
disadvantage concerns the benefits offered to the Scheduled
Castes. Since more often than not the test of backwardness
20is the membership of a caste, it is important to remain
is J. D. M. Derxett, Religion. Law and the State in India, 
(1968), pp. 332-333.
19 IMd. p. 333.
See Chapter V, infra.
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a Hindu to qualify for certain benefits. The Constitution
(Scheduled Castes) Order of 1950 provides that "no person
professing a religion different from Hinduism shall be
Pideemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste." Bor this
purpose even Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs are regarded as
non-Hindus on the ground that they do not believe in the
caste system. Conversions to Christianity or Islam have
the effect of removing the converts from their castes. Thus
in Michael v. Venkataswaran the religious requirement was
upheld against a Pariyan convert to Christianity, who wished
to contest a reserved seat. Though he himself and his
caste-fellows still considered him to be a member of the
caste, the court held that as a general rule, "conversion
operates as an expulsion from the caste. .. a convert
22ceases to have any caste," The Supreme Court reaffirmed
this principle in S. Ra.jagopal v. C. M. Armugam, where it
had been called upon to decide whether a Christian convert
23on reconversion to Hinduism regained his former caste.
The Court did not consider the question whether reconver­
sion had the effect of reverting him to the old caste 
automatically. It held that the burden of proof lay on
21 Para 3.
22 A.I.R. 1952 Mad. 474, at p. 478.
23 A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 101, at p. 108.
203
the appallent and that in the circumstances he had failed 
to satisfy the C o u r t W h e r e  the Madras Government had 
extended the school-fee concession to Harijan converts, 
it was held that it could he restricted to one generation 
of converts only without offending the provisions of equa­
lity. The concessions were merely an indulgence on part 
of the state, as hy conversion they had 11 ceased to belong
to any cast^ because the Christian religion does not
2 *5recognise a system of cactes.11 ^
It has to be recognised that where measures are
designed to improve the social and economic conditions of
the backward classes, religious affiliations have little
relevance, and conversion is not likely to have any effect
26on them. In Gurmukh Singh v. Union of India, where the
exclusion of Sikh Bawarias from the Scheduled Castes was
questioned, as Hindu Bawarias had been included, the court
conceded that the Scheduled Castes were to be designated
on the basis of their backwardnessf though it held that
the Presidentte Order could not be reviewed. In Jasani v.
27Moreshwar Parasram ( the Supreme Court seems to have acce­
pted the view that conversion need not necessarily alter
\
24 Ibid, pp. 109-110.
25 In re Thomaa. A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 21 (22).
26 A.I.R. 1952 Punj. 143.
27 A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 236 (244-245).
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the convert’s caste status, if the new religion permits 
it, and the old caste regards the convert as one of them­
selves despite conversion. The Mysore High Court has 
held that a Samgar candidate for election still retained
his caste despite accepting and following the tenets of
28Arya Samaj, and the Patna High Court has held that mem­
bers of Oraon tribe embracing Christianity do not cease
to be Oraons and are entitled to the rights and privileges 
29of tribals. J However, there can be no denying that the 
“Hinduism1 test of Scheduled Castes, and the caste crite­
ria for backwardness operate to penalise many a convert 
and deny him the benefits which his condition of backward­
ness entitled him to receive before conversion. The adop­
tion of a purely economic and social criteria seems to be 
the only satisfactory method to overcome these difficulties.
The Indian attitude to conversions has been 
described by one writer as “anachronistic”. There is 
no doubt that the anomalies cited above have a tendency 
to discourage conversions and to maintain the status quo.
For the freedom of conscience guaranteed in the Constitu­
tion to be real a way will have to be found to overcome
28 Shyamsunder v. Shanker Deo Yedalankar, A.I.R. I960 Mys.
27 131, 33;.
° Kartik Oraon v. David Munzni. A.I.R. 1964 Pat. 201.
30 Marc Galanter, “The Problem of Group Membership: Some 
Reflections on the Judicial Review of Indian Society”, 
4, J.I.L.I.. (1962), p. 331, at p. 355.
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these difficulties. The anomalies of the Hindu Code . 
legislation may perhaps he ironed out when a uniform 
Civil Code is adopted. As to those pertaining to “prote­
ctive discrimination1 there is now an increasing tendency 
to adopt alternative criteria for backwardness, besides 
the fact that this measure itself is meant to be of a 
temporary nature.
3. Education
It is the right of every society to choose the 
type of education it considers appropriate for its younger ■ 
generation. This is of vital importance to all minorities 
who seek to transmit to their children the common fund 
of their particular traditions and cultural values. In 
the case of religious minorities there is also a desire 
to create a favourable atmosphere for the promotion of 
their particular religious values. It is relevant to note 
that much of the pioneering work of education in India 
was done under the auspices of various religious bodies.
The Indian Constitution has shown its awareness of the
31needs of the minorities by granting them cultural freedom 
and recognising their educational rights. Article 30(1)
^  Article 29
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guarantees the right of religious minorities !tto esta­
blish and administer educational institutions of their 
choice.” The state is debarred from discriminating 
against any educational institution on the ground that 
it is under the management of a minority.^
The essential problem, however, is to determine 
the substance of this right in the light of governmental 
policy on education and the vicissitude of its administra­
tion. In general, it has been the policy all over India 
to encourage private agencies to develop their educational 
institutions at all levels. At the same time, there has 
been an increasing tendency to exercise greater control, 
which in some cased has severly curtailed the right of 
private management. Government controls in the form of 
the powers of inspection, granting of recognition, quali­
fications of teachers, audit of public funds, etc., have 
been in existence for some time. These are gradually 
being enlarged with requirements such as the inclusion 
of government nominees on school boards, appointment of 
headmasters by seniority, restrictions on the selection 
of the teaching staff and various service regulations. 
There has not been a consistent all-India policy in this
32 Article 30(2)
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respect. Education being a subject on the State List,^ 
conditions vary from State to State. A /general picture 
in this regard will, therefore, have to be constructed 
by reference to the case law.
The Supreme Court has had occasion to consider
the educational rights of the minorities in some detail
*4.
in Re Kerala Education Bill, 1957. when the President 
referred to it a Bill passed by the Kerala Assembly for 
its advisory opinion. The Bill included a number of pro­
visions affecting the rights of private management. Among 
the controversial provisions were some of the following:' 
all teachers1 salaries were to be paid directly by the 
government, and all f,ees collected by the management remi­
tted to the government; appointment of teachers had to 
be made only from a state register prepared by the govern­
ment; government could take over the management of any 
school for five years if the manager neglected to perform 
his duty; government could take over any category of 
aided schools, if it was thought necessary in order to 
standardise general education. The acceptance of these 
and other regulations was made a condition for recognition 
and the receipt of state aid.
Seventh Schedule, List II, entry 11. There are certain 
exceptions as to Central Institutions and Union agencies, 
(entries 63 to 66 of List I, and entry 25 of List III).
54 A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 956.
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The Court held that clauses 14 and 15 of the 
Bill, which enpowered the government to take over aided 
schools, were unconstitutional. However, it rejected 
the contention that the Bill, as a whole, constituted an 
attack on the right of minorities to establish and admini­
ster educational institutions of their choice. There was 
nothing in the Bill which discriminated against minorities; 
if any private school solicited state aid, it mast be 
willing to submit to reasonabe regulations. It said that 
the right to administer could not obviously include the 
right to maladminister. A minority surely cannot ask for 
aid or rrcognition for an educational institution run by 
it in unhealthy surroundings, with incompetent teachers, 
possessing no semblace of qualification, and which did 
not maintain even a fair standard of teaching or which 
taught matters subersive to the welfare of the scholars.
The Constitutional right to administer an educational 
institution of their choice does not necessarily militate 
against the claim of the state to insist that, as a con­
dition for a grant in aid, the state may prescribe reaso­
nable regulations to ensure the excellence of the insti­
tution to be aided. Reasonable regulations may certainly
■55
be imposed by the state for aid or even for recognition.
^  Ibid, at p. 982.
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The Court found, however, that, though the
provisions of the Bill in general were reasonable, they
had made "serious inroads on the right of administration;
and appear perilously near violating that r i g h t . I t
was necessary to ensure that the regulations did not
interfere with the substance of the right guaranteed to
minorities. The government ougnt not to restrict that
right by indirect means, as for instance by denying aid
or withholding recognition. No educational institution
in modern times could afford to subsist and efficiently
function without some state aid, and hence the conditions
in that regard must not be such as to amount to a surrender
of the minorities1 Constitutional right of administering
37educational institutions of their choice. As to recog­
nition, without it the educational institutions establi­
shed or to be established by the minority communities 
cannot fulfil the real objects of their choice and exer­
cise the rights under Article 30(1) effectively. The 
right to establish educational institutions of their 
choice must, therefore, mean the right to establish 
real institutions, which will effectively serve the needs 
of their community and the scholars who resort to their 
institutions. It is true that there is no such thing
36 I M a , p. 983.
37 Ibid. p. 980.
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as a fundamental right to recognition by the state, but 
to deny recognition to educational institutions, except 
upon terms tantamount to the surrender of their Consti­
tutional right of administration of the educational 
institutions of their choice, is injtruth and effect to 
deprive them of their rights under Article 30(1). The 
legislative power is subject to the fundamental rights 
and the legislature cannot indirectly take away or abri­
dge the fundamental rights, which it could not do directly? 3
The Supreme Court has further clarified the 
position in Sidhrajbhai Sabba.i v. State of Gujarat.^ The 
right of minorities under Article 30(1) is an absolute 
right which is not made subject to reasonable restrictions 
as the rights in Article 19. It is intended to be a real 
right for the protection of minorities. Regulations in 
the true interests of efficiency of instruction, discipline, 
health, sanitation, morality, public order and the like 
can be made. Such regulations made to secure the proper 
functioning of institutions in matters educational are not 
restrictions on the substance of the right which is guaran­
teed. Regulations which may lawfully be imposed either 
by legislative or executive action as ft condition of
Ibid, at p. 985.
5 9 A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 540.
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receiving grant or recognition must be directed to making 
the institution effective as an educational institution, 
while retaining its character as a minority institution. 
Such regulations must satisfy a dual 1^ st —  the test of 
reasonableness, and the test that it is regulative of 
the educational character of the institution and is condu­
cive to making the institution an effective vehicle of 
education for the minority community or other persons 
who resort to it. In this case it was held that the 
rules made by the Bombay Government as to the recognition 
of private training institutions, the requirement as to 
reservation of 80 per cent of seats for government nominees, 
and the threats to withhold grants-in-aid and recognition 
constituted a violation of the rights guaranteed in 
Article 30(1) . 4 0
In K. 0. Varkey v. State of Kerala, the High 
Court struck down a number of the Kerala Education Rules, 
1959, as being ultra vires Article 30. Prom the fact that 
the minority had submitted to those rules in the past, it 
could not be inferred that they had waived the right under 
Article 30 by non-assertion.^ It was doubtful if a 
fundamental right given to a community with fluctuating
^  5 kid, paragraphs 1 0 , 15 and 16, at pp. 545, 547. 
4 1  A.I.R. 1969 Ker. 191 (195).
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membership could be waived so as to bind its future mem­
bers.^*2
The rights guaranteed in Article 30 can be
claimed by any religious denomination which can prove its
distinctive character. The term Religious minority1 for
4-3this purpose is widely interpreted!^ The admission of 
outsiders to a minority educational institution does not 
derogate from its character as such. Such an eventuality 
is clearly contemplated by Articles 29(2) and 30(1) read 
together.4 4 The Patna High Court has held that a school 
managed and administered by the Brahmo Samaj is entitled 
to protection under Article 30(1), even though the majority 
of the students were not of Brahmo faith and no instruction 
in that faith was given. The words "educational insti­
tutions" are of very wide import and hence it is within 
the competence of a minority to establish a university 
also.4^
Not only has a minority the right to establish 
and administer educational institutions, but the institu­
tions must be of their own choice. In the Bombay Education
4 2 Ibid, pp. 195-196.
4  ^See p. 155ff., supra.
4 4 A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 956, at p. 978.
4  ^Dipendra Nath Sarkar v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1962 Pat.
tut:
4  ^Azeeb Basha v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 662(670).
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Society1s case the Bombay High Court held that it is not
open to the State to dictate to a minority what the nature
of its educational institution should be. It is for the
minority itself to decide what is best to conserve the
rights given to it under Article 29(1).^ In appeal, the
Supreme Court upheld this view. It said that the power
of the State to determine the medium of instruction must
yield to the fundamental right of the minority to impart
instruction in their own institutions to the children of
4-8their own community in their own language.
The Fundamental Rights in Articles 29(1) and 
3 0 (1 ) are, however, two separate and distinct rights 
although it is possible that they may meet in a given 
case. In a recent decision the Supreme Court has held 
that the right guaranteed in Article 30(1) cannot be limi^ r 
ted by introducing in it considerations on which Article 
29(1) is based. The latter Article is a general protection 
which is given to minorities to conserve thfiir language, 
script|or culture. The former is a special right to mino­
rities to establish educational institutions of their 
choice. This choice is not limited to institutions seeking 
to conserve language, script or culture and the choice is
^  Bombay Education Society v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1954 
Bom. 468 1476).
State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society. A.I.R.
1954 S.G. 561 (568)
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not taken away if the minority community having establi­
shed an educational institution of its choice also admits 
members of other communities. The court held that this 
is a circumstance irrelevant for the application of 
Article 30(1) since no such limitation is expressed and 
none can be implied.^
Whether the right of administration given to 
a minority is violated is a matter to be decided in the 
context of particular circumstances. It was held that 
the provisions of the Bihar University laws (Amendment) 
Act, 1965, seeking to regulate the constitution of gover­
ning bodies were unconstitutional. If a governing body, 
as required by the Act, is imposed on an educational 
institution run by Muslims, its character as an institu­
tion for imparting modern education to Muslim students 
would disappear. Under the statute most of the members 
of the governing body needjnot necessarily be Muslims 
and the governing body would be like that of any other 
educational institution. The effect would be the total 
destruction of the character of the institution as an 
institution administered by a minority community. The
State cannot, in the guise of regulatory measures, take
50away the character of such an institution. On the 
^  Rev, ffr. W. Proost v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1969 S.C.
465 (468- 6^ , 470).
50 Muslim An.iuman-e-Taleem v. The Bihar University, A.I.R. 
Iyfe7 Pat. 1 4 8 CU9). --------------------
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other hand, the service rules, framed under the Punjab 
University (Amendment) Act, 1962, which sought to give 
representation to teachers on governing bodies were held 
not to violate the rights of the Sikh community. Even 
if non-Sikh members could be elected to the governing 
body of Khalsa College, the presence of two representa­
tives in a total of, say, 2 9 persons would not in any 
manner alter the real and true composition of that body. 
Moreover, it is open to the Governing Body not to appoint 
any person who is not a Sikh as a teacher. ^ 1
In Aldo Maria Patroni v. E. C. Kesavan, where 
a Director of Public Instruction made an order abrogating 
the appointment of a Headmaster in a Catholic school on 
the sole ground that he was junior in service, the Kerala 
High Court struck it down as being unconstitutional. It 
held that the right to choose a Headmaster was perhaps 
the most important facet of the right to administer a 
school; the imposition of a trammel thereon' — except to 
the extent of prescribing the requisite qualifications 
and experience—  could not but be considered a violation
C O
of the guaranteed rights.
51 Khalsa College, Amritsar v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 
1968 Pun j J 4o3 ('465) .
5 2 A.I.R. 1965 Ker. 75 (77),
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The term 'administer1 has been held to be wide
enough to take the enfocement of discipline with regard
to dress and other matters. Thus a direction that a
teacher, an expelled nun, should not wear the religious
habit of a nun could not be questioned.^  A Christian
institution receiving state aid was within its rights in
forbidding the performance of a non-Christian religious
ceremony within its precincts. Although it could not
interfere with the beliefs and profession of religion,
it could control the outward manifestation of it within
54the boundaries of ts property.
A minority's right to establish educational 
institutions, however, is not an exclusive right. It
does not mean that the minority in a village has an exclu-
i
sive right to conduct a non-denominational school in the
village, unmolested by any competition from the majority
population of the village. The setting uj,p of a rival
school by a member of the 'majority' community does not
55violate any of the rights of a minority. If, as a 
result of such competition, a school established by a 
minority cannot get enough students to qualify for a
^  Puthota Chinnamma v. The Regional Dy. Director of Public 
Instruction, A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 277.
54. Sanjib Kumar v. Principal, St. Paul's College, A.I.R. 
1957”CaT.'” "524.
^  Joseph Callian v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1962 Ker. 35.
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grant from the government, there is no question of dis- 
crimination by the State on grounds of community,
57In kzeez Basha v. Union of India, the Supreme ■ 
Court has held that the words 11 establish and administer11 
in Article 30(1) must be read conjunctively. Here the 
Aligarh Muslim University (Amendment) Act, 1965, had been 
challenged as unconstitutional. The Court held, on facts, 
that the Aligarh University had been established by the 
Central legislature, and not by the Muslim minority, and 
hence Article 30(1) did not apply. A minority has the 
right to administer educational institutions of its choice, 
provided it has established them. The Article cannot be 
read to mean that, even if the educational institution 
has been established by somebody else, any religious 
minority would have the right tojadminister it, because
for some reason or other it might have been administering
58it before the Constitution came into force. This seems 
to be somewhat a narrow view, especially since it was 
admitted thtit the institution in question came into 
being as a result of the efforts of the Muslim minority 
though its formal establishment was by an Act of Central
Jose Callian v. Director of Public Instruction, A.I.R. 
1959 Ker. 331 (33^7^
5 7 A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 662.
5 8 Ibid. pp. 669-670.
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Legislature. Leaving aside the merits of the impugned 
legislation in this particular case, it seems more appro- 
prite, in principle, to decide the status of such an 
institution with reference to its real connection with 
a particular community.
The question of religious instruction in schools
While on the subject of education, a reference 
may also be made to the issue of religious instruction 
in schools, in particular, government schools. It may 
be noted that private schools run by any community, 
recognised by government and receiving aid out of state 
funds, are entitled to impart religious instruction, 
subject only to obtaining guardians1 consent as laid 
down in Article 28(3).
As to government schools, Article 28(1) lays 
down that no religious instruction shall be provided 
therein. While this is still the rule, a debate has been 
going on for some time as to the desirability of intro­
ducing some form of moral instruction to take its 
finplace. The need for moral and spiritual instruction 
is not denied by any religious community. Such instruction
^  For a critique of this case, see, Mohammad Grhouse,
"A Minority University and the Supreme Court11, 10, J.I.L.I. 
(1 9 6 8 ), p. 5 2 1 .
6 0 A detailed discussion on the subject is to be found in 
L. E. Smith, India as a Secular State, p. 347ff.
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would also be within the framework of the Constitutio, 
though at times it would not be easy to distinguish it 
from religious instruction. This problem can be overcome, 
if necessary, by amending the Constitution once general 
agreement is reached. The most crucial issue, however, 
is to find agreement between all the religious communi­
ties as to what the content of such instruction ought to 
be, and the manner of its presentation.
The minority communities who recognise the need 
for such instruction to the extent of gladly welcoming 
religious instruction, are at the same time apprehensive 
of the danger of such instruction being inconsistent with 
their particular religious beliefs. In their opinion, 
religion, spirituality and morals cannot be divorced 
from each other. Hence the University Education Commi­
ssion^ recommendation for the teaching of universal 
religion did not find favour with Indian Christians and 
Muslims. That commission sought to take "the Indian
view of religion", seeking to "harmonise all faiths in
61one universal synthesis." But this view does not 
coincide with those of the above communities, who also 
find that certain types of common worship is objection­
able. A Committee appointed subsequently, the Committee
61 Report of the University Education Commission, Simla, 
(1§5C)), see Chapter "ST
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on Religious and Moral Instruction, has taken a different 
approach. They have suggested that every citizen should 
seek to understand the basic principles and values of 
religions ther than his own with a view to promoting a 
spirit of tolerance through the understanding of differen­
ces. They have recommended a comparative and sympathetic 
study of the lives and teachings of the great religious 
teachers, their ethical systems and philosophies, and 
the inculcation of good manners, social service and true 
patriotism. ^
The task of incrementing any scheme of religious 
or moral instruction amid the existing diversity of reli­
gious beliefs would not be easy. The Muslim view appears 
to be that it would be an "undesirable and unsafe" policy 
to entrust the direction of religious education to the 
government, &ven if it were Constitutionally possible, 
and that the common religious and moral instruction which 
is being considered is also "unacceptable and impracti­
cable." Their view is that religious education for
Muslim children in government schools must be conducted
6^by Muslims themselves. J General public opinion among 
Muslims is said to be in favour of making religious
62 Report of the Committee on Religious and Moral Instru­
ction. Rew Delhi, (I960), p. lb.
^  S. Abid Husain, The Destiny of Indian Muslims, (1965)•
p. 2 1 0 .
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instruction in Islam for Muslim children compulsory.
They also demand the eradication of Hindu religious mytho­
logy and anti-Muslim historical references from state 
text-books and the elimination of Hindu rituals and public 
ceremonies from state education.^ In a general context, 
they resent r,a system of education and a course of study 
....that teach a creed which is opposed to the basic 
concepts of Islam, which cuts across the fundamental doct­
rines of Divine Unity and Apostleship, preach openly 
pantheistic and polytheistic beliefs and force Muslim 
children to learn the mythology of another religious
community, after believing in which no Muslim can remjin
65a Muslim by any stretch of imagination." J
These strong sentiments represent, perhaps, just
66one shade of Muslim opinion. But they serve to illustrate 
the point that in the present circumstances much effort 
will be needed before a course of moral instruction accep­
table to all can be found. The desirablity of introducing 
some such course is now greater than ever. But it would
T. P. ¥right Jr., "The Effectiveness of Muslim Repre­
sentation in India”, in D. E. Smith (ed.), South Asian 
Politics and Religion, (1966), p. 102, at p. 105.
65 A. H. A. Uadvi, quoted by 2, H. Paruqui in "Muslims and 
the Secular State”, in D. E, Smith (ed.), Ibid, at p.144*
66 T. P. Wright Jr., distinguishes various sections of the 
Muslim community as "modernist”, "secularist”, "tradi­
tionalist", and "fundamentalist": "Muslim Education in 
India at Cross Roads", 59, Pacific Affairs. (1966), at 
pp. 61, 65.
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be unwise to force the pace irrespective of the suscepti­
bilities of any religious community. A gradual transfor­
mation in outlook is meanwhile taking place among all 
communities and perhaps it may be possible to arrive at 
such an agreement in the not too distant future.
4. Safeguard of communal interests
A predominant feature of religion in India is 
that it has created a strong sense of community among 
members of each religious persuation, the significance 
of which reaches far beyond the immediate sphere of reli­
gion. That communities polarise around and identify 
themselves with a religion is a historical fact. Despite 
what the Constitution seeks to achieve, the communal 
consciousness among religious groups is strong as ever.
As D. E. Smith has observed, religion provides each 
group with a focal point of identity and social solida­
rity and large areas of culture are intimately associa­
ted with it. Thus, though a member of the Muslim commu­
nity may be an atheist, the social institutions, personal 
laws, customs, traditions, history, art and literature, 
which have helped to mould his individual and social exi­
stence have been closely related to Islam. Religious 
symbols represent group interests and group self-esteem 
and continue to be emotionally powerful in unifying the
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group in the face of real or imagined threats from out- 
67
side. Though ideally in a democracy there is no place 
for purely communal groups of any kind, for the present 
at least the aspect of religious communities cannot he 
ignored. It is, therefore, necessary to ensure that the 
legitimate interests of all such groups are protected.
The most prominent among all communal interests 
must undoubtedly be the preservation of law and order 
assuring all communities security of life and property.
The Muslim minority is particularly vulnerable in this 
respect. Unfortunately, tension between Hindu andMuslim 
communities still persists leading to open clashes at 
least excuse and resulting in the loss of life and property. 
Events in the recent past have shown that incidents of
/To
this kind are on the increase both in number and in scale. 
This is bound to create a sense of insecurity in the
^  !D. E. Smith, "Emerging Patterns of Religion and Politics”, 
in P. E. Smith (ed.), South Asian Politics and Religion,
(1966), at p. 22.
68 eg., in August 1967, more than 150 lives were lost in 
Bihar (The Times, November 3, 1967, p.5); in the first 
four months of 1968, there were more than 200 cases 
of communal riots (The Times, June 12, 1968, p.6); in 
September 1969, over 100 people lost their lives in 
Gujarat (The Times, September 22, 1969, P*6). A Report 
published by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government 
of India, in June 1969 (but which is not yet available 
in London), has reported a steady rise in deaths due 
to communal clashes since 1966. The total of deaths in 
the first guarter of 1968 equalled the total of those 
killed over the previous eight year period. By far the 
greater number of those who lost their|lives were Muslims: 
The Times, leader article, September 22, 1969.
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Muslim community, and in a lesser degree among minorities 
generally. It is necessary to take urgent steps to reverse 
this trend and to reinforce the safeguards. J Everything 
possible must be done towards achieving communal harmony.
In the context of the present chapter, however, 
we must confine our attention to interests which are of 
special religious significance. It is apparent that the 
task of separating religion from non-religion, which is 
already difficult on account of the nature of religion in 
India, is further complicated in the communal context.
Where communal interests come into conflict with the decla­
red goals of the Constitution, the task of reconciling 
the two is, therefore, a delicate one.
The range of communal interests is very wide 
and it is not within the scope of this chapter to go into 
them in detail. A discussion on a number of these issues 
concerning particular communities is to be found in E. E. 
Smith1s book.^0 In the following pages it is proposed 
to merely touch upon three of the issues, viz., the perso­
nal laws, language and culture, and property and insti­
tutions, with a view to giving an idea of the communal 
aspect of religion in a minority context.
69^ Eor suggestions in this regard, see Humayun Kabir, 
Minorities in a Democracy, (1968), p. 55ff.
70 India as a Secular State. See Part IY on minorities, 
especially chapter 14.
Personal Law
Every Indian is governed, in a greater or 
smaller degree, by a 1personal law1 which applies to him 
in matters concerning the family. This law is determined 
and interpreted by reference to the r/ligion he professes 
or is presumed to profess. Thus Hindus, Muslims, Christi­
ans, Parsis and Jews are subject to their respective perso 
nal laws, codified or uncodified, with regard to matters 
such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and succession.
In the context of the present chapter we must consider 
the religious and communal significance of these laws to 
the minorities vis a vis the objectives of reform and the 
Uniform Civil Code contemplated in the Constitution.
Though reform and codification are not new 
features introduced by the Constitution, there can be no 
doubt that it has given the movement a sense of direction 
and urgency. The earlier attempts at codification, begi­
nning in the nineteenth century, have been few and far 
between.^ The Caste Disabilities Removal Act (1850), 
the Hindu Widows1 Remarriage Act (1856), the Hindu Inhe­
ritance (Removal of Disabilities) Act (1928), the Hindu 
Women1s Right to Property Act (1937) and the Hindu Married 
Women’s Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance
71 Ibid, p. 266ff
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Act (1946), scanning a century of reform hardly touched 
the fringes of Hindu personal law. In a decade following 
the assumption of government by the Crown in 1858 a con­
certed attempt to codify the law was made. The Code of 
Civil Procedure (1859), the Penal Code (1860), the Code 
of Criminal Procedure (1861), and the Indian Contract 
Act (1872) took over areas formerly governed by justice, 
equity and good conscience”, The Special Marriages Act, 
1872, applied to anyone who availed of it and the Indian 
Succession Act, 1872, (reenacted with amendment in 1925), 
applied to all except Hindus and Muslims. But the move­
ment was not carried further and important areas of 
personal laws were left untouched. Some legislation 
pertaining to individual communities was passed, Thus, 
the Indian Divorce Act (1869) and the Indian Christian 
Marriage Act (1872) governed Christian marriage and divorce 
(with exceptions for the Catholic community with regard
72to matters governed by Canon law). The Parsi community' 
was governed by the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1865, 
(now replaced by the Act of 1936). Until the introduction 
of the Constitution no coherent attempt had been made to 
deal with the problem as a whole.
 ^ As to law relating to Parsis, see P. K. Irani, nThe 
Personal law of the Parsis in India”, in J, H. D. 
Anderson (ed.), Bamily law in Asia and Africa, (1968), 
p. 273.
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With the introduction of the Hindu Code legis-
73lation in the mid-fifties, a major step was taken in
the direction of a Uniform Civil Code envisaged by Article
*
44 of the Constitution. It is significant that the per­
sonal law of the majority community, accounting for 85 
per cent of the total population, has been amended and 
brought on the statute book. Though it still remains a 
personal law, applied by reference to the religious affi­
liation, it seems a natural first step towards the codi­
fication of other personal laws and bringing them in 
line with each other preparatory to an uniform Code. The 
anomalies arising out of a multiplicity of personal laws
7 A
will have to be removed. ^ Whatever may be the method 
used in bringing this Code about, the question now seems 
to be not ’whether1, but rather ’when’ it will come. It 
is generally accepted that it is bound to come sooner or 
later.
This situation has given rise to some concern 
among the minority communities as to the possible changes 
in their laws. The personal law of the majority community 
having been changed, it is now their turn to take stock
^  Hindu Marriage Act (1955), Hindu Succession Act (1956), 
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act (1956), and Hindu 
Adoptions and Maintenance Act 11956).
^  On this subject, see J. D. M. Derrett, Religiont Law 
and the State in India, (1968), pp. 542-545•
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of the situation, and also for the government to decide 
what attitude it shall adopt in this regard. In this 
context the Muslim community is in a particularly grave 
predicament. Though other communities are also natuaally 
concerned to some extent, as the Christian Community was 
with regard to the proposed legislation on marriage,^ they 
are, on the whole, prepared to accept a Uniform Code.^
The Muslim community is as ayet not prepared for this.
On account of a number of factors, such as the size of the 
community, the intensity of feeling and historical conside­
rations, the question of personal laws at present is essen­
tially a Muslim problem and needs to be dealt with as such.
It is not necessary to elaborate on the fact
that Muslims have always felt very strongly on this issue.
The retention of the personal law has been one of their
demands since pre-Independence days. In 1931 they asked
for, and got in the form of a resolution, an assurance
from the Working Committee of the Congress that their
personal law shall be protected by specific provisions
77to be embodied in the future Constitution.' In the 
Constituent Assembly the Muslim members emphasised that
^  See the Report on the Law Relating to Marriage and
Divorce amongst Christians in India, (i960) / Law Commi­
ssion of India, l5th Report.
7 6 D. E. Smith, India as a Secular State, pp. 422-423.
77 Ibid. pp. 420-421.
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it was part of their religion, and that they would in 
no circumstances give it up.^S Retention of the perso­
nal law still continues to he a religious demand of the
79Muslim community. ^
The need forjthe reform of the Muslim personal 
law is all too clear. As J. D. M. Derrett has pointed 
out, in the context of the Hindu Code, Muslims have as 
much need, from an academic and practical viewpoint, to
have their personal law (or rather laws) reformed and
30perhaps codified. It is also clear that the powers
of the government are quite wide enough to carry this
reform through if it is prepared to undertake this hold
venture. It seems unlikely that amending and codifying
the personal law would he held hy the courts to he repug'
81nant to an essential part of religion. The reluctance 
on the part of the government, perhaps, stems from the 
needs of political expediency, a desire not to offend 
the susceptibilities of a minority community, or may
^  Maulana Hasrat Mohani, C.A.D.t Vol.VII, p. 759*
^  T. P. Wright Jr., **The Effectiveness of Muslim Repre­
sentation in India*1, in 3). E. Smith (ed.), South Asian 
Politics and Religion, (1966), at p. 105.
Religion, Law and the State in India, p. 522.
^  In Badruddin v. Aisha Begum, (1957 All. L.J. 300), it 
was held that polygamy is not an essential part of a 
Muslim*s religion. As to Hindu law, in the similar 
context, see State of Bombay v. Warasu Appa Mali, (1951) 
53 Bom. L .R .7W * and £rTnivasa v. Saraswati, A.I.R.1952 
Mad. 193. --------- ---------
even be a deliberate plan to induce the minority concerned 
to initiate the change itself.
The main argument put forward against the 
change of Muslim personal law has been that ttin Islam,
Law is Religion and Religion is Law, because both have 
the same source and an equal authority, being both con­
tained in the same divine revelation —  a revelation
which covers the whole sphere of man's thought and 
82action." But this argument has now lost much of its 
force in view of the vast changes in the law that have 
taken place in most Muslim countries, including Pakistan. 
The law in contmporary Islam is by no means exclusively 
Islamic.^ Very little of the Muhammadan law actually 
depends on the Koran; only a fraction of it, as origi­
nally interpreted, is actually in force in India (the 
rest having been abolished), and of that fraction a great 
part has been modified deliberately or accidentally by 
the judiciary since the East India Company undertook
op
Lord Bryce, quoted by S. S. Uigam, "Uniform Civil
Code and Secularism", in G. S. Sharma (ed.),
Secularism, p. 153, at p. 155.
Por a detailed discussion on this subject see, U. J. 
Coulson, "Islamic Law", in J. 3). M. Lerrett (ed.),
An Introduction to Legal Systems, (1968), p. 54. As
to changes in family law in Pakistan see, by the same
author, "Islamic Pamily Law: Progress in Pakistan", 
in J. IT. 3). Anderson (ed.), Changing Law in Developing 
Countries. (1963), p. 240.
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directly to administer it.8^ The Muslim Personal Law 
(Shariat) Act, 1937, is not uniform in its application 
to all Muslims in India. Various sections of the Muslim 
community in different parts of India are governed by 
laws which differ from each other, being derived from 
local custom and usage, and in some cases by law resem­
bling uncodified Hindu Law.8^
Within the Muslim community itself the attitude 
towards reform varies among different sections, with 
shades of opinion ranging from conservative to progre­
ssive. Among those who hold the former are the ulama 
with a following of the greater part of the community. 
Pazlur Rahman attributes the conservative tendencies and 
the lack of initiative of the community to the fact that 
Muslims have always been a minority in the sub-continent, 
a fact which compelled them to emphasise and cling tena­
ciously to relatively external expressions at the ex­
pense of inner growth, and also to the fact that the 
quality of the ulama is generally lower than in the more
J. D. M. Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India, 
p. 514. Chapter 1~, entitled 11 The Puture of Muhammadan 
Law in India11 is of special interest in the present 
context. Other references to personal law, in general, 
can be found at pages 39ff-, 51ff., and 438ff.
85 rbia. pp. 521-522.
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86progressive Muslim countries. In the latter category 
are the Muslim intelligentia who, as a whole, are said 
to be in favour of reform.8*^ The progressives, with
A. A. A. Fyzee and M. C. Chagla among them, see the need 
for a correct linguistic assessment of Quranic injun­
ctions and its re-interpretation and application to the 
conditions of modern life according to the needs and 
appeals to the mind of the twentieth century Muslim.
This, coupled with the acceptance of religious pluralism 
under the sovereignty of a secular state is seen as a 
solution by Fyzee. He sees the need to disentangle law 
from religion in Islam in distinguishing subjective 
ethical norms from objective rules; this, according to 
him, would make the acceptance of even secular law 
possible.®8
This dilemma presents two alternatives: the 
government could force the pace and codify the law 
irrespective of opposition, as was done in the case of 
the Hindu Code; or, it could wait for the community 
itself to take the initiative. In the existing circum­
stances the second course seems to be the wisest. On
86 Pazlur Rahman, "The Controversy over the Muslim Pamily 
Laws", in D. E. Smith (ed.), South Asian Politics and 
Religion, (1966), p.414, at p. 427*
8  ^2. H. Faruqi, "Indian Muslims and the Ideology of the 
Secular State", in Ibid, p. 138, at p. 194.
88 A- Ahgiad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan.
(1967), pp” Ybb-2b7. '--------------------------
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an issue where the communal emotions, rather than the 
rational arguments, are likely to prevail, it is essential 
that nothing should he done which would cause undue alarm 
and a sense of insecurity in the community. Meanwhile, 
the government could create conditions for a favourable 
public opinion towards reform in the community by means 
of education, debate, and the bringing together of Muslim 
jurists who would examine the whole question. At the 
same time some of the abuses resulting from the personal 
law can be dealt with by legislation without actually
OQ
interfering with the personal law. * It is important that 
the Muslim community itself should recognise the urgency 
of the situation and take the opportunity afforded it.
Language and Culture
Karl Vossler suggests that the function of
language in relation to religion can never be more than
the expression of an opinion. Nevertheless, pious minds
are always inclined to look upon language, like everything
90else, as a special gift and a tool of divinity. A 
commumity of religion and of language not too infrequently 
coincide, in which case that language would be held in
J. L. M. Derrett, n. 84 at p.231, supra, pp.538-542,546ff.
90 The Spirit of Language in Civilisation, (1932), pp.23-26.
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greater respect and have a religious significance. This 
is the case with regard to Muslims in relation to Urdu 
and to a lesser extent the case of Sikhs as to Gurmukhi.
The Muslim^ attachment to Urdu springs from 
the fact that it has been associated with the scriptures, 
particularly when the Arabic script is used, and also 
from the fact that it is used by the greater part of the 
community. It has been the language through which gene­
rations of Muslims have received their education. These 
facts, coupled with the fear that some sections of the 
majority community seek to discourage Urdu on account 
of its Islamic connections and replace it with the lan­
guage of the majority, have tended to increase its reli­
gious significance to the Muslim ommunity.
The case of the Sikhs is on a different footing. 
Here the question involved is one of using the Gurmukhi 
script, the script used in the sacred writings of the 
Sikhs. However, it has come to possess a greater signi­
ficance in a political context. During the controversy 
on the Sikh demand for a Punjabi Suba, it was insisted 
that Punjabi written exclusively in Gurmukhi should be 
used.-^ Kushwant Singh has suggested that the only 
chance of survival for the Sikhs is "to create a State
D. E. Smith, India as a Secular State, p. 450.
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in which they form a compact group where the teaching 
of Gurmukhi and the Sikh religion is compulsory. It 
may he noted that with the creation of the new States of 
Punjab and Haryana the demand for a new State has been 
conceded, but there is no compulsion as to the learning 
of the religion or the language.
Muslim fears with regard to Urdu have not been 
without justification. Post-Independence policy in some 
States, particularly Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh 
and Rajastan, was to discourage Urdu, leading to its
93
virtual elimination as a medium of instruction in schools. 
Perhaps the long Hindi-Urdu controversy , with the align­
ment of communities behind each, has something to do with 
these anti-Urdu tendencies. However, since the States 
Reorganisation in 1956 and the Constitution Seventh 
Amendment providing for primary education in the mother 
tongue, the position of Urdu is now on a secure footing.
A Commissioner for linguistic Minorities has been appointed
94.
to look after the welfare of all linguistic minorities.
But, as we shall see later, all the problems are not
^  K. Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Yol. II, (1966),p.305•
93 / \ ^D. E. Smith, op. cit., (n. 91, supra), p. 425*
94. See Chapter IY, infra.
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overcome by these measures, and a great deal depends 
on the willingness of the State governments to actually 
implement the policies that have been laid down.
There are more questions facing the Muslim 
community than merely securing the preservation of Urdu.
It has been asked whether it is a wise policy for Indian 
Muslims to isolate their community by insisting on edu­
cation in Urdu, and whether it would be in its interest 
to receive instruction in Urdu instead of the dominant 
language if they wish to succeed in business, the profe­
ssions, the Public Services and politics.^ Butthese 
are questions which the Muslim community alone is in a 
position to decide and no attempt should be made to pre­
ssurise them in any way. As yet, the Muslim demands with 
regard to Urdu continue. The preservation of Urdu langua­
ge and Arabic script and its use in education, government, 
and courts, the correct census of Urdu speakers, and the
fair treatment of Urdu Muslim newspapers have been listed
96as some of the demands in this respect.
The question of culture is somwwhat more compli­
cated. Some concern has been expressed by the minority 
communities, particularly Muslims and Christians, at the
95 / xD. E. Smith, op. cit., (n. 91, supra), p. 430.
96 T. P. Wright Jr., ”The Effectiveness of Muslim Repre­
sentation in India”, in D. E. Smith (ed.), South Asian 
Politics and Religion, at p. 106.
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tendency to equate Indian culture with Hindu culture 
97exclusively. ' Muslims feel that the composite character
of the Indian culture is not being acknowledged and that
their contribution to the national culture is often 
98ignored. It is noted that there is a tendency to regard 
Indian culture as synonimous with the religious practices 
of the majority community and that consciously or unconsci­
ously, those who wield authority seek to impose these
99outward forms of religion of the majority on others.
However, it should be realised that the admi­
nistration of a cultural policy is bound to be difficult 
in India in view of the close association of culture of 
the particular communities with their religion, and the 
unequal size of the communities. To some extent it is 
inevitable that the Hindu culture should have an all- 
pervading influence on the cultural scene, if alone on 
account of the sheer size of that community. It is essen­
tial that the minority communities should not force them­
selves into cultural isolation. There is room for all 
communities to be left open to }the cultural influences 
of others, without having to compromise their religious 
beliefs or without having to give up their own culture.
97 For a detailed discussion on the subject see, D. E.
Smith, op. cit., (n. 91, supra), Chapter 13, "Hinduism 
and Indian Culture", p. 372-
98 S. Abid Husain, National Culture of India, pp. 11-13,176. 
^  E. E. Smith, n. 97, at p. 376.
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Cultural freedom is a fundamental right which 
is guaranteed by the Constitution to every community and 
sections thereof. The cultural policy of the Union Govern­
ment so far has been one of active encouragement to all 
communities in their cultural activities. Where lapses 
have occured, or continue to occur, the blame must lie 
elsewhere than on the Constitution or the Central policy.
It is a matter to be pursued by the sections concerned 
through the democratic or legal processes open to them.
Property and Institutions
It has been noted that the freedom of property 
intrudes substantially into all discussion of the freedom 
of religion, more than one might expect.^ It is of inte­
rest to note that, of the four denominational rights 
guaranteed in Article 26, three deal with property and 
institutions. Clause (a) thereof guarantees the right to 
establish and maintain institutions for religious and 
charitable purposes, clause (c) the right to own and acquire 
movable and immovable property, and clause (d) the right to 
administer such property in accordance with law.
J. D. M. Eerrett, "The Reform of^Hindu Religious 
Endowments", in E. E. Smith (ed.J, South Asian Politics 
and Religion, (1966), p. 311- See also, Chapter 14,
B.eligious Endowments, Public and Private", in Religion, 
Eaw and the State in India, (1968), p. 482.
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An important distinction lias been made between 
the right of communal autonomy in religious affairs 
guaranteed in clause (b) of Article 26 and the other 
rights guaranteed therein. Whereas the former is an 
absolute right, the latter are to be exercised in accor­
dance with the law in force. The former is a fundamental 
right which no legislature can take away, while the latter 
can be regulated by laws which the legislature can vali— 
dly impose. In the right to property there is always 
a secular element which is supplied by the law of the 
country, and no religious denomination would be allowed 
the claim to be governed by a law derogating from it.
Accordingly, the property of the Christian 
religious institutions is as much subject to law as any 
other property privately held in the country and the 
State Legislature is competent to make laws with regard
3
to it. The government could validly inquire into the 
financial affairs of Christian Missions to determine how 
much foreign money comes in as aid and no objections 
could be taken to such an inquiry. But the Missions
2 Sarup Singh v. State of Punjab. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 860(865).
3
The State of M. P. v. Mother Superior, Convent School,
i.i.k. 1935 m. p. 362 TTS5T. ---------------
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are at complete liberty to utilise the funds to their 
best advantage without having to account to anyone unless 
the money is used in a way which promotes a breach of 
public order, morality and health. The internal admini­
stration of institutions is not a concern of the govern­
ment. It is a matter for the denomination alone to 
decide.^ It is not necessary to go into the details re­
garding the management of institutions here as the question 
has already been discussed above, in the context of edu­
cational institutions.
While the right of religious denominations to 
hold and acquire property is guaranteed, it does not 
prevent, or was not intended to prevent, property belon­
ging to a religious body being acquired by authority of 
law. The acquisition of a Devadayam inam under the 
Orissa Estates Abolition Act was held not to be an inter­
ference with the rights guaranteed under Article 26.
There was only a change in the form of the property, from
immovable property into money, and the fundamental rights
6were in no way affected. The West Bengal Poodgrains 
(Intensive Procurement) Order, 1952, which authorised
^ Prancis v. Madhy a Pradesh, 1957 M.P.l.J.l (Hag.).
 ^Suryapal Singh v. Govt. of U. P ., A.I.E. 1951 All. 674, 
alp.69^) .
 ^Chintamoni Pratihari v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1958 
Orissa 18, at p. l£.
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the State to acquire the entire produce of land dedicated 
to a deity or in trust was not an infringement of the 
rights conferred by Articles 25 and 26J  Section 55 of 
the U. P. Muslim ¥aqfs Act, I960, did not interfere with 
the freedom of religion of a mutawalli, as his duties
o
were held to be that of a purely secular character.
The power of the government to regulate matters 
pertaining to property and institutions is enormous. A 
great deal of legislation dealing with religious trusts 
and endowments already exists and more is being enacted. 
It is true that most of the legislation so far enacted 
pertains to the Hindu community in particular. But the 
trusts and endowments of the minority communities have 
not escaped notice. The Muslim waqfs are now regulated 
by the Muslim Waqfs Act, 1954. Its last amendment, in 
1964, has considerably broadened the scope of regulation 
by bringing within the ambit of registration a large 
number of institutions which were formerly excluded, 
and by bringing them under the control and administra- 
tion of state boards. General acts, dealing with the
7
Ram Krishna Kamar v. Junior Assessor, A.I.R. 1954 Cal.
o
Hafiz Mohammad v. U. P. Sunni Central Board of Waqf, 
A.I.R. 196^ All. 333.
9
2. H. Paruqi, "Indian Muslims and the Ideology of the 
Secular State" (n. 87 at p. 232), pp. 144-145.
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trusts and endowments of all communities are in force 
in some States.^ Thus, the Bombay Act deals with all 
religious and charitable trusts, whether managed by Hindus, 
Jains, Buddhists, Parsis, Christians or Muslims.
A plea for uniform legislation on trusts and 
endowments pertaining to all communities was made by the 
Hindu Religious Endowments Commission. It suggested that 
legislation could be enacted along the lines of Religious 
Trusts Bill, I960, with special provisions for individual 
communities, where necessary.1 1 The purpose of legislation, 
it was suggested, was not to affect or modify the obser­
vances, rituals and ceremonials associated with worship 
but only to ensure proper management and utilisation of 
the funds of religious institutions. It was not intended 
to interfere with the internal administration of insti­
tutions in any way which would entirely be vested in the
12particular religious denomination. However, nothing 
emerged from this proposal.
There is no doubt that in matters of property 
and institutions the tendency is one of increasing state
1(^ e.g., Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950; Madhya Pradesh 
Public Trusts Act, 1951; and, Rajastan Public Trusts 
Act, 1959.
11 Report of the Hindu Religious Endowments Commission,
U'9'£>2)7 pp.' 50-31.
12 Ibid. p. 29.
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regulation. It is clear that the government is enpowered 
to legislate with regard to all or any of the religious 
communities when it chooses, without infringing the rule 
of equality. The classification of institutions and 
endowments according to religion has been held hot to be 
arbitrary or unreasonable when the object sought to be 
attained is one of better administration and management 
of institutions. Article 14 does not prevent the legis­
lature from taking up one set of institutions for legis­
lative consideration at one time and enacting laws in 
respect of them, reserving others for consideration at 
a future date.1 -5 One could expect increasing activity 
in this sphere with a view to bringing the laws relating 
to all communities in line with each other.
13 P. M. Bramadathan Nambooripad v. Cochin Devaswom Board, 
A.I.R. 1956 T.C. ldY at' 'p. 21.
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Chapter IT
LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL INTERESTS
I. General Background
Language groups and their strength
No other single factor contributes more to 
the diversity of India than its languages. According to 
the Linguistic Survey of India, 179 languages and 544 
dialects are spoken there,1 India is thus truly a land of 
linguistic minorities,
Erom a genealogical point of view, Indian lan­
guages can be divided into four groups: first, the Indo- 
Aryan or Indo-European group from which nine major languages 
of North India are derived; second, the Dravidian group 
consisting of four great languages of South India —  Tamil, 
Telugu, Kannada and Malayalam; third, the Austro-Asiatic 
group represented by tribal and Adivasi languages of 
Central India; and the fourth, the Sino-Tibetan group which
1 Y. K. Narasimhan (ed.), The Languages of India: A Kaleido­
scopic Survey, (1958), p. 87.
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mainly comprises the dialects of the Assam area.
In terms of relative size of the groups speaking
these languages the picture is interesting, with about a
score of the languages accounting for the bulk of the
total population. Fifteen of the major languages falling
into the first two categories between them account for
ninety per cent of the population of India. 116 of the
languages are merely tribal tongues belonging to the Sino-
Tibetan family; those who speak them account for less than
one per cent of the population.^" The major languages in
the order of their numerical strength^ are, Hindi (with
associate languages like Urdu, Hindustani and Punjabi) with 
£
42 per cent, Telugu 9, Marathi, Tamil and Bengali 7 each, 
Gujarati 5, Kannada, Malayalam and Oriya 4 each, and 
Assamese two per cent of the total population.
A note of caution in respect of percentage 
figures seems appropriate here. It would be unrealistic
2 rbid, p. vii and pp. 8 8 -9 0 .
 ^S. K. Chatterji, "linguistic Survey of India: languages 
and Scripts", in S. Radhakrishnan (ed.), The Cultural 
Heritage of India, Vol. I, (1958), p. 53, at p. $4.
^ B. U. Prasad, "The languages in India", in Y. K. Narasim- 
han and others (ed.), The languages of India, (1958),p.87-
The figures have been rounded and are meant to give a 
general idea.
 ^This figure is disputed: see Shri Prank Anthony in the 
Report of the Committee of Parliament on Official lan­
guage, (1958), p. 97.
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to make comparisons involving linguistic groups, however 
small, without considering the actual numbers involved.
It may be borne in mind that one per cent of the popula­
tion of India amounts to over five million people.
Unique nature of the Indian problem
Comparisons are often sought to be made between 
the language problems in India and those elsewhere, parti­
cularly in countries like Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, 
Pakistan and Russia. It must be stated at the outset 
that these comparisons are of no practical value and would 
be potentially dangerous as sources of a solution. Por, 
the conditions in these countries bear little resemblance 
to those in India, whether in relation to the language 
issue as a whole or to minorities in particular. In the 
case of the countries mentioned, with the exception of 
Soviet Russia, the languages are limited to two or three 
and there is a polarisation into major camps capable of 
safeguarding their own interests. Widespread educational 
advancement means that a great number of the people are 
bilingual and trilingual. In the case of Pakistan the 
two language zones are separated by over a thousand miles 
of Indian territory. Though an analogy with Russia may 
be somewhat more realistic on account of its multiplicity 
of languages, the comparison ends there; for Russian has 
always been the dominant language and most other languages
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are undeveloped, and have never been in use as literary 
languages. One common script, the Cyrillic, puts matters 
on a different plane altogether. In most countries lan­
guage groups coincide with fnation groups1, while in India
the idea of a language group as a Nation1 or 1 sub-nation1
7
has been vigorously repudiated.' India has a score of 
major languages with different scripts, each endowed with 
a rich literature of its own.
The complexities of the Indian problem have been
highlighted by W. H. Morris-Jones, thus:
India has not one language problem, but a complex 
of language problems. It has them, moreover, in a 
situation of political and social revolution. Its 
difficulties are so unlike those of any other country 
in the world that direct comprehensive comparisons 
are worthless. It is not a question of establishing 
an equilibrium between two equally prominent languages, 
as in Belgium and Pakistan; nor of giving equal status 
to two or three languages spoken by unequal numbers 
of citizens as in Canada and Switzerland. The experi­
ence of the Soviet Union is of limited relevance for 
the reasons that Russian is the mother tongue of the 
great majority of the people and that it was already 
the established language of imperial administration 
and the cultural hegemony within the territories of 
the State. Turkey and Japan have had to reform and 
modernise —  borrowing words and changing scripts —  
but they had one language to deal with. In some 
African States English is in effect the official 
language, while also serving as flinkf language across 
tribal areas and medium of bulk of education, but in 
these areas there are no developed indegenous lan­
guages with their own literary traditions.0
 ^Report of the linguistic Provinces Commission (Dar 
Commission), (1948), pp. 2l0-2ll.
o
"Language and Region within the Indian Union”, in Philip 
Mason (ed.), India and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity,(1967), 
p • 51 y at p. 55* *
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While examples of foreign practise have been 
cited in the Indian official reports, they have been 
careful to warn of the dangers in drawing comparisons.
"The arrangements for safeguarding the interests of lin­
guistic minorities in other countries were adopted", noted 
the States Reorganisation Commission, "against their own
particular backgrounds. We must be careful, therefore,
g
in applying such precedents to our own problems". The 
Official Language Commission, after an extensive condide- 
ration of foreign practise, concluded that the problem 
of languages, as it arises in India, is of "peculiar 
difficulty and complexity" and that, "in view of the num­
ber of languages the problem does not admit of the easy 
solution that has been successfully employed in other 
countries"
Apart from the multiplicity of languages, a 
crucial factor in the minority context has been the poli­
tical division of the country on the linguistic basis.
In 1956, India was divided into 15 States principally 
coinciding with the language regions forming contiguous 
and compact units. Two more have been added since. Eor 
a perspective of the problem of linguistic minorities
9 Report of the States Reorganisation Commission, (1955), 
p. 2Ub“
^  Report of the Official Language Commission, (1956), 
p. 16
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arising from it, it is necessary to trace the develop­
ments leading to the reorganisation of States, and consider 
the course of events touching the language question since.
A brief historical background
The political organisation of the country prior 
to Independence had been haphazard. Boundaries of provin­
ces were not based on any rational criteria and were fixed 
by chance and convenience. Compact language groups were 
often broken up between different provinces. The hetero­
genous character of the provinces created problems, and 
various Commissions had been appointed from time to time 
to re-align the boundaries and deal with the problems.
The Philip-Buff Committee, the Attlee Committee, and the 
OfBonnell Committee, among others, may be cited. The 
Montagu-Chelmsford proposals did in fact include a sugges­
tion for reorganisation, but this did not materialise.
The present language policy has its origin in 
the Congress policy of early twenties onwards. With the 
growth of Independence movement Congress saw the need to 
appeal to the masses in a medium that they would under­
stand and which would prove effective. Por that purpose 
it set up its own administrative regions on a linguistic 
basis and in 1920 at the Wagpur Session declared the 
linguistic re-distribution of provinces as a clear
ii
i
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political objective. It was fully endorsed by the All 
Parties1 Conference in 1928, where it was said that "the 
mere fact that the people living in any particular area 
feel that they are a unit and desire to develop their 
culture, is an important consideration, even though there 
may be no sufficient historical or cultural justification 
to their demand".^ Congress reaffirmed its adherence 
to the linguistic principle at its Calcutta Session in 
1957, in the V/ardha Resolution of 1938 and in the election 
manifesto of 1945-1946. The Sapru Committee reiterated 
the position, and suggested that though it may not be 
possible to re-align the boundaries before the Constitu­
tion , it should indicate the machinery and prescribe
12the procedure for a re-alignment on a linguistic basis.
The convening of the Constituent Assembly marks 
a new phase in the development. On November 27, 1947, 
the Prime Minister on behalf of the Government accepted 
the demand for the linguistic provinces. In 1948, the 
President of the Constituent Assembly appointed the Lin­
guistic Provinces Commission (known as the Dar Commission, 
after its Chairman) which submitted its Report on the 
eve of the Jaipur Congress.
Nehru Report, (1928), p. 63.
Sapru Report, (1945), (Reprint, 1946), p. 296.
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The Bar Commission’s task was to examine and 
report on the feasibility of creating the new provinces 
of Andhra, Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra. Being the 
first Commission of its kind, it had to lay down general 
principles for the creation of new linguistic provinces. 
In doing so it recognised for the first time that the 
criterion of language alonw was inadeqate for that pur­
pose. Among other requisites were the geographic conti­
guity of a region without pockets and corridors of other 
languages intervening, its financial self-sufficiency, 
administrative convenience and the inherent capacity of 
a region for future development. It was necessary to 
have a large measure of agreement with regard to the 
formation of a new province amongst the people speaking 
the same language, and such a province could not be
forced by a majority upon a substantial minority of peo-
13pie speaking the same language.
The Commission realised that the Constitution 
of India would have to be promulgated with the internal 
boundaries unchanged because the peace and calm necessary 
for scientific and unbiassed consideration of the problem 
did not then exist. The redrawing of the map of India
^  Bar Commission Report,(1948), in Reports of Committees, 
(3i’d Series), 1950, p. 183.
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was essential, but such a step had to he postponed to a
future date, when conditions would he more suitable.^
But language alone could no longer he the sole test:
In any rational and scientific planning that may 
take place in regard to the provinces in India in 
the future, homogeneity of language alone cannot 
he decisive or even an important factor. Admini­
strative convenience, history, geography, economy, 
culture and many other matters will also have to he 
given due weight. ... Homogeneity of language will 
enter into consideration only as a matter of admini­
strative convenience and not on its own independent
force .t c 15
The lingustic Provinces Committee, appointed 
by the Jaipur Congress to consider the Par Commission's 
Report and "the new problems that have arisen out of the
-j g
achievement of Independence", also thought that the time 
was not yet ripe. It noted that, "at the present moment 
of our history when some of the smaller ^states have been 
merged into a province, a neighbouring province has obje­
cted with such violence and language that one would have 
almost thought that two countries were on the verge of
war. These are evil symptoms and we have to be very care-
17ful lest we do anything to encourage them."
14 IMd, p. 184
15 IMd, pp. 211-212.
-j C
Indian Rational Congress, Report of the Linguistic 
Provinces Committee appointed by the Jaipur Congress, 
(known as J. Y. P. Report, after its members), 1948, 
(2nd impression, 1953J* p. 1.
^  Ibid, p. 7.
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The agitation for linguistic provinces, however, 
kept growing and reached the danger point when a Andhra 
leader died for the cause. This led to the creation of 
the province of Andhra in 1953, and was soon followed 
by the appointment of the States Reorganisation Commission. 
On the basis of its Report, the country was divided into 
15 States in 1956. Two more have been added since by bi­
furcating two of the States.
The Official langudje Commission was appointed 
by the President under Article 544 in 1955, and submitted 
its Report in 1956. A Committee of Parliament on Official 
language was set up to consider this report, which submi­
tted its Report in 1958. The second Commission under 
Article 344 which was due in I960 was not appointed. In 
1963, the Official language Act was passed and it came
into force in 1965, bringing in its wake widespread lan-
18guage riots in various parts of the country.
^  Amended by the Official language (Amendment) Act, 
1967, (Act 1 of 1968).
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II# Linguistic Minorities and the Linguistic Issues
The minority problem in a political setting
language in India has always been a dividing
factor and, in a political context, an explosive issue.
"Tempers are frayed and heads broken" on this vexed que- 
19stion. v The language issue has set going more riots, 
more fasts and more trouble for the Central Government
20than any other issue in India’s years of independence.
It touches everyone in a variety of ways: instruction in 
the mother tongue in schools, the medium of instruction 
in universities, civil services with their prestige and 
money, cultural and historical pride of linguistic groups, 
and, in the case of Muslims and Sikhs, the religious 
sentiment. The political organisation, particularly that 
on a linguistic basis, has a profound influence on these 
interests on account of the vast amount of patronage at 
the disposal of the governments in power.
Por the purpose of the present chapter it is 
necessary to distinguish between two aspects of the lan­
guage question, of which one is constantly in the limelight
^  Report of the Committee on Emotional Integration,
11962), p. 47.
on
The Times, leader article, November 14, 1967.
255
and the other almost in oblivion. The first concerns 
the wider issues such as the question of the official 
language, the language of inter-State communications, the 
language medium of examinations of the Union Public Service 
Commission, medium of instruction in the universities and 
the languages of the law courts. These are familiar to 
all from the intense controversy surrounding them. The 
other is the problem of linguistic minorities, of which 
little is known, except to those immediately affected by it. 
The problems pertaining to these two aspects arise at diffe­
rent levels of administration and are of a different order. 
The issues in the first category concern the language 
policies of both the Union and the State governments. The 
problem of linguistic minorities, on the other hand, arises 
only in the context of a linguistic State, and is largely 
governed by the language policy pursued by the government 
of that State. As such, the issues mentioned earlier 
concern the linguistic minorities only remotely and are, 
therefore, outside the purview of our discussion.
Before proceeding to consider the linguistic 
minorities in the States, it is necessary to dispose of 
the allusions to minority problems that have sometimes 
been made in the context of the official language of the 
Union. It has been argued that the adoption of one of the 
regional languages, Hindi, as the official language of the
Union puts the people from non-Hindi areas at a disadvan­
tage and would lead to their becoming second class citi- 
21zens. During the debate in Parliament on the E.eport of 
the States Reorganisation Commission a Member from the 
South suggested that, Indians having derived their origins 
from different racial groups, the imposition of the lan­
guage of one of those groups as the official language on
the rest of the country amounted to a domination of one
22group on others. Similar fears were also expressed by
Shri Prank Anthony in his minute of dissent in a Parlia-
23mentary Report.  ^ Nor has the anxiety felt in non-Hindi
areas gone unnoticed. This is evident from the terms of
reference of the Official language Commission, which was
required to consider nthe just claims and interests of
persons belonging to the non-Hindi speaking areas” while
24.
making recommendations. There is reason to believe 
that the concern of the non-Hindi speaking people is not 
unjustified. However, it would be unrealistic to desig­
nate these two groups as the majority and the minorities. 
Even if Hindi were to be the sole official language, thus
^  Dr. Chatterji’s dissent in the Report of the Official 
Language Commission, (1956), p. 276- The case in favour 
of Hindi as the official language has been elaborately 
argued by Ram Copal, Linguistic Affairs of India, (1966)
22 Shri N. S. ITair. I.S.D., December 21. 1955. Col. 917-918
23 Report of the Committee of Parliament on Official Lan­
guage , (19581, see p. 82ff.
24 —Report of the Official Language Commission, p. 105.
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placing non-Hindi areas at a certain disadvantage, the 
fact is that these States, as a bloc, are, and always will 
be, in a position to bargain at the political level. The 
question of linguistic minorities in the real sense, there­
fore, does not arise at the national level.
States and minorities
The problem of linguistic minorities arises at 
the State level. This was one of the reasons which had 
prompted the Dar Commission to advise a postponement of 
the creation of linguistic provinces. It noted that such 
provinces could be carved out only at the cost of creating 
fresh minority problems. For, "nowhere will it be possible 
to form a linguistic province of more than 7 0 or 80 per 
cent of the people speaking the same language, thus lea­
ving in each province a minority of at least 2 0 per cent
25of the people speaking other languages.” The J. Y. P. 
Committee also thought that it was “impossible to have 
clear and rigid demarcations of linguistic areas", and 
was convinced that trouble was inevitable in attempting
2 c
to demarcate areas according to the linguistic principle.
25 Par Commission Report, p. 210
26 J. Y. P. Report, p. 7
iil
j
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As was foreseen, the creation of linguistic 
States has created minorities on an unprecedented scale. 
The States Reorganisation Commission noted that, even if 
the linguistic principle were rigidly applied, it would 
by no means solve the problem of minorities. But in the 
reorganisation carried out, language was not an exclusive 
factor and this has had the effect of swelling the ranks 
of the minorities considerably. According to the Commi­
ssion's findings and as stated in Parliament, substantial 
minorities existed even in those States which were consi­
dered unilingual. Their proportion was as much as 50 per
cent in Assam and varied from 6 to 30 or 35 per cent in
27other States.
Linguistic minorities arise due to the fact 
that, f,i) not all the language groups are so placed that 
they can be grouped into separate States, ii)there are 
a large number of bilingual belts between different zones, 
and iii) there exist areas with a mixed population, even
po
within unilingual areas.tt In the first category are
the compact groups speaking languages and dialects of 
their own within different States, as for instance, the 
tribal communities. In the second category are the
^  Pandit Gr, B. Pant, L.S.P., December 14, 1955, col. 11.
O Q
Report of the States Reorganisation Commission, (1955), 
paragraph 756".
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permanent residents of border areas, who happen to be 
included in the State whose predominant language is 
different from their own. The claims and counter-claims 
of the border areas and the ’treatment' of their inhabi­
tants have been a constant source of inter-State quarrels, 
and in some cases special border Commissions had to be 
appointed to resolve matters.2  ^ And, in the third cate­
gory are the migrants, who take up voluntary residence 
in a different State, like the Tamils in Bombay. This 
last category has been referred to as ’relative minori- 
ties.130
It is difficult to assess the exact number of
the linguistic minorities as it is liable to constant
change. There is only one citizenship for the entire
country and the Constitution guarantees the right of every
citizen to "move freely throughout the territory of India”,
and to "reside and settle in any part of the territory 
31of India”. Due to the tremendous changes taking place 
in the country, there is bound to be a shift in the popu­
lation, resulting in the people of all languages residing
32in all States in due course. Eurther, the minorities’
2 9 e.g., see the Report of the Commission on Maharashtra- 
Mysore-Kerala Boundary^)isputes, Vols. 1 & 2, (1967)•
Gr. Austin, The Indian Constitution, (1966), p. 287•
Article 19(1), clauses (d) and (e).
^ 2 Shri J. R. Mehta, I .S.D., December 20, 1955*
situation is also bound to alter in the event of any 
readjustments of borders. Under the Constitution, Parlia­
ment is enpowered to increase or decrease the area of a 
State, alter its boundaries, and divide or merge States 
by means or ordinary legislation.^ The States Reorgani­
sation Act, 1955, is an example of such legislation.
Por Constitutional purposes, in determining
whether a particular linguistic group is a minority in a
34.State, the courts have adopted a simple numerical test.  ^
However, in general administration the size of a lingui­
stic minority has a bearing on the facilities that may 
be afforded to it. Government of India have accepted the 
States Reorganisation Commission's recommendation that, 
where a minority constitutes 3 0 per cent or more of the 
population, the State should, for administrative purposes, 
be recognised as bilingual and that where a minority 
group constitutes 7 0 per cent or more of the population 
of a district, the language of the minorityjgroup, and 
not the State language, should be the official language 
of that district.^ This policy is now being implemented.
^  Article 3.
^  Re Kerala Education Bill. A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 9.56, at p.976 
also, Aldo Maria Patroni v. E. C. Kesavan, A.I.R. 1965 
Ker. 75 {It).
^  Memorandum, (1956), paragraph 8 .
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III* Protection of the Interests of Linguistic Minorities
Speaking in the debate on the Report of the 
States Reorganisation Commission, the then Home Minister 
emphasised that it was necessary to provide adequate safe­
guards to linguistic minorities to ensure "unfettered 
scope for advancement for every citizen, so that everyone 
living in a State, whatever his language, may have equal
opportunities of self-expression and self-realisation and
36self-development.11^ There is general agreement on this 
issue. However, there has been less agreement as to the 
nature of these safeguards and the form they should take.
The greatest reassurance the linguistic mino­
rities can have is a scheme of Constitutional guarantees 
ensuring that their interests will be protected. Ror, it 
is said that cultural communities which cannot count on 
the strength of their numbers must depend on the force
of law, if they wish to have their legitimate claims re- 
37cognised. ' Such guarantees by themselves do not amount 
to much, as it is unlikely that the minorities will have 
the capacity, resources and energy to move the courts; 
but they will at least have the satisfaction of knowing
^  Pandit G. B. Pant, L.S.D., December 14, 1955, Col.14.
^  J. J. Bertrand, Speech in the Quebec legislature, May 8 , 
1963, in P. R. Scott and M. K. Oliver (ed.), Quebec 
States Her Case. (1964), p. 125.
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that the courts are there as the ultimate sentinels of
70
their rights.
The provisions of the Indian Constitution 
pertaining to linguistic minorities are few and far "bet­
ween, and have often proved inadequate and ineffective. 
Although the Constitution had anticipated the reorganisa­
tion of States, no great attention was paid to the inclu­
sion of specific minority safeguards apart from four 
Articles. Of these, two (Articles 29 and 30) pertained 
to the cultural and educational rights, and the other 
two (Articles 347 and 350) pertained to the official recog­
nition of a minority language, and the use of a minority 
language in making representations to public authorities. 
The issue of minority safeguards was strongly urged 
before the States Reorganisation Commission by both the 
proponents and the opponents of linguistic States, who 
asked for a strengthening of the Constitutional safe-
•ZQ
guards. However, despite much talk on the need to pro­
vide additional guarantees, the only addition came by 
the inclusion of Article 350-A, which sought to provide 
for instruction in mother tongue in primary schools, and
^  Shri Frank Anthony, L.S.D., December 20, 1955, Cols. 
766-767.
^  Report of the States Reorganisation Cftmmission, p. 207.
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Article 350-B which, provided for a Commissioner for 
linguistic Minorities. There appears to have been a fear 
that the setting up of an elaborate system of guarantees 
might complicate, rather than solve, the problem and tend 
to perpetuate separatism.^-0
Thus, in seeking to protect the interests of 
linguistic minorities, the Constitution relies on a gene­
ral scheme of fundamental rights, apart from few specific 
provisions to ensure that the minorities are not denied 
the rights which the majority enjoys. Emphasis is placed 
on the fact that there is one common citizenship for all 
the Indian people, with equal rights and opportunities 
throughout the Union.^ If the spirit of the Constitu­
tion is adhered to, there is little or no need for any 
concern among linguistic minorities or indeed among any 
minorities.
However, there are signs in different Indian 
States that not infrequently narrow regional considerations 
override the wider national outlook, linguistic fanaticism 
is widespread and is causing alarm among linguistic mino­
rities in various parts of the country. Private armies
4 0 Ibid, p. 208
Ibid, p. 229. See n. 26 on p. 101, supra.
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of local extremists have been operating in some cities 
demanding a preference for the ’sons of the soil’ and the 
exclusion of the ’outsiders’. A well-known example of 
this phenomenon is the ’Shiv Sena’ of Bombay.
The danger of the growth of such an attitude 
was in fact anticipated by the Bar Commission, who thought 
that the principle of government of a province by a lin­
guistic group was basically wrong, on account of the
various problems it would create, and, above all, on account
42of the danger of a ’sub-national’ bias. Rationalism 
and sub-nationalism were two emotions which grew at the 
expense of each other. In a linguistic State sub-nationa­
lism would always be a dominant force, would always evoke 
the greater emotional response, and undermine nationalism. 
The Commission thought that,
the moment a province is alioted to a majority 
linguistic group as such and that group forms a 
majority government in it, it begins to regard that 
area as exclusively belonging to that particular 
linguistic group, and to treat all persons not be­
longing to the majority linguistic group and spea­
king a different language as outsiders and aliens.
And by a natural reaction, people not speaking the 
majority language resent the intolerance of the 
majority or have their own affinities with a sepa­
rate linguistic group elsewhere and thus a vicious 
circle of mutual hostility begins and a minority 
problem comes into existence.^
Bar Commission Report 
4-5 Ibid. p. 207.
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The Commission further warned that, if the majority group 
in such a province came to regard the territory of the 
entire province as exclusively its own, the time could not 
he far distant when it would come to regard the minority 
living in that province and the people living outside it 
as not its own; and once that stage was reached, it would 
only be a question of time for that sub-nation to consider 
itself a full nation.^ It, therefore, firmly repudiated 
the idea of a linguistic group being a ’sub-nation’.
The States Reorganisation Commission also was
aware that States based on languages tended to be intole-
45rant, aggressive and expansionist m  character.  ^ It, 
therefore, took care to repudiate once again the idea of a 
’sub-nation’ and its extension, the ’homeland’ theory. 
According to the latter, an area would claim to be the 
homeland of all people speaking a particular language, 
wherever they might be domiciled, would promote loyalty 
to that homeland, overriding loyalty to the area of domi­
cile, and would have claims on them, wherever they may be. 
The Commission emphasised that the acceptance of such 
theories would cut at the very root of the national idea 
and would deepen the majority-minority consciousness,
4 4 Ibid. pp. 210-211.
4-5^  Report of the States Reorganisation Commission, p. 39.
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thereby aggravating the minority problem.^ As events
have shown, and as some writers have pointed out, the
sub-national idea and regional competetion are far from
4-7being absent from the country.
The protection of linguistic minorities in 
India is sought to be achieved by a combination of the 
Constitutional guarantees and various political arrange­
ments, placing greater reliance on the latter. Constitu­
tional provisions relating to linguistic minorities offer 
little help, apart from laying down principles, and general 
guide-lines. The specific details of the minority policy 
are the outcome of agreements and decisions arrived at 
in a series of ministerial meetings. The present policy 
was evolved from such sources as the Provincial Education 
Ministers’ Conference, 1949, the recommendations of the 
States Reorganisation Commission, the Government of India 
Memorandum, 1956, the Meeting of the Ministerial Committee 
of the Southern Zonal Council, 1959, the Conference of 
Chief Ministers of States and Central Ministers, 1961, 
and policy statements of the ruling Congress Party. The 
outcome of these meetings and conferences can at best be 
described as ’gentlemen’s agreements’, with no legal
4 6 Ibid, p. 44.
47 e.g., see G. Austin, The Indian Constitution, p. 306, 
and the chapter on "Regional Elites" in S. Harrison, 
India; the most dangerous decades, (i960).
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consequences for their "breach by a State. Except in 
some cases, the relevant provisions of the Constitution 
are not precise enough successfully to support legal 
action against an offending government. The protection 
of the interests of the linguistic minorities, therefore, 
depends to a great extent on the good faith of State 
Governments.
The principal minority issues are discussed in 
the following pages in the light of the Constitutional 
provisions and the government policy.
1. Conservation of minority language and culture
The issue of minority language and culture 
comprises an array of specific issues such as education, 
employment, and the use of the minority language for offi­
cial purposes. But at the same time it is also an issue 
in its own right in the generality of which specific 
issues merge. A discussion of the general issue will 
serve as a background and put the individual issues in 
their proper perspective.
The Indian Constitution recognises the fact of 
linguistic and cultural diversity and the need for its 
preservation. Article 29(1) states —
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Any section of the citizens residing in the terri­
tory of India or any part thereof having a distinct 
language, script or culture of its own shall have 
the right to conserve the same.
However, what is not certain is the exact nature of this 
guarantee and the method by which it is to be secured.
The Article is vague and its interpretation difficult.
It is apparent that it does not confer any tangible right 
on the minorities. There is no corresponding duty or 
obligation cast on the state to help minorities to rea­
lise that right. lor instance, there is no legal obliga­
tion on part of the state to lend financial or other 
support to minorities for that purpose. The government, 
while making grants to the institutions of the majority 
language group, may legally withhold the same from mino­
rities1 institutions so long as the equality provisions 
are not infringed. Hor is it certain as to what is meant 
by the right to ’conserve’. The definition of ’culture’ 
raises futher difficulties, and so do the qualifications, 
^uch as the numerical strength and the territorial test, 
which a group must possess before it can claim the right 
under Article 29.
There is also hardly any unanimity as to either 
the need for the preservation of minority language and 
culture or the extent to which it should be protected.
The questions of the importance of language and of culture 
and their inter-relationship are subjects of controversy.
For instance, Karl Vossler, while accepting that language 
furthers social intercourse in communities of men, denies 
that it plays any fundamental role in founding and main- 
taining these communities. He points out that language 
societies arise late, are impure and unstable; that men 
first come together under the pressure of natural needs, 
and only after these primitive communities have been formed 
can language arise as an attempt at spiritual trasfusion 
and elevation of social existence. For hrra, language is 
neither the root, nor the trunk, but the flower and the
AQ
fruit of social life, and therefore super-social.  ^ The
argument is carried further by those who do not accept
that there is any vital connection between language and
culture. Sir Ernest Barker points out that, while the
vog.ue of a culture may be connected with the dissemination
of a language, a culture or civilisation, whether it is
only material or more than material, is something distinct
from both race and language. It may be diffused over an
area and practised by a group in which different languages
50are spoken and different races are mixed. In the Indian
*
context it has been pointed out that equating language and 
culture would be superficial and artificial, because
^  The Spirit of Language in Civilisation, (1932), p. 187.
49 Ibid.
50 Sir Ernest Barker, national Character and the Factors 
of its Formulation, (4th ed.. 1948). n. 22.
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Indian culture has never been identified with language, 
India has existed with a single culture in spite of vari­
ous languages, so equating language with culture would
ci
not only be wrong, but perverse. Social and cultural
differences exist in spite of the language and they depend
52more on religion and caste than on language.
The concept of culture is even more indefinite
and the task of defining it is phenomenal. How are the
minority cultures to be ascertained and by what test are
they to be differentiated from the rest? By its very
nature, culture is elusive. It is said to be a sense of
ultimate values possessed by a particular society which
it has expressed in its collective institutions, which its
individual members express in their dispositions, feelings,
attitudes and manners as well as in significant forms
53which they give to material objects.  ^ In a general
sense, it is a social heritage of moral, spiritual and
economic values, expressing itself in distinct way of
life of a group of people living as an organised community,
and covers the language, habits, ideas and even vocational
54.pattern of a society. ^ A spokesman of the Anglo-Indian
^  Acharya Sripalani, L.S.D., December 14, 1955, col.37-33. 
Shri Kelappan, Ibid, December 23, 1955, Cols. 1254-55.
53 S. Abid Husain, National Culture of India, (2nd ed.,1961), 
p. 3.
54 Report of the States Reorganisation Commission, p. 47*
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community spoke of their culture as a social inheritance 
of beliefs, habits, moral and aesthetic standards, manners,
institutions and the whole complex web of a community1s
55inner and outer life. The problems posed by these di­
verse elements of culture in its definition seem insoluble.
Yet, linguistic and cultural diversity is a
fact that has to be recognised. And, although very real
difficulties exist in demarcating the cultures, we are
not entirely without guide-lines. GruLop cultures in India
5 6are said to be principally linguistic or religious, and
in the case of Muslims, Sikhs and Anglo-Indians, both.
Whatever the dispute with regard to the inter-relation
between language and culture, it is evident that language
is a most important mark of group identification and a
57delineator of group boundaries, and is, therefore, a
good index to minority culture. However, two tests have 
been suggested by the States Reorganisation Commission 
which the claims based on cultural homogeneity should 
normally satisfy. First, the people claiming a distin­
ctive culture must constitute a recognisable group and 
it should include a number of persons sufficient by
^  Shri Barrow, L.S.P., December 23, 1955, Cols.1785-86.
^  S. Abid Husain, The Destiny of Indian Muslims, (1965), 
p. 215*
57' W. H. Morris-Jones, op. cit.
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themselves to claim, conserve and develop stable tradi­
tions or the characteristics of their culture; and second, 
such cultural individuality should be capable of being
expressed in terms of a defined and sizable geographical
58entity. Further, such groupings should not hinder the 
social and cultural evolution in a changing world and 
should not lead to cultural isolation or cultural conflict.
The general consensus in the country under poli­
tical leadership has always favoured the all round growth 
of diverse cultures. It evolved with the language policy 
of the Congress Party. The All Parties’ Committee in 1928 
saw the granting of cultural autonomy to all groups as
the only method of giving a feeling of security to the
59minorities as an alternative to separate electorates.
It considered a proposal to create communal councils to
protect the interests of each community, which would
£0
receive grants from Central and State governments. The 
Congress Party reiterated its language policy in 1945-46 
by an assurance that the language, culture and script 
of different linguistic areas would be protected.^
Report, p. 47.
^  Nehru Report, p. 28.
60 Ibid, pp. 30-31.
^  Manifesto of the I. N. Congress, 1945-46; L.S.D., 
December 17, 1955, col. 412.
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During the discussion of the States Reorganisation Commi­
ssion's Report in Parliament the issue of linguistic and 
cultural diversity figured very prominently. It was ur­
ged that it would be unrealistic to disregard the fact 
of diversity and hence the unity of the country should 
not be sought to be imposed externally, but rather a 
fundamental unity should be brought about which recognised 
the diversity of language, culture, and tradition of the
£p
Indian people.
An important question that arise#, is what the
relative role of the various cultures should be. What
should be the role of regional cultures or sub-cultures
in relation to the larger national culture? Are the
smaller cultures to lose their identity by merging into
a single monolithic national culture or should their
continued identity and diversity be encouraged? S. Abid
Husain points out that, Indian nationhood and national
culture are a deliberately balanced system of unity in
diversity. A wrong handling of the cultural problem
would disturb this balance entailing a disintegration,
endangering the democratic system and leading to inter-
63nal and external tyranny.
^  Shri.. A. K. Gopalan, L.S.D., December 14, 1955, col. 55.
6 3 Rational Culture of India, p. x.
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It has been noted that cultural intolerance is 
widespread and deep rooted at various levels. It appears 
In the form of patriotism in many who believe that in 
order to achieve unity injthe whole of India (or a region) 
there should be one language and one culture, obviously 
the language and culture of the majority. Unfortunately, 
this can only be achieved by "blotting out of existence, 
or at least keeping down to a subordinate position, the 
languages and cultural traditions of the minorities.n^
Shri Frank Anthony’s dissent from the Report of a Parlia­
mentary Committee on Official language is revealing. He 
says that if the fanaticism of the Hindi extremists were 
to triumph, the same spirit of intolerance, of domination 
that has already exhibited itself against the languages 
of the Anglo-Indians, the Muslims, the Sikhs, the Tribals 
and others will also express itself in an equally oppre-
65ssive manner against all the non-Hindi linguistic groups.
He speaks of the tendency of Hindi protagonists to behave
as if they are a chosen race, to consider Hindi as a
synonim for patriotism, and even to make it a religious 
66symbol. A discussion of this issue is beyond our province
64 Ibid, p. 12.
65 Report of the Committee of Parliament on Official 
Language, (1958), p. 94.
66 IMd. p. 92.
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but its implications on the minority issue under discussion 
cannot be ignored.
A perusal of the linguistic Commissioner’s 
Reports shows clearly that in all the States the linguistic 
minorities are under disabilities of one kind or another, 
whether on account of genuine difficulties in administra­
tion, or as a result of the deliberate policy pursued by 
the State governments. It is not necessary to refer to 
individual cases at this point. What is relevant to note 
here is that there is very little the minorities can do. 
Article 29 is of little consolation, and the existing 
machinery for the assertion of their rights is not effe­
ctive enough. The preservation of the language and 
culture of the minorities, therefore, derives more from 
the good sense of the majority than from the authority 
of the Constitution.
2. Education
Of the educational rights of linguistic minori­
ties, three issues may be considered: the principle of 
non-discrimination in admission to educational institu­
tions, the right to establish and maintain private schools, 
and instruction in the mother tongue. The two former 
need only a brief consideration here, as some of their
aspects have already been dealt with in the previous 
chapter.
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i. Non-discrimination in admission to educational 
institutions
Article 29(2) bars discrimination based solely
on grounds of language —
No citizen shall be denied admission to any educa­
tional institution maintained by the State or 
receiving aid out of the State funds on grounds 
only of religion, race, caste, language, or any 
of them.
This Article is similar to Article 15, with the 
omission of the grounds of sex and place of birth, and 
the addition of the ground of language. It has been 
suggested that the omission of this clause altogether 
would not have made any difference at all, as with^he 
coming into vogue of intruction in regional and mother 
tongues, ’language’ would automatically bar admission
67and other language groups would not have a place therein. 
But it should be realised that despite the similarity 
of form between the two Articles, there is considerable 
difference in their application. Whereas Article 15 
is of general application to a variety of issues arising 
in the public life, Article 29(2) is designed specifica­
lly to deal with the issue of admission to educational 
institutions. As such, in an educational context, Article
6*7 K. V. Rao, Parliamentary Democracy of India, (2nd ed., 
1965), p. 220.' ' "
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29(2) prevails over Article 15(1).^
However, despite its associations with minority- 
right s, Article 29(2) is in no way an exclusive ’minority 
right’. Prom the words of the Article it is clear that 
it is meant to he of general application. Its associa­
tion with minority rights appears to he incidental. In 
the Bombay Education Society’s case the Supreme Court 
firmly rejected the contention that the benefit of Arti­
cle 29(2) was restricted to minorities, pointing out that 
other citizens have as much need of protection in this 
matter and that to accept such a contention would amount
to the creation of a privilege in favour of the minorities
6Qwhile denying the same rights to others. J
The above case arose out of an Order of the 
Bombay Government in 1954, restricting admission to the 
English medium schools in the State to pupils whose 
mother tongue was English, i.e., the members of the 
Anglo-Indian community and others of non-Asiatic origin. 
Two of the aggrieved parents, who did not fall in this 
category, along with the Bombay Education Society success­
fully challenged the Government Order under Article 29(2)
State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society, A.I.R. 
19£4 S.O. 561; Joseph Thomas v. State of Kerala, 
A.I.R. 1958 Ker. 35 (34).
69 A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 561 (566).
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70in the Bombay High Court. The State thereupon appealed 
to the Supreme Court, which again found in their favour.
The Court said that although the object of the Order was 
to promote advancement of the national language, the object 
was sought to be achieved by denying to all peoples, whose 
mother tongue was not English, admission into any school 
where the medium of instruction was English offended 
against the fundamental right guaranteed to all citizens 
by Article 29(2).71
Article 29(2) embodied two important principles. 
One is the right of every citizen to be admitted to any 
educational institution maintained by the State or recei­
ving aid out of State funds. Once the State gives its 
grant and puts its imprimatur upon the school, the Article
immediately comes into operation and the right of the
72citizen arises. The other is that an educational insti­
tution recognised and receiving state aid cannot restrict 
admission to members of a particular religion, race,
7*5
caste or language. ^
70 A.I.R. 1954 Bom. 468.
71 A.I.R. 1954 S.0. 561 (568).
72 A.I.R. 1954 Bom. 468 (474).
7  ^ Ibid. Also, Re Kerala Education Bill, A.I.R.1958 S.C. 
??F"(976).
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The right of admission to educational insti­
tutions is a fundamental right and the denial of such 
admission to any individual citizen according to a classi­
fication on the forbidden grounds is unconstitutional. 
Thus, in State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan it was 
held that the Communal Gr. 0. fixing proportionate seats 
in State colleges to different communities based on such 
grounds constituted a clear violation of the right guaran­
teed under Article 29(2).^
Article 29(2), however, does not forbid discri­
mination based on grounds other than those mentioned in 
the Article. Thus, it is permissible to restrict admi­
ssion on grounds of sex and to provide separate facilities 
7*5for women. Restriction based on the place of residence
has been upheld,^ and the charging of a capitation fee
to non-residents has been held not to violate the provi-
77sions of Article 14 read with Article 29. Reservation 
of seats for students of transferred areas of a State does 
not violate Article 1 4 . The non-admission of a person 
to a college on the ground of his not being in government
74 A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 226 (227,228).
7^ The University of Madras v. Shanta Bai, A.I.R. 1954 
rfad. 67 (?0).
7 Joseph Thomas v. State of Kerala, A.I.R.1958 Ker.33 (34). 
77 Rustom Mody v. State of M. B.. A.I.R.1954 M.Bli. 119.7g .........  .....
A. Muralidhar v. State of A.P..A.I.R. 1959 A.P. 437.
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service does not violate Article 29(2).^ Moreover, the 
right of admission to an educational institution is not 
an absolute right. The Constitution does not guarantee 
to a student a right to be admitted to an educational 
institution, for no such right exists. In Vikruddin v. 
Osmania University the Hyderabad High Court held that 
persons have no right to be admitted as members of a 
college as a matter of course; they must be approved 
by the college or by those to whom such power is delega­
ted. If an authority has exercised discretion bona fide 
in accordance with the rules of the institution and not 
been influenced by extraneous or irrelevant considera­
tions and such discretion has not been exercised arbitra­
rily or illegally, the courts would not interfere to 
enforce such a claim.
A further discussion of this Article, in the 
context of the reservation of seats for backward classes, 
is to be found in the next chapter.^
^  Dr. Harayana Swamy v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1968 
Mys. 189.
80 A.I.R. 1954 Hyd. 25 (27).
See Chapter Y, p. 355 et aeq.
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ii. Right to educational institutions
The principal means by and through which the
minorities can effectively exercise their right under
Article 29(1) to conserve their language, script and
culture are the educational institutions. The right to
establish and maintain educational intitutions of their
choice is, therefore, a necessary concomitant of that 
82right. This is guaranteed by Article 30 to all mino­
rities, whether based on religion or language, and the 
State, in granting aid, is not to discriminate against 
such institutions on the ground that thgy are under the 
management of a minority.
One aspect of this ’right1 in the light of the
principle of equality must not escape notice. Article
30 confers a ’right’ on the minorities, in the sense that
they are not restricted from doing so, are are therefore
free to establish and maintain educational institutions
if they want to, and can afford to do so. There is no
corresponding duty imposed on the state in this respect.
The resulting situation, of the private schools vis a vis
state schools, is interesting. It is asked, ’’what equality
*
is there when a member of the minority has to start his
82 Re Keral Sducation Bill, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 956, (976).
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own school while his compatriot will be educated in the 
state-run schools?” The capacity of the minorities to 
establish their own institutions fo^ jc the preservation of 
their language and culture depends to a large extent 
on their economic strength, which varies from one commu­
nity to another. But there is no easy solution to this 
problem. What is to be done to encourage minorities in 
this respect is a matter for the broader cultural policy 
of the Union and the State governments. What can be done 
in the immediate context is to ensure an equitable system 
of grants to all minority schools and to supplement the 
facilities available to linguistic and cultural groups 
through the state schools wherever possible.
It must be pointed out that past experience 
in regard to educational and cultural needs of the mino­
rities has not been wholly satisfactory. To some extent 
the danger of different States using education as a vehi­
cle of regional particularism to revive and exalt the 
past achievements of the dominant language group, and 
of pursuing policies of their own without regard to the 
interests of the nation as a whole, without co-ordination 
and unity of purpose, had been foreseen by the States
83 K. V. F.ao, op. cit.. p. 222.
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Reorganisation Commission. G-. B. Kanungo observes 
how this has increased with the growth of regionalism, 
and how the majority1s language has become the cornerstone 
of nationalism in States, as they seek to pursue educa­
tion to the highest level through the regional medium.
He points out that following the formation of linguistic 
States the right of minorities to intruction in mother 
tongue has been largely overlooked and that they are
compelled to get their education through the regional
85language, which is the language of the majority. Hot 
infrequently the educational and cultural needs of the
minorities have been sacrificed on the altar of admini-
86strative convenience. In the absence of clear legal
obligations on part of the government the only course open
to the minorities was to secure a "generous approach by
8 7
the administration at the Centre and in the States.”
The right which Article 30 guarantees to the 
minorities is the right to establish institutions !1of 
their choice”. This includes the right to choose the 
medium of instruction. The Supreme Court noted in the
Report, p. 39*
G. B. Kanungo, The Language Controversy in Indian 
Education, (1962), pp. 57-58.
86 Report of the nomniittee on Emotional Integration. 
(.1962), p. 6l.
87 ibid.
284
Bombay Education Society1s case that to hold otherwise 
would be to deprive Articles 29(1) and 30(1) of the 
greater parts of their content. The power of the state 
to determine the medium of instruction must yield to these 
fundamental rights to the extent it is necessary to give 
effect to them and cannot be permitted to run counter to
oo
them. The Gujarat High Court has similarly held that 
the Gujarat University has no power to lay down any 
particular language media of instruction on educational 
institutions and colleges established and/or administered 
by minorities, whether religious or linguistic. Neither, 
the State legislature, nor the University has power or 
competence to interfere with their free choice by dire­
cting them to have Gujarati or Hindi or any other language
or languages as media of instuuction to the exclusion
89of the language or languages of their choice. Mere
threat to the right, and not the actual infringement of
90it, is sufficient to move the court.
However, the private aided schools have to 
comply with the reasonable requirements laid down by the 
government. Thus, according to the Resolution adopted
88 A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 561 (568).
8 9 Shri Krishna Rangnath v. Gnj.arat University, A.I.R. 
1962 Guj. 88 (122).
90 Ibid.
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by the Provincial Education Ministers1 Conference, 1949, 
secondary schools can be required to arrange for instru­
ction in a language different from their own, if it is 
desired by one third of the pupils of whom it is their 
mother tongue, and there are no adequate facilities in 
the area.
As to the affiliation of private institutions,
the policy of the Central Government stipulates that, as
a corollary to Article 30, minority institutions would
be permitted to seek affiliation to bodies outside the
State where it becomes necessary or convenient, without
having to suffer any disability as to grants-in-aid and
other facilities merely because they cannot be fitted into
91the educational administration of the State.
iii. Instruction in the mother tongue
The principle of instruction in the mother tongue 
of the child is recognised as basic throughout the world. 
But the Constitution of India, as enacted, did not contain 
any such right, though the Congress policy had always 
inclined in that direction. Jawaharlal Nehru, writing in 
1937, spoke of the need of instruction in the mother tongue 
for all at the primary stage, and where numbers warranted
Memorandum, (1956), paragraph 5.
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it, even at the secondary stage. The Government of
India accepted it at an early stage and the Ministry of
Education passed a resolution on the subject on 10th
93August, 1943. However, the idea was only given Consti­
tutional form in 1956, following the reorganisation of 
States in the addition of Article 350-A by the Consti­
tution (Seventh Amendment) Act.
Article 350-A states —
It shall be the endeavour of every State and of 
every local authority within the State to provide 
adequate facilities for instruction in the mother 
tongue at the primary stage of education to children 
belonging to minority groups; and the President may 
issue such directions to any State as he considers 
necessary or proper for securing the provision of 
such facilities.
It is obvious that the Article is of a doubtful 
legal force. Its language is deliberately vague, perhaps 
not unjustifyably so in view of the practical difficul­
ties that can be expected in its implementation. The 
only certainly in the Article is the President’s power 
to issue directives to States, which is a weighty safe­
guard if exercised. But ordinarily it would not be 
reasonable to expect it to be so exercised except in extreme 
cases and as a last resort. A further point to be noted
92 Jawaharlal Hehru, The Question of Language, (1937), p.19.
^  Gazette of India, August 14, 1948, Part I, Section 1, 
at p. 1600; h.S.D., December 17, 1955, col. 411.
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is that the Article covers only the primary stage of edu­
cation and does not contemplate the secondary stage. In 
effect, the Article amounts only to a Constitutional recog­
nition of an important right without providing the means 
to enforce it. In its present form it does not amount to 
much more than a weighty directive principle.
The details of the present policy as regards 
the instruction in the mother tongue at primary and 
secondary levels have evolved over the past twenty years.
The development of this policy and the progress of its 
implementation may be traced at these two levels separately.
Primary education
The basis of the present policy was laid down
in a Resolution of the Provincial Education Ministers1
Conference in 1949. The Resolution, approved of by the
Central Advisory Board of Education and the Government
of India, stated that —
The medium of instruction and examination in the 
Junior Basic Stage must be the mother tongue of the 
child and, where the mother tongue is different 
from the Regional or State language, arrangements ' 
must be made for instruction in the mother tongue 
by appointing at least one teacher, provided there 
are not less than 40 pupils speaking the language 
in the whole school or 10 such pupils in a class.
The mother tongue will be the language declared by 
the parent or guardian to be the mother tongue.
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The regional or the State language, where it 
is different from the mother tongue, was to he introduced 
not before the third standard and not after the end of the 
Junior Basic Stage. It was also recommended that, in 
order to facilitate the change over in the regional lan­
guage, children should be given the option of answering 
questions in their mother tongue in the first two years 
after the Junior Basic Stage.^
The States Reorganisation Commission regarded
this question as the "core” of the minorities' problem.
It recognised that the linguistic minorities did not have
the resources required to establish and maintain their
own educational institutions and therefore urged that a
positive duty should be cast on the State to provide the
facilities by a Constitutional Amendment.  ^ When the
Government of India published its Memorandum in 1956,
Article 350-A was already at the draft stage and the
Memorandum passed over the subject by following the line
9 6laid down in the 1949 Conference.
94 This Resolution and the Minutes and Dicisions of succe­
ssive Ministerial Meetings mentioned earlier can be 
found in Appendices I to IV to the Report of the Commi­
ssioner for Linguistic Minorities, 8th Report, (1968).
Report, p. 209.
9 6 Clause 2 of the Government of India Memorandum, (1956).
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The Ministerial Committee of the Southern Zonal 
Council, 1959, while generally following the principles 
enunciated earlier, made specific recommendations with 
regard to pupil strength and school facilities. It reco­
mmended that,
all Primary schools shall entertain applications from 
parents belonging to the linguistic minority groups 
for admission of their children and for their instru­
ction in the mother tongue for a period of three 
months ending a fortnight before the commencement 
of the school year. These applications should be 
entered in a register. Departmental arrangements 
should be made to see that no such applicant is 
refused admission for the reason that the number is 
insufficient in a particular school where the app­
lication is made; and wherever necessary, inter­
school adjustments are made in the matter of admi­
ssion of the minority pupils. ^
The Conference of Chief Ministers of States
and Central Ministers, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as
the Chief Ministers1 Conference), accepted in principle
the decisions of the Southern Zonal Council. It declared
that the main objective must be to see that the facilities
already available should not be reduced and where possible,
98further facilities provided.
With regard to the implementation of the above 
policy, the Linguistic Commissioner has reported that all 
the States, with the exception of Madhya Pradesh and Punjab,
Clause 2(ii) of the Resolution. 
Clause 3 of the Statement.
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have agreed in principle to do so fully. The Orders of 
the Madhya Pradesh Government stipulated that primary 
education would he available through the medium of 15 
languages mentioned in the Eighth Schedule only,^ whereas 
the Punjab Government has persistently maintained that 
the provisions of Article 350-A are only "directory” and 
not "mandatory". The Commissioner’s efforts, including 
a recommendation for the issue of a Presideniial directive 
as regards the latter, have so far not succeeded in brin­
ging these States in line with others.1
A Statewise survey made by the Commissioner 
indicates that the all-India policy enunciated above is 
generally being followed throughout. However, there are 
frequent instances of divergence in practise among the 
States. Ron-implementation of the various agreed propo­
sals is not uncommon. Thus, there are instances where 
there is no provision for instruction in mother tongue
even where there are more than the prescribed number of 
2
pupils. Though the principle of advance registration 
has been agreed to by all the States, the actual mainte­
nance of such registers has been reported from only nine
q q
J The number of languages on the Eighth Schedule incressed 
to 15 by the addition of Sindhi by the Constitution 
(21st Amendment) Act, 1967.
i
Report of the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities,
8th Report, (1968), p. 6'.
 ^ Ibid, p. 6.
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of the States. Similarly, not all the State governments 
have issued Orders regarding the continuation of facilities 
without dimunition, though such a step had "been agreed to 
by all of them.A Prom a comparison of the Statwise figu­
res of the number of minority schools and pupils with 
earlier figures, it emerges that in some instances there 
have been considerable improvements in facilities, while 
in others there has been a marked decline. It is not 
possible to assess the situation fully, as in most cases 
particulars of reduction of facilities have either not 
been supplied or are ina.deq.uate for the purpose.
Secondary education
The question of instruction in the mother 
tongue at the secondary level is in a different category 
altogether, and is not covered by the Constitutional 
provision. It is nevertheless an important issue both 
to the minorities and in the context of higher education 
generally.
The Provincial Education Ministers1 Conference 
recommended that in the secondary stage, if the number
 ^Ibid, p. 7.
 ^Ibid, p. 8. A tabulated summary of these and other
details can be found in Appendix YI of the Report, p.151.
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of pupils, whose mother tongue is other than the regional 
or the State language, is sufficient to justify a separate 
school in the area, the medium of instruction in such a 
school may be the mother tongue of the pupils. Such 
schools, if organised and established privately would be 
entitled to recognition and grants-in-aid. The govern­
ment would provide similar facilities in all Government, 
Municipal and District Board Schools, where one third of 
the pupils request instruction in their mother tongue.
The aided schools would be required to arrange for such 
instruction, if there are no adequate facilities in the 
area. The regional language would be a compulsory subject 
throughout the Secondary stage.
The Tone third1 quota, however, was later thought 
to be unsatisfactory, both from the point of view of mino­
rities and the government, since in large schools separate 
sections might be necessary, even if the ratio was less 
than one third, and in small schools even a ratio of above 
one third might be impractical. Consequently the Ministe­
rial Committee of the Southern Zonal Council in 1959 unani­
mously decided that where such facilities did not exist, 
a minimum strength of 60 pupils in the last four standards 
of the Higher Secondary course and 15 pupils in each such 
standard would be necessary, provided that for the first 
four years a strength of 15 pupils in a class would be
sufficient.^
The Chief Ministers1 Conference accepted this 
decision in principle. The Conference, however, pointed 
out that the mother tongue formula could not he fully 
applied for use as the medium in the secondary stage of 
education, as this stage gives a more advanced education 
to enable stadents to follow a vocation after school 
leaving age and also prepares them for higher education 
in Universities. The languages used should, therefore, 
be modern Indian languages mentioned in the Eighth Sche­
dule as well as English.^ It adopted a simplified 1 Three- 
language Pormula1, providing for the study of the mother 
tongue as a language subject. The Committee of the Zonal 
Councils for National Integration, which met in the same 
year, invited the attention of all the State Governments 
to early implementation of the decision of the Chief 
Ministers1 Conference.
Por the implementation of these proposals, all
the State Governments, excepting those of Madhya Pradesh,
Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Maharashtra, have issued Orders
for providing secondary education through the medium of
7
minority languages.
 ^Decisions, paragraph 5, item 3.
 ^ Item 3(b) of the Statement.
 ^Reuort of the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities, 8th 
Report, p. 37. Por Statev/ise position, see pp.38-42 thereof.
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A passing reference to the *Three-language 
Pormula1 may he made here. The formula, as adopted hy 
the Chief Ministers* Conference, envisages the study 
of, i) the regional language and the mother tongue, \\rhen 
the latter is different from the regional language, ii) 
Hindi, or, in Hindi-speaking areas, another Indian lang­
uage, and iii) English or any other modern European
Q
language. The practise in this regard is, however, far 
from being uniform. Different States have adopted diffe­
rent formulae of their own, giving rise to various 
9problems, and many State governments have misapplied 
the formula in various ways.^ It may be noted that in 
the case of pupils belonging to linguistic minority groups 
the above formula actually becomes * four-language formula1, 
as the study of the regional language is made compulsory.
To relieve this burden the Education Commission has reco­
mmended that the regional language should be made optional 
and the formula modified as follows: i) the mother tongue 
or regional language, ii) the Official Language of the 
Union or the Associate Official Language of the Union
Q
Paragraph B of the Statement issued by the Chief Ministers* 
Conference.
 ^Por a detailed discussion on the subject, see the Lingui­
stic Commissioner *s 7th Report, (1965), pp. 184-194. Por 
different formulae, see Appendix X of the 8th Report, 
(1968).
^ Report of the Committee on Emotional Integration, (1962). 
p. 53.
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so long as it exists, and iii) a modern Indian or foreign 
language not covered -under (i) and (ii), and other than 
that used as the medium of instruction. However, no 
decision has so far “been taken on this proposal."^
3. Employment
The fact that employment in the Public Services
12is much sought after in India has already been noted.
There can be no doubt that the formation of linguistic 
States has tilted the scales in favour of the predominant 
language group in each case and thus imperilled the chan­
ces of minority groups. The Par Commission has noted that 
the conflict between linguistic groups originated in a
desire for power, which in its lower sense, was a desire
13for jobs and offices. The agitation for linguistic 
States was at least partly inspired by local claimants 
for government jobs.^ It has been said that it was the 
middle class job hunter and the middle class politician 
who sought to benefit by the establishment of a linguistic 
State, T!which creates for them an exclusive preserve of 
jobs, offices, and places by shutting out, in the name of
11 The linguistic Commissioner’s 8th Report, p. 116.
12 See p. 133, supra.
13 Par Commission Report, p. 186.
S. Harrison, India; the most dangerous decades, (i960), 
p. 90.
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promotion of culture, all outside competitors**1
The States Reorganisation Commission which 
considered this issue reported that the "recruitment to 
service is a prolific source of discontent among lingui­
stic minorities. Two principal ways in which some of 
the States sought to make the State Services a preserve 
of the predominant language group have been the placing 
of domiciliary restrictions and prescribing a high test 
of proficiency in the regional language or making it the 
medium for competitive examinations.
Domiciliary requirements
The Commission noted that a number of States
sought to confine their services to ’permanent residents’,
with the qualifying length of residence varying from 3 to 
1715 years. ' Domiciliary rules were applied not only to 
determine eligibility for appointment to services, but 
also to the award of contracts and rights in respect of 
fisheries, ferries, toll bridges, forests and excise 
shops. The conditions for the acquisition of domicile 
have included a) ownership of a homestead in the State,
^  Krishna Mukherji, Reorganisation of Indian States, (1955), 
p. 315 quoted in Ibid, p. 91.
^  Report, p. 212.
17 Ibid, pp. 212-213.
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b) residence in such a homestead for ten years, c) a 
clear intention to live in the State till death, and 
d) renunciation of the old domicile. The fact of the 
domicile was to be determined after considering such 
circumstantial evidence as whether the applicant had 
landed property or interests in his native place, and 
whether he paid periodic visits to that place.
Such restrictions are clearly against the 
spirit of the Constitution, which provides for a single 
citizenship for the whole of India, and the G-overnment 
felt the need to rectify the situation.^ Accordingly 
the Public Employment (Requirement as to Residence) Act 
was passed in 1957, and came into force in March 1959*
By s . 2 it repealed existing laws prescribing the requi­
rements as to residence which were in force in any State 
or Union Territory. Section 3 enabled the Central Govern­
ment to make rules in respect of certain classes of public 
employment"in certain areas, prescribing requirements 
as regards residence. Rules made by the Central Govern­
ment must be laid before each House of Parliament and 
are subject to its modicications (s. 4); s. 3 and the 
rules made thereunder are to cease to have effect on the
18 Ibid. p. 230.
Government of India, Memorandum, (1956), paragraph 16.
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expiration of five years from the commencement of the 
Act. Sections 4 and 5 were amended by the Public Employ­
ment (Requirement as to Residence) Amendment Act, 1964, 
and the original period of five years in s. 5 was substi­
tuted by ten years. It would seem that the legislation 
has achieved its purpose. Except in a few minor instances,
no cases of a direct breach of the Act by States have been
20reported by the Commissioner.
language medium of examinations and proficiency tests
The requirement of a high standard of proficiency 
in the State language can be even more effective than en­
forcing domiciliary requirements.
It is generally not disputed that public servants 
should be conversant with the official language or langua­
ges of a State. But the question is at what stage should 
competence in it be required of a candidate whose language 
is different: should it be a condition precedent for entry 
into the public services, or a condition of confirmation 
in the service, or a condition in the matter of promotion. 
The proposals made by the States Reorganisation Commission 
and accepted by the Government of India in its 1956 Memo­
randum lay down the guide-lines in this regard.
2 0 The Linguistic Commissioner’s 8th Report, Chapter IT.
299
The Commission, while accepting that all public 
servants should be conversant with the official language 
of a State, felt that candidates belonging to one language 
group should have no initial advantage over those belonging 
to other language groups. It was, therefore, both desira­
ble and practicable that for State Services, apart from 
the main language of the State, the candidates should 
have the option to elect, as medium of examination the 
Union language —  English or Hindi —  or the language of 
the minority, consisting of about 15 or 20 per cent or more 
of the population of the State. A test of proficiency in 
the State language should be held in that event, after 
selection, and before the end of probation. In the case
of subordinate services, however, the State language could
21continue to be the medium of examinations. The Govern­
ment of India accepted these proposals and recommended 
to the State governments that they should "as far as 
possible be accepted." It further recommended that "where 
cadre included in a subordinate service is treated as a 
cadre for a district, any language which has been recog­
nised as an official language in the district should
also be recognised as a medium for the purpose of competi-
22tive examinations in the district."
21 Report of the States Reorganisation Commission, p.213.
22 Memorandum, (1956), paragraph 15.
iiI
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The Committee of the Southern Zonal Council 
decided that it should he open to any candidate belonging 
to linguistic minorities to apply for a post, notwith­
standing that, at the time of such application, he does 
not possess adequate knowledge of the regional language.
The selection of such candidates should he subject to the 
condition that he passes the regional language test during 
probation; and, where the medium of examination for re­
cruitment is the regional language, the linguistic mino­
rity candidates could offer any of their regional languages
23plus Urdu, English and Hindi. ^
The Chief Ministers1 Conference merely re-stated 
the proposals of the States Reorganisation Commission 
with the omission of a reference to the minority’s lan­
guage . They said that, besides the official language of 
the State, an option should be given of using English or 
Hindi as a medium of examination. A test of proficiency 
in the State official language should be held after 
selection and before the end of probation.^ The provi­
sion of English and Hindi as additional media was presu­
mably considered an adequate safeguard to minorities, 
since under the three language formula they would be
23^ Decisions, Paragraph 12.
24 Statement, Paragraph 16.
obliged to study them.
According to the Linguistic Commissioners 
Report, English continues to be the sole medium of exami­
nation for the State Services in the States of Assam, 
Orissa, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Madras, Mysore, 
Gujarat, Maharashtra and Punjab. In Madhya Pradesh, Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar and Rajastan both English and Hindi are 
offered as media. In all the States, except Uttar Pradesh,
Orissa and Punjab, the language is no bar for recruitment,
25and the above policy is generally being followed.
In a complex issue as employment it is not possi­
ble to generalise. Each complaint has to be judged on 
its own merit. Por, as the States Reorganisation Commi­
ssion has pointed out, in the matter of employment, pro­
motion, disciplinary and other matters for the minorities
ultimately "there is no real safeguard other than to trust,
2 6the administrative purity, efficiency and fairness."
^  8th Report, pp. 92-95* 
Report, p. 214*
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4. The use of minority languages for official purposes
In view of the deep permeation of offical 
activities within the life of a modern community, the 
selection of languages as ’official language(s)1 becomes 
a matter of deliberate choice, and therefore of greatest 
interest and concern to linguistic m i n o r i t i e s A c c o r ­
ding to the States Pie organisation Commission, it forms, 
along with the issue of education, the ’core* of the
po
problem of linguistic minorities.
The question of the Official language of the 
Union, which is a subject of fierce controversy, does not 
concern us here. In the context of the minorities it arises 
as a local problem in relation to the administration of a 
State. It may be recalled that the States are multi­
lingual with a considerable proportion of minorities 
speairing languages other than that of the predominant 
group. The position of these minority groups has to be 
viewed in the light of Article 345, which deals with the 
official language of a State, and Articles 347 and 350, 
which seek to protect the linguistic interests of the 
minorities.
^  Report of the Official Language Commission, (1956),p. 11. 
Report, p. 209.
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Under Article 345, a State may by law adopt
any one or more of the languages in use in the State, or
Hindi, as the language or languages to be used for all
or any of the official purposes of thet State. This is
to be read with Article 347 which states —
On demand being made in that behalf, the President 
may, if he is satisfied that a substantial propor­
tion of the population of a State desire the use 
of any language spoken by them to be recognised by 
that State, direct that such language shall also be 
officially recognised throughout that State or any 
part thereof for such purpose as he may specify.
Article 350 entitles a person to make a repre­
sentation for the redress of any grievance to any officer 
or authority of the Union or of a State in any of the 
languages used in the Union or in the State, as the case 
may be.
Articles347 and 350 are at best statements of
priciples and are, therefore, relevant only to the extent
to which they are translated into practise. The States
Reorganisation Commission suggested that the Central
Government in consultation with the State Governments
should evolve a clear code to govern the use of different
languages at different levels of State administration and
29and ensure that this code is followed. It suggested
^  Henort, p. 212.
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that the States may be classed as ’unilingual1 or ’bilin­
gual1 , according to the percentage figures of population 
speaking different languages. A State would be unilingual 
where 70 per cent or more of the population speaks one 
language and, where a minority constitutes 30 per cent or 
more, it would be considered bilingual. The same test 
would apply at the district level. It was recommended 
that in bilingual districts, municipal areas or other 
smaller areas such as taluks, where the minorities consti­
tute 15 to 20 per cent of the population, documents which 
are used by people at large, such as government notices, 
electoral rolls, ration cards, etc., should be in both 
languages, and it should also be permissible to file 
documents in the courts in the minority language. Minority
languages should be given recognition for local election 
*50purposes. These proposals were agreed to by the Govern-
31ment of India.
The Committee of the Southern Zonal Council 
decided that, for the purpose of recognition of minority 
languages for specific purposes, every municipal town and 
the non-municipal area of every taluk should be treated
50 Ibid.
31 Memorandum, paragraphs 8 and 9.
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as separate.local areas and that a list of all such local
areas, where 20 per cent of the people spoke a language
other than that of/the State, should be prepared for each
State. It suggested that following steps should be taken
in respect of every such local area —
All important Government notices and Rules, Electoral 
Rolls etc., should be published in the minority lan­
guage or languages.
forms etc., to be used by the public should be prin­
ted both in the regional language and in the minority 
language.
Facilities for registration of documents in the mino­
rity languages should be provided.
Correspondence with government offices in the mino­
rity language should be permitted.
Permission should be given to file documents in the 
minority languages in the courts in the areas.
An endeavour should be made to secure, in so far as 
this may be found practicable with due regard to 
administrative conveniences that the officers posted 
to work in such local areas are persons who possess 
adequate knowledge of the minority language.^
The Chief Ministers1 Conference generally re­
iterated the earlier proposals with certain modifications. 
They recommended that in communications withjthe public, 
languages other than official language should be used 
with the objective that the great majority of the people 
should understand what they are told. With regard to the
"52J Eecisions, paragraph 8, item 6.
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official language at the district level, they said that 
where 60 per cent of the population speaks a language 
other than the official language of the State, that lan­
guage should be recognised; however, for that purpose 
recognition may be given only to the major languages spe­
cified in the Eighth Schedule with certain exceptions in 
regard to certain hill districts. In a district or a 
smaller area like a municipality or tehsil, it was desi­
rable to get important government notices and rules publi­
shed in the language of the minority as well, where they 
constitute 15 to 20 per cent of the population, lastly, 
the administration should accept public petitions and 
representations in other languages and arrangements should 
be made for replies to be sent in the same language, as 
far as possible. The Conference also recommended that 
arrangements should be made for the publication of trans­
lations of the substance of important lais, rules, regula-
33tions, etc., in the minority languages.
It is apparent that the issue of official 
languages affords the greatest possibility of divergence 
between theory and practise. It is not easy to get a 
clear picture of the situation, as much depends on local 
conditions, which greatly vary from one place to another.
33 Statement, paragraphs 11 to 14.
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Heat and passion generated in some places (as for instance 
in disputed border areas), practical difficulties in the 
implementation of the agreed proposals, and in some 
instances the deliberate policies of State governments 
are among the factors which should be taken into account.
A survey of the complaints received by the linguistic 
Commissioner shows that they range over a very wide field 
and include those pertaining to the language of applica­
tions, radio programmes, electoral rolls, registration 
offices, sign-boards, language of courts, languages of 
Panchayat and local bodies, gerrymandering of wards, non­
reporting of the speeches made in minority languages,
and the posting of officers without adequate knowledge
34-of local languages. ^ In view of the practical difficul­
ties, each of such cases has to be judged on its own 
merits. Thus, with regard to the preparation of electoral 
rolls, it has been pointed out that nit is expensive and 
wasteful to require the duplication of an electoral 
roll in another language simply because in a particular 
area there is a substantial minority speaking that 
language.” After considering such factors as literacy 
among the minorities and similarity of script it has 
been found that the preparation of the roll in a second
34-^  See the Linguistic Commissioner’s Reports, 7th Report, 
(1965), pp. 63-79; 8th Report, (1968), pp. 79-100.
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language is necessary only for certain small areas in 
some States.
As to administration, there is hardly any 
uniformity of practise among the States in this regard. 
The rule as to the publication of notices etc., in a 
minority language is not yet being implemented fully.
Only about half a dosen of the States have prepared the 
lists of such local areas and have implemented the pro­
posals, while others have yet to prepare them. Some of 
the States have implemented the proposals with regard to 
certain areas of the State, while others have pleaded
their inability to prepare such lists as the Census fi-
36gures below the district level were not available.
As to sending replies to petitions and representations 
in the same language in which they are received, only 
a few States have agreed to do so, advantage being taken 
of the qualifying proviso ’whenever possible’. Some 
send such replies only in certain specified languages. 
Rajastan sends them in either Hindi or English along 
with a translation of it in the language concerned.
Three of the Southern States, Andhra Pradesh, Madras and 
Mysore, have restricted the application of this rule to 
the local areas where the minorities consist of 15 to 20
^  Report on the Third General Elections in India, Yol.I,
(1966), pp." 121-122.
3 6 linguistic Commissioner’s 8th Report, pp. 72-75.
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per cent of the population.
Results are not very encouraging either with 
regard to the publication of the substance of important 
laws, rules, regulations etc., in minority languages.
The four southern States and Assam have made some progress 
in this regard. Two of the States, Madhya Pradesh and 
Punjab, have refused to do so, while Gujarat and Bihar 
have issued no orders, though they have agreed in prin­
ciple. Only partial progress has been reported from 
other States.^
Prom the Commissioner's Report it is clear 
that very much remains to be done towards the full impli- 
mentation of the agreed proposals as regards the use of 
minority languages for official purposes.
IV. Agency for the enforcement of safeguards: need for 
a review
It is evident from the above discussion that 
the policy governing minority safeguards leaves much to 
be desired. It is apparent that the Constitutional 
provisions are not adequate; that, while generally there 
is agreement on principles, there is lack of uniformity
37 Ibid, pp. 75-77.
38 Ibid, pp. 78-79.
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in practise, and not infrequently, divergence from the 
principles themselves. Moreover, there is no effective 
Central agency to ensure the proper implementation and 
co-ordination of the policy. This needs to be put on a 
sounder basis than it is now.
One argument against the provision of any elabo­
rate or special safeguards to minorities has been that 
they tend to keep alive the minority consciousness and 
perpetuate the problem. This fear was expressed by the 
States Reorganisation Commission which said that any over­
emphasis on minority rights or an elaborate system of
guarantees would complicate rather than solve the prob- 
39lem. While the substance of this argument is not 
denied, it is submitted that the problem cannot be wished 
away by ignoring it. When a problem exists, there is no 
alternative to providing safeguards for those who might 
be adversely affected thereby. While these may be desig­
ned as a temporary measure and cease when the problem no 
longer exists, they must nevertheless be adequate and 
effective during the time of their operation. Ttiis cannot 
be said of the present sefeguards for linguistic minorities. 
Purther, though one hopes for a time when the wider natio­
nal outlook may replace the majority-minority consciousness,
39 Report, pp. 207-208.
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the indications are that this problem will be there 
for the foreseeable future. The need for a review of 
safeguards is, therefore, clear. There are two aspects 
of this issues first, the provision of adequate safe­
guards and second, the machinery for their implimentation.
As to the first, it is evident that the existing 
Constitutional provisions by themselves do not provide 
an adequate basis for the protection of the interests of 
linguistic minorities. The need for strengthening of 
these provisions has often been voiced, and has to be 
looked into. Perhaps it would be possible o give a Con­
stitutional form to some of the principles which have been 
agreed to by the States and which are now part of the all- 
India policy. However, inadequacy of Constitutional 
provisions is a relatively lesser problem in the present 
context. It is not practical to -enact Constitutional 
provisions for every contingency that may arise. In a 
complex situation, such as that of linguistic minorities, 
discretion must necessarily reside with the State autho­
rities, to be exercised by them according to the local 
needs and circumstances. As far as the principles of 
minority safeguards are concerned, those contained in 
the Constitutional provisions, together with those agreed 
upon by the States, are adequate for the purpose at 
present.
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The shortcomings of the minority policy arise 
from its implementation and the machinery for the enfor­
cement of safeguards. It is true that in India there is 
an independent judiciary for the enforcement of the citi­
zens1 rights. But, as mentioned earlier, it is not for 
everybody to go to the court; nor is it practical to do 
so on every issue. While there have been important issues, 
which have been fought and won in the courts, there remain 
many more for which the courts cannot provide an adequate 
remedy. A permanent body is, therefore, needed to look 
after the interests of linguistic minorities, with adequate 
powers and authority for the purpose, working under the 
direction of the Central Government.
There is, of course, the Linguistic Commissioner, 
provided for by Article 350-B, to look after these inte­
rests. But, despite the gallant efforts by successive 
Commissioners, this institution has proved wholly inade­
quate for the purpose. It is not denied that in many 
individual cases his efforts have succeeded; nevertheless, 
there cannot be any doubt as to the overall ineffectiveness 
of this office. His 'duty* is nto investigate all matters 
relating to the safeguards provided for linguistic mino­
rities under this C o n s t i t u t i o n . I t  is already seen
4-0 Article 350-B.
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that these safeguards themselves are va^gue. He does not 
possess adequate powers and authority to rectify matters 
which his ivestigations reveal or which are brought to 
his notice. As Ram Gopal has pointed out, the Commissi­
oner , strictly speaking, has no power to deal with any 
undertaking or safeguard outside the Constitution, nor 
could such an undertaking or safeguard be legally enfor­
ced. ^  The States have been too slow in furnishing the 
information sought for by him, and not infrequently have 
turned a blind eye to his recommendations. Administrati­
vely, there is no effective co-ordination between the 
various persons concerned. Though there is a Special 
Officer in each State concerned with the implementation 
of safeguards and maintaining liason with the Commissioner,
the Commissioner has so far been receiving relevant in-
42formation from only two of the State governments. The 
latest Report of the Commissioner, published in 1968, 
pertains to the year ending June 1966 and much of its 
information relates to the year 1964-65. In many cases 
even this information is not available. The usefulness 
of these Reports jerhaps lies in serving as an index 
to the grievances of linguistic minorities and nothing 
mor e.
^  Linguistic Affairs of India, (1966), p. 124.
^  6th Report, p. 112, paragraph 583.
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The need for an effective Central Agency is,
therefore, clear. Such an idea is certainly not new.
It has been put forward in various forms many times, but'
ignored as often. Thus a proposal for a Central Ministry
for Minority Affairs was put forward before the States
Reorganisation Commission, but it rejected the idea on
the ground that the role of the Central Government in
linguistic minority affairs was a limited one, and there-
4-3fore a Ministry not justified.  ^ The question of a Mini­
stry apart, it is difficult to understand the Commission's 
interpretation of the role of the Central Government. 
Obviously, the ultimate resposibility for the minority 
safeguards must lie with the Central Government. This 
was the consensus among the Members of Parliament during 
the debate on the Commission's recommendations. Acharya 
Kripalani told the House that "it is for the Central 
Government to see that no harm is done to minority groups 
and to see that no individual in a minority group is 
denied common r i g h t s . A n o t h e r  Member, Shri M. A. 
Ayyangar, \fanted the Constitution to be amended so tht
the linguistic minorities would be in in the charge of
45the Central Government.
^  Report, p. 214.
^  L.S.D., December 14? .1955, Cols. 42-43. 
45 Ibid, December 17, 1955, Col. 379.
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In what form this control should he exercised is 
a matter for debate. In the opinion of the States Reorga­
nisation Commission, the Governor of a State should look
after the minority interests as a representative of the 
A S
Centre, but this idea did not find favour. It is sugge­
sted that the establishment of a Commission to look after 
minority interests may be further investigated. The need 
for a Statutory Commission, which was to be a non-political 
and quasi-judicial advisory body, was pressed before the 
States Reorganisation Commission.^ In Parliament at
A O
least two members strongly supported the proposal. Pandit
Bhargava spoke of the need to take the minority safeguards
from the sphere of the executive and vest it in a permanent
4-9Commission on the analogy of the Election Commission. The 
outcome, however, was the provision for a linguistic Commi­
ssioner, in Article 350-B, as suggested by Shri. V. V. Giri.
A re-appraisal of the situation is now due. The
old arguments that the existence of a Commission might
spoil relations between the minorities and the dominant
50language group do not have much force. If the mutual rela­
tions are good and there is goodwill on both sides, there
Report, p. 216.
47 Ibid, p. 217.
Pandit Bhargava, X.S,D., December 20, 1955, Cols.703-704;
Sliri Prank Anthony, Ibid, Cols. 766-767.
49 Ibid.
50 Report of the States Reorganisation Commission,pp.214-215.
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is no reason why the existence of a Commission should 
spoil it. On the other hand it would he a safeguard if 
relations should worsen, it is not suggested that the 
Commission should be legalistic in its dealings and enfor­
ce only 'strict justice'. As the States Reorganisation 
Commission has pointed out, "no guarantees can secure a 
minority against every kind of discriminatory policy of a 
State government" and "there can be no substitute to a
sense of fairplay on the part of the majority and a sense
51of obligation on part of the minorities." The existence 
of a Commission is in no way prejudicial in this context. 
Its value will depend on the need for it. It will be a 
reminder to the State governments of their obligations to 
the minorities and will impart a sense of security to 
the minor i t i e s.
This is not the place to consider all the attri­
butes which such an agency must have. But it must cer­
tainly have adequate powers and judicial authority, which 
are lacking in the present arrangement. Such an agency 
may be created, perhaps, by reorganising the office of the 
Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities and investing it 
with necessary powers and authority.
51 Ibid, p. 216.
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Chapter V
SOCIO-ECONOMIC INTERESTS
The first and foremost of the difficulties 
faced by democracy is said to be the persistence of great 
social and economic inequalities.1 Perhaps nowhere else 
do they stand out in such sharp contrast as in India.
The removal of these inequities has been a major concern 
of the freedom fighters, social reformers and governments 
alike. The Nehru Committee urged the need to undertake 
vast programmes for social advance as a strong argument 
for responsible governments "We cannot believe that a 
future responsible government can ignore the claims of 
mass education, or the uplift of the submerged classes
or the social and economic reconstruction of the village
2
life in India." These sentiments were even strongly 
voiced in the Constituent Assembly, when the relevant
Morris Ginsberg, The Psychology of Society, (9th ed., 
1964), p. xix. Also. J. A. Hobson/ Towards Social 
Equality. (1931), p. 4.
2 Nehru Report, p. 11.
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Constitutional measures were being discussed. "After all 
why are we having this liberty for?*, asked Dr. Ambedkar, 
and answering the question himself he said, "we are having 
this liberty in order to reform our social system, which 
is so full of inequalities, discriminations and other
*5
things which conflict with our Fundamental Rights."-^ Dr. 
Radhakrishnan said that India must have a ’socio-economic 
revolution1, designed to bring about not only fthe real 
satisfaction of fundamental needs of the common man*, but 
go much deeper and bring about a ’fundamental change in
A
the structure of Indian society*.
The attainment of social and economic justice
with equality of status and opportunity for every citizen
5
is a major objective of the Constitution. All its re­
sources are to be directed towards this end. But in their 
realisation two problems will have to be overcome, and 
the success of the Constitution and of democracy in India 
depend on this.
The first problem is that of under-development 
of the country as a whole. The characteristics of a 
modern society are said to be, among other things, " a 
comparatively high degree of urbanisation, widespread
3 VII, C.A.D.. p. 781.
4 IJ, C.A.D.. see pp. 269-273.
" Preamble.
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literacy, comparatively high per capita income, extensive 
geographical and social mobility, a relatively high degree 
of commercialisation and industrialisation of the economy, 
and extensive and penetrative network of mass-communieation 
media, and in general by widespread participation and in­
volvement by members of the society in modern social and 
economic processes." The state of Indian society, in 
general, is different. The characteristiss of modernism, 
though, need not be the same everywhere: they must necessa­
rily vary according to circumstances, social values and 
ideals of each society. However, India's efforts since 
independence have, in general, been directed towards the 
creation of the conditions mentioned above. Yast resources, 
both human and economic, have been mobilised and ambitious 
Five Tear Plans have been conceived and executed with this 
end in view. Undoubtedly, considerable progress has been 
made since independence towards obtaining a better stan­
dard of life for the common man. An evaluation of the 
specific ends and means in this respect is, however, out­
side the scope of our discussion.
Our concern is with the second .problem, which 
is intimately linked with the first: the problem of socio­
economic inequalities which must be removed, if all
£
J. S. Coleman, "The political systems of the developing 
areas", in G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman (ed.), The 
Politics of the Developing Areas. (I960), p. 532.
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members of Indian society are to benefit equally under 
the Constitution. The existence of social and economic 
disparities is too notorious to require much elaboration. 
There are many sections of the Indian society which on 
account of social disabities, poverty, or for other rea­
sons have always been, and still are, at the lower end of 
the social scale. These are generally referred to as 
'backward classes*. On account of their backward condi­
tion in relation to the genral population, they are at 
a disadvantage, and for them 'citizenship*, *liberty* 
and 'equality* are empty phrases, which have no meaning. 
If national citizenship is to be a reality, these people 
will have to be brought into the mainstream of national 
life, and placed on a footing of equality with the rest 
of their contrymen* In this chapter it is proposed to 
consider the measures incorporated in the Constitution 
for this purpose.
I. Definition of 'Backward Classes*
The term 'backward classes* is used in the Con­
stitution both in a general sense denoting all backward 
sections of the community and also to indicate particular 
communities. In this chapter it is used in the former 
sense, except where the context requires it otherwise.
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The backward classes envisaged in the Consti­
tution comprise three categories and may generally be 
said to represent three different types of socio-economic 
development. In the first category are those who are 
known as Scheduled Castes'. These are sections of the 
population, which for a long period of time have been 
subject to severe social disabilities associated with 
the caste system, as for instance untouchability; their 
alternative title, 'depressed classes', is descriptive
c.
of their condition. In the next category are the 'Sche­
duled Tribes', who mostly live in hill regions as compact 
social units, whose cultural and socio-economic interests 
need special protection. And thirdly, there are the 
*other backward classes' who, in effect, constitute an 
amorphous mass in the Indian population, whose backward­
ness derives from a multiple of causes, chief among them 
being the lack of economic and educational opportunities. 
The distinction between the above three categories becomes 
relevant on account of different measures taken to suit 
different circumstances. While all three categories 
are singled out from the genrral population for special 
treatment, additional measures are aimed at the Scheduled 
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes to overcome their special 
disabilities J
 ^The Supreme Court has recognised this distinction in 
Heggade Janardhan Subbaraya v. State of Mysore (A.I.R. 
196? S.d. 702) in favour of the Scheduled Castes and the 
Scheduled TriDes, (pp. 702, 703;.
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Scheduled Castes
The term 'Scheduled Caste* is a legal designa­
tion first adopted in 1935, when the lowest ranking castes 
were listed in a schedule appended to the Government of 
India Act, 1935, for the purposes of statutory safeguards 
and other benefits. A movement for the improvement of 
their condition had been steadily building up with the 
active support of various organisations and since 1920 
it gathered momentum, when the Congress Party made the
O'
abolition of untouchability one of its principal objectives
O
and Mahatma Gandhi took control of the campaign. These 
castes have since been variously described as 'depressed 
classes', 'Harijans* and 'Scheduled Castes'. The concept 
of a scheduled caste is, however, relevant only in the 
context of statutory provisions, government action, and 
politics. Outside of this, it only means a diverse popu­
lation, divided into numerous communities with a diversity 
of traditions, culture, and problems, and distributed
throughout India, forming a minority in India as a whole
o
and in every unit formed by the Constitution.
Q
See the Nehru Report, p. 59.
 ^Lelah Dushkin, "Scheduled Caste Policy in India", Memio- 
graphed typescript, (1966).
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The mode of designation of the Scheduled Castes
is laid down in Article 341 —
The President may with respect to any State or Union 
Territory, and where it is a State, after consulta­
tion with the Governor thereof, by public notification, 
specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or 
groups within castes, races or tribes which shall, for 
the purposes of this Constitution, be deemed to be 
Scheduled Castes in relation to that State or Union 
Territory, as the case may be.
Parliament is enpowered to include in or exclude 
from the list of Scheduled Castes so specified any caste, 
race or tribe, or any parts or groups thereof, by law 
enacted for the purpose.^
Scheduled Tribes
These are generally referred to as tAdivasist. 
While being backward in every respect like the Scheduled 
Castes, they are concentrated in certain areas in different 
parts of the country, have a tribal organisation, and di­
stinctive cultures of their own.^ The mode of designation 
of the Scheduled Tribes is similar to that of the Scheduled 
Castes, and is contained in Article 342. Certain areas 
with a concentration of tribal population are designated
10 Article 341(2).
On the subject generally see S. S. Ghurye, The Scheduled 
Tribes, (2nd ed., 1959).
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as Scheduled Areas (formerly known as * excluded areas1) 
and special arrangements have been made for their admini­
stration in Schedules V and VI of the Constitution.
Although the mode of designation of the Scheduled 
Castes and of the Scheduled Tribes is in itself a simple 
affair, the practical difficulties involved in differenti­
ating between various castes and tribes is not to be under­
estimated. The task, essentially, is one of establishing 
the facts: before the issue of a public notification it 
is necessary to establish the fact of backwardness of the 
groups involved; the task facing the courts when such an 
Order is in dispute is, by and large, to establish the 
fact that the caste of a party before it is, or is not,the 
one specified in the relevant Order. Before a notifica­
tion is issued, an elaborate enquiry is made, and it is 
within the authority of the President to specify the castes, 
races, or tribes, with reference to different districts 
or sub-areas of a State and having regard to different
O 1 9stages of their development. After the President has 
specified the groups, it is only Parliament that is compe­
tent to include in or exclude from the list of tribes or 
castes specified in the notification.^ The High Court
Bhaiya lal v. Har Kishan Singh, A.I.R. 1965 S.C.
K s r t T s r o ) . -------------------
^  Chandappa v. Laxman Naik, A.I.R. 1967 Mys. 182 (184,185).
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has no power to contradict Presidential Order
The first lists issued were under the Constitu­
tion (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, the Constitution 
(Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950, and the Constitution (Sche­
duled Castes) Part C States Order, 1951, and these continue 
to be the bases* The actual number of the population and 
of the castes and tribes involved is variable, depending 
on the periodical modifications to the lists. The lists 
were modified in 1956 on the recommendation of the Back­
ward Classes Commission (appointed under Article 340) by 
the enactment of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
(Amendment) Act, 1956, and again by the Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes lists (Modification) Order, 1956, 
issued under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. The 
lists were revised again on the creation of the new States 
of Maharashtra and Gujarat by the Bombay Reorganisation 
Act, I960. Separate orders were also made at different
times for Jammu and Kashmir, Andaman and Nicobar Islands,
15Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Pondichery.  ^ According to 
the 1951 Census, the population of the Scheduled Tribes 
was 19,147,054 which was 5.3 per cent of the total popula­
tion. After the Scheduled Tribes lists (Modification)
^  Siddappa v. Chandappa, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 929 (932).
^  The Report of the Advisory Committee on the Revision 
of ike lisis of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
p. 26. A full list of all Orders is to be 
found in Appendix I of this Report.
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Order, 1956, this rose to 22,511,854 or 6.23 per cent.
The increase of 34 lakhs was due to the addition of groups
16omitted in the earlier list. According to the 1961 
Census, the combined population of the Scheduled Castes 
and the Scheduled Tribes is over 94 millions, the former 
being over 64 millions (or about 15 per cent) and the la­
tter close to 30 millions (or about 7 per cent).1^
One of the difficulties in employing the crite­
rion of caste to determine backwardness, apart from the 
question of its desirability, is the difficulty in identi­
fying caste boundaries. This problem was commented upon
by the Punjab High Court in Deedar Singh Cheeda v. Sohan 
18Singh. The Court noted that the distinction between
castes had assumed imprrtance in recent years as a result
of special concessions given to some castes under Article
341. The results of researches made by various authors
in this respect did not seem to the Court to carry preeis^e,
exact and distinctive meanings, excluding the possibility
of some individuals using their criteria interchangeably.
In its opinion the position with regard to castes had all
19along been somewhat confused and imprecise.
Report of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes 
Commission. tl9blj, p. 7.
^  Detailed figures are cited in the Report of the Commissi- 
oner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 16th
report',' Cl'966-67T; "p. 'T---------------------
18 A.I.R. 1966 Punj. 282.
Ibid. p. 288.
327
The task of deciding whether or not an indivi­
dual is a member of a particular caste rests ultimately 
with the courts, to be decided by reference to the facts 
in each case. Generally, it is held that caste is the 
result of birth and not of choice or volition. Thus, 
where it was alleged that a member of the Muka Dora tribe 
had ceased to be such by conversion to a higher caste, 
it was held that the mere performance of a ceremony and 
following the customs and manners of a higher caste was 
not sufficient to show that he had ceased to be a member 
of his former caste. In order to prove that he had ceased 
to be a member, there should be first of all, evidence
of intention, the reactions of the old body and that of 
20the new body. This principle was confirmed in appeal
21by the Supreme Court. The decisions relating to the
effect of religious conversions have already been refe-
22rred to in an earlier chapter.
Other backward classes
The method of designation of this class is 
markedly different from that of the two earlier categories 
and is fraught with difficulties. In the absence of any
20 D. S. Dora v. V. V. Giri. A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 724.
21 V. V. Giri v. D. S. Dora. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1318.
Chapter III, pp. 201-204, supra.
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distinctive characteristics possessed by the former and 
the heterogenous and uncertain characteristics of back­
wardness , this class is not easily ascertainable. This, 
as we shall seeflater, leaves room for manoeuvre for various 
groups seeking to be designated as one of the backward 
classes, on account of the benefits that acrue on such a 
classification.
The relevant Constitutional provision is to be
found in Article 340(1), which states —
The Pre,sident may by order appoint a Commission, 
consisting of such persons as he thinks fit, to inve­
stigate the conditions of socially and educationally 
backward classes within the territory of India and 
the difficulties under which they labour and to make 
recommendations as to steps that should be taken 
by the Union or any State to remove such difficulties 
and to improve their condition and as to the grants 
that should be maj3e for the purpose by the Union or 
any State and the conditions subject to which such 
grants should be made, ... etc.
The Commission so appointed is to investigate the matters 
referred to them and present to the President a report 
setting out the facts as found by them and make such reco­
mmendations as they think proper; and the President is to 
cause a copy of that report together with a memorandum
explaining the action taken thereon to be placed before
23each House of Parliament. ^
^  Article 340, Clauses (2) and (3)
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The Backward Classes Commission was appointed 
in 1953, and one of the terns of reference was to report 
whether any section of the people, in addition to the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, should be trea­
ted as socially and economically backward classes* The 
Commission reported in 1955 and laid the blame for back­
wardness squarely on the caste system* In his forwarding 
letter, the Chairman of the Commission stated that "in 
the present context 1 classes and sections1 means nothing 
but castes and no other interpretation is feasible*"^
The Commission compiled a list of over 2000 backward groups 
and recommended various measures for their economic, edu­
cational, social, cultural and political advancement.
It has been estimated that 913 of the 2399 groups listed
had a total of 116 million members or 33 per cent of the
then population of India, not including the members of
OR
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes* ^
The Commission recommended that "as long as 
social welfare and social relief have to be administered 
through castes, classes, or groups, full information
26about these groups should be obtained and tabulated*"
^  Report of the Backward Classes Commission* (1956), 
p. Xlll.
OR
 ^Marc Galanter, "Protective Discrimination for Backward 
Classes in India", 3, J.I.L.I.* (1961), p. 39, at p. 53*
^  Report* p. 159.
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However, the Government of India, after long consideration 
of the Report, decided not to draw up any all-India list 
of the backward classes other than the already existing 
lists of the Scheduled Castes and of the Scheduled Tribes. 
They have left it to States to draw their own lists, choo­
sing their own criteria for defining backwardness, though
they have indicated their preference for the economic
27criterion to that of caste in defining it.
Thus, differing from the case of the Scheduled 
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, there is neither a central 
authority nor a defined procedure for designating the 
tother backward classes1. The matter now rests in the 
hands of State governments and, not unnaturally, there is 
neither unanimity as to the criteria of backwardness nor 
uniformity in the percentage of tbepopulation of different 
States declared as backward. Article 340 lacks any legal 
force in the determination of backward classes, and accor­
dingly the lists issued by the Backward Classes Commission 
are of no consequence. The President has no authority 
under the said Article to issue any instructions, which 
have a binding force on the States, nor is the Memorandum
issued by the Government of India pursuant to the Repg:t
28of the Backward Classes Commission so binding. In
^  Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled bribes, Report, 1964-65. (19^7)> P. 155 •
28 Desu Rayudu v. A.P. Public Service Commission, A.I.R. 
1^67 A?P. 353.
I
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consequence, the classes enumerated by the said Commi­
ssion as socially and educationally backward classes, 
even though accepted by the President, will not for the 
purposes of the Constitution mean socially and eduea-
OQ
tionally backward classes. It is the Union or the 
State government who have to take action in this respect 
and not the President.^
In view of the wide divergence in practise in
designating backward classes it is impossible to get a
clear overall picture in this respect. But though not 
easily ascertainable, they nevertheless for a very siza­
ble proportion of the total population. The criteria 
for the determination of backward classes is considered 
at greater length at a later stage.
II. Measures for the removal of backwardness
The task facing India, as mentioned above, is 
one of securing a general advancement of the people as a 
whole, while at the same time bringing the relatively 
backward sections of the community in line with their 
fellow countrymen. But while this objective is simple
^  Ramakrishna Singh v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. I960
i C T T O ? ) ,  ------------- ------
30 M. R. Bala.ii v. State of Mysore. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649, 
at p.
51 See p. 355 ff., infra.
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and clear, the best means of achieving it are far less
certain. The problem of backwardness is a complex issue,
to which no simple answer can be found. The Backward
Classes Commission, for instance, was able to offer only
general suggestions —
It should be remembered that in modern conditions 
of life, isolated treatment of anh one cause of 
backwardness will not bring about the desired re­
sult. An integrated plan for the removal of all 
causes of backwardness, accompanied by ameliorative 
measures, will alone be able to remove this malady, 
inherent in our society. Economic improvement, 
removal of social inequality, educational advance­
ment and representation of these classes in spheres 
of power, prestige and authority should form the 
main features of such a plan.^g
Different types of backwardness are mutually interdependent
and the remedy calls for an integrated plan of action.
One important feature of the Indian Constitution 
in this respect is the obligation it has cast on the 
state for achieving a welfare state. The provisions in 
this regard are contained in the chapter on *Directive 
Principles of State Policy1. These are not enforceable 
in a court of law, "but >£he principles therein laid down 
are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the 
county and it shall be the duty of the State to apply 
these principles in making laws."^ The state is committed
32 Repoxt, p. 51-
33 Article 37.
333
to promoting the welfare of the people by securing and 
protecting a social order in which social, economic and 
political justice is to inform all the institutions of 
national life (Article 38)• It is bound to devote its 
energies towards securing adequate means of livelihood, 
a fair distribution of the material resources, fair ope­
ration of the economic system, and the welfare ofthe 
workers and of children (Article 39). Some of the other 
Articles deal with other aspects of the welfare ideal, 
such as, the right to work, to education and to public 
assistance (Article 41), humane conditions of work (Arti­
cle 42), a living wage (Article 43), free and compulsory 
education for children (Article 45), and the improvement 
in the standard of living and public health (Article 47).
In the context of the present chapter, Article
46 is of particular relevance as it shows a deep concern
for the backward sections of the community —
The State shall promote with special care the edu­
cational and economic interests of the weaker sections 
of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled 
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect 
them from social injustice and all forms of exploi­
tation.
Briefly, the directive principles visualise 
a social and economic order based on equality of opportu­
nity, full employment, provision of adequate means of 
livelihood and social security benefits for all citizens.
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However, one of the major difficulties in the 
scheme is the scarcity of resources. There can be no 
doubt that the outstanding cause of all backwardness is 
economic. In the numerically second largest country 
in the world, the standard of living of the people as 
a whole is one of the lowest in the world. Studies of 
the Planning Commission have indicated tlij; about 60 per 
cent of the population is below the minimal income level 
of Rs. 100 per month per household and the Report of the 
Second Agricultural Labour Enquiry Committee has revealed 
that the economic condition of the landless agricultural 
workers, who form a sizable proportion of the rural popu­
lation, has hardly shown any improvement over a period 
34of ten years. ^ Speaking at a seminar organised by the 
Planning Commission in 1963, the then Prime Minister Nehru 
spoke of the magnitude of the problem and the extra-ordi­
nary measures required in terms of obligations to the 
weak, handicapped and the backward. The Government, he 
said, had decided to extend the special facilities as far 
as possible to all people who lacked them. "Then we 
looked at the picture again from the ecomomic point of 
view and found that 80 per cent of our people would
34 Shriman Narayan, Socialism in Indian Planning, (1964), 
p. 134•
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qualify for these privileges. Now if we are going to
give special privileges to 80 per cent it really means
the whole lot of them: 100 per cent."^ In his opinion,
what was necessary was a scheme of social engineering,
and planning with a view to raising the whole level of
life in the country, while special institutions dealt
36with particular issues.
A detailed evaluation of all the aspects of 
the general welfare measures aimed at removing backward­
ness is not possible within the limited scope of this
work. Such a task must be left to be discussed in reports
37and specialist studies undertaken for that purpose. 1 In 
this chapter attention is focused on the role of law as 
an instrument for the removal of social and economic 
inequalities•
The Constitutional provisions with regard to 
the backward classes fall roughly into three categories.
In the first one are those which seek to secure their 
political interests by special measures, including the 
provision for special administration, tribal and regional 
autonomy, reservation of seats and the appointment of
^  Planning Commission, Social Welfare in India*s Deve­
loping Economy. (19o3;» p. 2.
36 Ibid.
37' Por instance, on the economic aspect, see R. D. Agarwal, 
Economic Aspects of Welfare State in India, (1967;.
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special ministers and officers to look after their inte­
rests; secondly, there are those provisions incorporated 
in the chapter on Fundamental Rights, which seek to abolish 
certain social disabilities; and lastly, there are those 
which provide for protective discrimination1 in favour 
of these classes.
Of these, the political interests have already 
been discussed.^ The discussion in this chapter pertains 
to measures in the two latter groups. Both these are 
unique experiments in achieving an egalitarian soeiety 
within a democratic set-up and are thus an index to the 
socio-economic philosophy of the Constitution.
III. Removal of social disabilities
The Constitution-makers were aware that a decla­
ration of Fundamental Rights would be quite meaningless 
to some, unless cetain aggravated forms of social disabi­
lities were removed at the same time. This is sought to 
be done by the incorporation of specific Articles in the 
Constitution.
Article 17 states —
"Untouehability" is abolished and its practise in 
any form is forbidden. The enforcement of any disbi- 
lity arising out of "Untouchability11 shall be an 
offence punishable in accordance with law.
Chapter II, p. 128ff., supra.
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No citizen is to be discriminated against on grounds of 
bis caste in the use of public facilities (Article 15), 
in public employment (Article 16), and with regard to 
admission to educational institutions maintained by or 
receiving aid out of state funds (Article 29(2) ). As a 
further corollary to the above, Article 25 provides for 
the throwing open of the Hindu Religious Institutions 
of a public character to all classes and sections of 
Hindus. Article 23 prohibits traffic in human beings and 
all forms of forced labour. Though as a rule the Funda­
mental Rights protect the individual against state action, 
three Articles, viz., 15(2), 17 and 23, also protect the 
individual against the actions of private citizens.
Social inequalities and the caste system
Without doubt, the caste system is the most 
significant factor on the Indian social: scene and plays 
a dominant role in it. According to M. N. Srinivas, 
caste is the one institution in India, which cuts across 
religious, regional and class divisions and which he
39refers to as "that classic expression of inequality.
The practise of "untouchability" is intimately 
linked with the caste system. The origins of the caste
^  Paste in Modern India, (1962), p. 88.
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system are shrouded in mystery, but it is generally be­
lieved that it derived from a four-fold organisation of 
society based on varna and a broad division of labour. 
These divisions crystallised into the hierarchical castes, 
Brahmana, Kshatriya, Yaishya and Sudra, which took prece­
dence in that order.^ The "untouchables" existed at the 
bottom of this social scale, and were sometimes referred 
to as the "fifth class".^
The ritual status of the forr castes in society 
followed the order of their precedence, and all other 
issues, including their respective positions in legal and 
social spheres, were tied to this. Thus caste is a cons­
picuous factor in Manufs law on defamation. The penalties 
prescribed varied according to the caste status of the 
persons involved. In the case of the Sudra the punish­
ment was excessively harsh and included such measures as 
the thrusting of a red hot iron rail into his mouth,
cutting off his tongue, and pouring hot oil into his
4.2mouth and ears. The Brahmana was only required to 
perform the same penance for killing a Sudra as for
^  For a general discussion on the subject, see J. 3). M. 
Derrett, Religion. Law and the State in India,pp.172-182.
^  Ibid. p. 176. For a discussion on the theories of the 
origin of untouehability, see B. R. Ambedkar, The 
Untouchables. (1948), Chapters 3-6.
42 B. Prasad & others, "Law and Legal Institutions", in 
R. C. Majumdar (ed.), The History and Culture of the 
Indian People. Vol. ll,~ p. 53l?, ai p. 338.
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killing a cat, a frog, a dog or a erow.^ Whether or 
not these penalties were actually carried out is a diffe­
rent matter* What is important is that a lower caste 
status always carried a heavier burden. Economic status 
generally coincided with the ritual status of a caste.^ 
The Backward Classes Commission appointed to investigate 
into the condition of those classes squarely laid the 
blame for their backwardness on the caste system.^
The Constitution seeks to remove this co-rela­
tionship between caste and socio-economic status. The 
acceptance of the principle of democracy is in a sense a 
negation of caste.^ The proper operation of the demo­
cratic principle requires that there should be social 
mobility based on merit. It is rightly pointed out that, 
in an ideal mobile society, individuals must be distribu­
ted according to their capacity and ability, and placed 
in their proper place regardless of the position of 
their fathers.^
The future of the caste system isffchus a topical 
issue on which the attitude of the state needs to be
43 R.K.Mookerji and R.C.Majumdar, "Social Condition", in 
Ibid, p. 542, at p. 544.
^  M. N. Srinivas, Caste in Modern India, pp. 90, 92. 
Report, p. xiii.
46 K. M. Panikkar, Hindu Society at Cross Roads,pp.17. 88.
^  P. A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Mobilitv, (Reprint.
1964), p. 530. --------------------------
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defined. There are those, politicians and idealists 
among them, who blame all evils of the society on the 
caste system and advocate a "casteless society". On the 
other hand there are others, who deprecate any drastic 
action to tamper with this age old system. They disting­
uish between the system as such and the evils associated 
with it and recommend that action be directed only against 
the latter. M. N. Srinivas points out that the caste 
system provides an individual with some of the benefits 
of a welfare society; that bis earliest friends are drawn 
from his caste; and that it provides a certain amount of 
cultural homogeneity. He suggests that the vast majority 
do not regard caste as evil and would probably find it 
impossible to envisage a social system without it. It is 
only a small minority, which is numerically insignificant, 
which sees caste as a menace to national life and thinks 
that it ought to go.^8
Caution in formulating the state policy is 
necessary, particularly when there is a divergence between 
views of the small elite band of policy-makers and the 
general public. K. V. S. Iyer warns the former against 
drawing a parallel between a classless society and a 
casteless society, pointing out that the former is a
48 Op. eit.. p. 70.
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Western politico-economic idea, while caste is a soeio- 
religious idea.^ He suggests that the caste system 
should be left to itself to live or die, according to its 
own vitality and according to the degree of support it 
receives from each individual and society as a whole.
The state should remain neutral to caste and permit legis­
lation only under certain circumstances, viz., where the 
prevailing custom is shown to be inhuman, immoral, opposed
to decency according to international standards or is
*50injurious to public health. The final decision must 
necessarily lie with the people, for even where the remo­
val of evils alone is concerned, nothing effective can 
be done without their co-operation.
According to K. M. Panikkar, evil lies not so 
much in the caste system as a whole as in the fragmenta­
tion of groups into sub-castes. It is this that leads 
to so-called ’•casteism11. There are over three thousand 
major units, rigidly exclusive, each claiming superiority,
normally permitting neither inter-marriage nor inter-dining,
*51who are like aliens to each other in social life. But 
the remedy for this does not lie in a direct frontal 
attack on caste, for caste is too elusive to direct legis­
lation and does not lend itself for such attack. The
^  K. Y. S. Iyer, Democracy and Caste, (1956), p. 68.
50 Ibid, pp. 5-6.
51 ----I Hindu Society at Cross Roads, p. 36.
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answer must be found in a general course of action with, 
a view to loosen its rigidity.^2
The Constitution has wisely left the question 
of caste alone and concentrates mainly on the removal 
of evils associated with it. Meanwhile the historic 
process by which each caste group tries to move up in 
the caste hierarchy continues, tending to perpetuate the 
system, which occasioned the need for such upward movement.
Abolition of untouchability
The commitment of the Constitution to the 
abolition of untouchability is an outstanding example of 
the use of law in reforming society. Article 17 abolishes 
untouchability and prohibits its practise in any form.
The enforcement of any disability arising from it is made 
punishable by law. The principal enactment in this regard 
is the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955. It makes 
illegal the imposition of disabilities on grounds of un­
touchability in regard to, among other things, temple
it
enl^ y, access to shops and restaurants, the practise of 
occupations and trades, use of water resources, places 
of public resort and accommodation, public conveyances, 
hospitals, educational institutions, residential premi­
ses, holding of religious ceremonies and processions,
^2 Ibid, pp. 16-17.
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and the use of jewellery and finery. Denial of any of 
the rights and the refusal to sell goods or render ser­
vices is punishable by fine or imprisonment and the power 
of civil courts to recognise any custom, usage, or right 
which would result in the enforcement of any disability 
is withdrawn. There is also legislation enacted by diffe­
rent States on the subject, including several Acts dealing 
with temple entry.
The object of this legislation is to remove 
the injustice perpetrated against a section of the people 
and to elevate them to the same legal status as their 
fellow countrymen. As the Supreme Court pointed out in 
a tempie-en^r case, the right to enter temples symbolises 
the right of Harijans to enjoy all social amenities and 
rights. Social justice t o  the main foundation on which 
the democratic way of life envisaged in the Constitution 
rests
The difficulty in the enforcement of untoucha­
bility law lies in the faet that "untouchability" forbi­
dden by law is confined to discriminations against certain 
not readily defined classes of persons. As Marc Calanter 
has pointed out, the meaning of "untouchability" prohibited
^  Yagnapurushdas.1 i v. Muldas, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1119 (1135).
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by the Constitution is to be determined by reference to
those who have traditionally been considered as "untoueha-
bles". It is ascribed by birth rather than attained in 
5 A
life. It does not include every instance in which one 
person is treated as ritually unclean or polluting. It 
does not include such temporary and expiable states of
uncleanliness as that suffered by women in child-birth,
55mourners, etc., or which follows expulsion or excommuni- 
cation from caste. It does not include treatment as 
untouchable because of a difference of religion or member­
ship of a different or lower caste. It includes only 
those practices directed against "those regarded as 
1untouchables* in the course of historic development" and
"relegated beyond the place of the caste system on grounds
57of birth in a particular class.
A crucial test for the policy of abolition of 
untouchability has been the temple entry legislation.
Some such legislation had been enacted even prior to inde­
pendence, especially in the Province of Madras. With the 
coming into force of the Constitution, Article 25 specifi­
cally provided for the throwing open of the Hindu religious
54.^  Marc Galanter, "The Religious Aspect of Caste", in 
D. E. Smith (ed.), South Asian Politics and Religion, 
p. 277, at p. 292.
^  Pevara.iiah v. Padmanna, A.I.R. 1958 Mys. 84*
^  Hadibandhu v. Banamali, A.I.R. 1961 Orissa 33.
■
Hevara.jiah^ case (n. 55), at p. 85*
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institutions of a public character to allLsections of
Hindus. But the scope of its operation has been narrowed
by the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955, which only
provides punishment for the exclusion of untouchables from
places "open to other persons professing the same religion
or belonging to the same religious denomination or section 
58thereof." The scope of the rights conferred on the un­
touchables by the Act depends on the meaning of the phra­
ses "the same religion" and "the same religious denomination 
or section thereof." Thus in State v. Puranchand it was 
held that the exclusion of untouchables from a Jain temple 
is not forbidden, so long as the ground for exclusion is
50
that they are non-Jains, and not because of their caste. J 
Similarly, in State of Kerala v. Venkiteshwara Prabhu the 
Kerala High Court ruled that their exclusion from a tem­
ple belonging to the Gowda Saraswat Community was not an
offence, because they did not belong to the same denomi-
60nation or a section thereof.
It should not be imagined, though, that social 
discrimination is limited to the untouchables. Where 
untouchables were protected by law, it was found that other
Section 3(1).
59 A.I.R. 1958 M.P. 352.
60 A.I.R. 1961 Ker. 55.
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sections of Hindus could be excluded from temples with 
impunity. Some States have either enacted or extended 
the legislation to remove this anomaly. Thus the Bombay 
Hindu Places of Worship (Entry Authorisation) Act, 1956, 
makes it an offence to prevent "Hindus of any class or 
sect from entering and worshipping at a temple to the same 
extent and in the same manner as any other class or section 
of Hindus." This Act is in force in Gujarat, Maharshtra 
and other areas of old Bombay State. Legislation also 
exists in some States enabling the Scheduled Castes to gain 
access to all Hindu temples. Thus the Madras Temple Entry 
Authorisation Act, 1947, covers the areas of Madras, Andhra 
Pradesh, and parts of Mysore. This Act, along with the 
Travancor e-Co chin Temple Entry (Removal of Disabilities) 
Act, is in force in Kerala. The Uttar Pradesh Temple Entry 
(Declaration of Rights) Act, 1956, is in force in the 
State of Uttar Pradesh.^
The untouchability law has yet to prove its 
efficacy. After observing its operation in the early 
years of the Constitution, Sir W. I.Jennings noted that 
India has not been very successful in its attempt to avoid 
discrimination on grounds of caste. He added, "it illu­
strates the fact that one cannot change deeply imbedded
6l Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes. 14th feeport. p. 20.
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social ideas by Constitutional guarantees. It has been 
said that one cannot make people good by Act of Parlia­
ment. It should be added that one cannot overthrow a 
social system by drafting a Constitution. There seems
to be no real change in the attitude of the caste Hindus
62to the Scheduled Castes." This observation still largely 
holds good today. Perhaps too much should not be expected 
too soon, and may be decades, rather than years, must 
elapse before the objective is fully realised. The experi­
ence of Japan illustrates this aspect well. There the
discrimination against certain castes was abolished over
6380 years ago, but it still subsists in practise. *
According to the Commissioner for Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes, up to 1964 only 4340 cases 
of untouchability were registered, of which 1055 resulted 
in convictions, and the rest were acquitted, compounded,
CA
or were pending. * During the year 1967-68, the Commi­
ssioner^ Organisation received a total of 2931 complaints 
of various types (untouchability, harrassment, land and 
housing problems, service matters, and other matters rela­
ting to education, drinking water, shops etc.), of which
62 Sir ¥. I. Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government,
(1956), p. 110.
J. H. Hutton, Caate In India. (3id ed., 1961), p. viii.
64 14th Report, p. 19. This doesnot include figures from 
some States. Figures for subsequent years not available.
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only 88 related to untouchability.^ Obviously, this 
does not refleet the true picture. Only a tiny fraction 
of such instances do ever get reported and the vast majority 
of them go unheard.
There are strong indications that the practise
of untouchability and discrimination basedjon caste are
still widespread. The situation is particularly bad in 
66rural areas. Surveys conducted by the Commissioner's 
Organisation in different parts of the country have shown 
that untouchability continues to persist in various forms. 
Facilities such as the access to temples, tea-stalls, 
restaurants, barber shops, service by washermen, use of 
drinking water wells are still being denied to the Scheduled 
C a s t e s T h e  prevalence of this state of affairs has 
been corroborated in the report of the Parliamentary Co­
mmittee on Untouchability, laid before Parliament in 
April 1969.68
However, to write of this legislation as a total 
failure would be as unrealistic as to claim that it is a 
total success. The fact is that, while the early optimism
^  16th Report (1968), p. 33.
66 14th Report (1967), pp. 14-17.
 ^16 th Report, see Chapter 3 on Untouchability, at p. 22ff., 
and Chapter 11 on specific surveys, at p. 45ff.
68 Cited in an article by Harayan Swamy entitled "Plight 
of Untouchables" in The Times, October 13, 1969, Supple­
ment on India, p. Yl. The Report is not yet availabell 
in London.
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has been proved to be somewhat misplaced, there are signs
that it has initiated a process of change, which is bound
to accelerate. It has been observed that the anti-untou-
chability laws are beginning to have effect, as educated
and better-off Harijans are trying to get the law enforced
and that this tendency is bound to grow with the improve-
69ment in their educational and ecomomie conditions.  ^ The 
institution of caste itself is undergoing change. While 
on the one hand there are signs of growing caste-conscious- 
ness, such as the proliferation of caste-banks, hotels, 
co-operative societies, charities, marriage-halls, confere­
nces and journals in Indian towns, there are other indica­
tions of a change taking place in terms of endogamy, inter­
dining and occupational diversity by means of horizontal 
consolidation. The sub-divisions within the caste are 
becoming less relevant.*^
Legislation is not a complete cure for untoucha­
bility and caste-discrimination. But it is a necessary 
component in the general course of treatment aimed at 
removing these evils. It is necessary to enforce it firmly, 
but not regardless of the susceptibilities of the general 
public. It must be seen that its rigid enforcement does
^  M. N. Srinivas, op. cit.. p. 73.
^  Ibl<i« p. 89. See also Taya Zihkin, Caste Today. (1962), 
Chapter IY, "The beginnings of breakdown" and Chapter Y, 
"The law, ideals and politics", p. 38 et seq.
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not lead to hostility between groups, and to undue social 
tension and violence. Compliance of the law should result 
from its willing acceptance rather than coersion. Reform 
and improvement in the general standard of living should 
proceed hand in hand, with particular emphasis on education 
and economic advancement. Occupational mobility, which 
would enable the Scheduled Castes to give up their tradi­
tional tuncleant occupations, it is thought, would do much 
towards removing untouchability.^ Industrialisation and 
an expanding economy is expected to lessen the inter-caste 
tensions, and it is opined that the establishment of a 
single factory would do more to ease inter-caste relations
in a locality than an equivalent sum of money spent on
72propaganda to that end.'
IY. Protective Discrimination
By far the most significant and positive step 
taken so far towards advancing social equality has undoub­
tedly been the introduction of a system of protective 
discrimination in favour of the backward classes. While 
general development and welfare programmes are aimed at 
the population as a whole, special concessions are given
^  16th Report of the Commissioner, pp. 13» 23.
72 M. N. Srinivas, op. cit.. pp. 75-76; also p. 104.
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to certain backward classes, for which others are made 
ineligible. Both in terms of the number of benefits and 
magnitude of the groups eligible for them, the Indian 
system is unique in theworld.^ In authorising prefere­
ntial treatment on the basis of membership of backward 
groups, it is pointed out, India is experimenting with 
a method of ameliorating group differences that has been 
little used, and very possibly Constitutionally prohiti- 
ted, in dealing with minority problems in the United 
States
The necessity for such a measure arose from the 
justified fear that the general welfare measures would not 
otherwise reach people at the lower end of the social
^  Lelah Pushkin, “Scheduled Caste Policy in India11, 
memiographed typescript, (1966), p. 2.
The total outlay on the welfare of backward classes 
during the Third Five Tear Plan amounted to 113.87 
crores of rupees. Of this, Rs. 60.43 crores were 
earmarked for Scheduled Tribes, Rs. 40.40 crores for 
Scheduled Castes, and Rs. 9.04 crores for other back­
ward classes. During the year 1961-62, scholarship 
grants to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other 
backward classes amounted to Rs. 167.91 lakhs, 30*95 
lakhs, and 87.70 lakhs respectively, - a total of 
Rs. 286.56 lakhs: Figures cited in Tables 56 and 57 
in R. B. Agarwal, Economic Aspects of Welfare State 
in India. (1967), pp. 203-^04. The Fourth Five Year 
Plan involves an outlay of Rs. 180 crores, of which 
Rs. 100 crores are earmarked for Scheduled Tribes,
Ts. 66 crores for Scheduled Castes and Rs. 14 crores 
for other schemes: Fourth Five Tear Plan, (1966), p. 
372. (The expression ’lakh1 and fcrore' signify 
100,000 and 10,000,000 respectively).
74'^Marc Galanter, “Protective Discrimination for Backward 
Classes in India*, 3 J.1.1*1*. (1961), p. 39, at p. 41.
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scale* The Backward Classes Commission reporting in
the mid-fifties commented, —
In the prevailing conditions of India, and particu­
larly because of her caste ridden society, some of 
the general uplift measures do not reach the weaker 
section of the population, and even where they do 
reach the lower strata of society, they trickle down 
in very small proportions. It is generally the 
strong and most vocal that manage to snatch most of 
the help. It is therefore necessary that special 
provision should be made specifically for those 
communities that are extremely backward.^
This was despite the fact that the scheme had been already
in operation for nearly five years when the Commission
reported.
Thus it was clear from the beginning that a 
mre declaration of the legal status of equality was not 
sufficient. Without some positive steps to improve the 
soci-economic condition of the backward classes this 
would have meant a perpetuation of inequality. So a 
scheme of special benefits was instituted in their favour. 
The purpose was to accelerate their advance towards social 
equality through a short-cut which sought to eliminate 
the painfully slow climb up the social ladder. The argu­
ment in favour of such a policy was that, despite its 
shortcomings and risks, it was the only realistic way 
to proceed.^
^  Report of the Backward Classes Commission. (1956), 
p. 148. See also "the forwarding leiter, p. xxi.
nc
lelah Dushkin, op. cit.. p. 5.
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The main areas where this policy is pursued 
are education, the public services and political repre­
sentation# These are what Sorokin calls fchannels1 (or 
staircases1, •elevators1) of vertical mobility, which
permit individuals to move up (and down) from stratum to 
77stratum. The principal Constitutional provisions in
this regard are contained in Articles 15(4), 16(4) and in
Part XVI thereof. Clause (4) of Article 15 states —
Hothing in this Article or in clause (2) of Article 
29 shall prevent the State from making any special 
provision for the advancement of any socially and 
educationally backward classes of citizens or for 
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.
Clause (4) of Article 16 has similar provision with regard
to public employment —
Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State 
from making any provision for the reservationof appoi­
ntments or posts in favour of any backward class of 
citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not 
adequately represented in services under the State.
Article 335 enjoins on the State to pay particular atten­
tion to the claims of the Scheduled Castes and the Sche­
duled Tribes in the matter of public employment.’ Articles 
336 and 337 provide for the interests of the Anglo-Indian 
community as regards services and education. Articles 
330 to 333 deal with the political representation of these 
communities•
77 P. A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Mobilitv, (Reprint, 
1964), p. 164. — — — — — —
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The system of protective discrimination is 
envisaged as an exceptional and temporary measure for the 
purpose of mitigating the inequalities between the commu­
nities and is intended to disappear with these inequali­
ties* A definite time limit has been prescribed with 
regard to political representation* Originally this was 
introduced for a ten year period, but was extended for a 
further period of ten years by the Constitution (Eighth 
Amendment) Act, 1959. Unless renewed again this will 
cease in early 1970. But no such time limit has been 
prescribed in the Constitution as regards reservation of 
seats in educational institutions or posts in public ser­
vices for the backward classes genrally* It is a matter 
of discretion for the Union and the State governments* 
Protective discrimination is not mandatory, but only
78
permitted.* It does not confer a fundamental right on 
the backward classes to such arrangements.*^ The govern­
ment may constitutionally omit to make any such prefe-
80rences, or make as few as it withes. The state is
78 B. S. Kesava Iyengar v. State of Mysore. A.I.E. 1956 
Mys. 20(£5): Rajendran v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1968 S.c. 
507? Chamara.ia v. Stale of Mysore. A.I.R. 1967 Mys.21(23).
79 K. V. Rao, Parliamentary Democracy of India, (2nd ed..
1965), p. 2W .  ---------
80 Marc Galanter, “Protective Bis crimination for Backward 
Classes in India", 3 J.I.L.I.. p. 39* at p. 44.
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entitled to make such provision by executive action and 
it is not necessary to enact legislation for this purpose.8^
Criteria for eligibility of benefits
A notable feature of the scheme of protective 
discrimination is that, in this context, the Constitution 
shifts the emphasis from the individual citizen to a 
group. The provision for protective discrimination is 
the only exception to the Constitutional ban on the use 
of communal criteria by government.
To be eligible for special benefits, a group 
must be one of the "socially and educationally backward 
classes of citizens." The test of social and educational 
backwardness is expressly mentioned in Articles 15(4) 
and 340(1), and is implied in Article 16(4). In Triloki 
Nath v. State of J. & K . the Supreme Court rejected the 
contention of the State that the difference in the phra­
seology in Article 15(4) and 16(4) meant that, for the 
purpose of Article 16(4) the sole test of backwardness 
was one of inadequacy of representation in the services 
of the State. It said that to accept it would mean the 
creation of a privilege in favour of those sections of 
the people who, thogh socially and educationally advanced,
81 Mangal Singh v. State of Punjab. A.I.R. 1968 Punj. 306, 
at p. 309.
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have taken to other avocations and exclude those who are 
really backward. To attract Article 16(4)* therefore^  
it was necessary to satisfy two conditions, namely, (i) a 
class of citizens must be socially and educationally back­
ward, and (ii) the said class is not adequately represented
82in the services under the State. This test of backward­
ness is a factor common to all the three categories of 
backward classes contemplated in the Constitution. In 
Balaji's case the Supreme Court has held that the bracke­
ting of socially and educationally backward classes with 
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in Articles 
15(4) and 338(3) showed that in the matter of backwardness
they were comparable to the latter.8** Similarly, the
expression ’backward classes' in Article 16(4) includes 
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, though 
they are not expressly mentioned therein.8^ But his 
should not obscure the fact that the Scheduled Castes 
and the Scheduled Tribes are more easily ascertainable 
on account of their distinctive characteristics and that,
as laid down in Heggade Janardhan Subbaraya v. State of 
85Mysore.  ^separate arrangements can be made for reserva­
tion of seats in their favour.
82 A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1283, at p. 1286.
83 A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649, at p. 658.
Rangachari v. general Manager. S. RIt .. A.I.R. 1961 
Mad. 35, at p. 39; Desu Rayudn v. A.P. Public Service 
Commission. A.I.R. HTSTA.P. 353.
85 A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 702.
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Determination of 'class1
The provision for protective discrimination 
by reference to 'backward classes’ raises the questions 
as to what is meant by a 'class' and the test of its 
social and educational backwardness. No categorical 
answers are to be found to these questions.
In its ordinary connotation the expression
'class' means a homogenous section of the people grouped
together because of certain likeness or common traits
and who are identifiable by some common attributes such
as status* rank, occupation, residence in a locality,
86race, religion and the like. But a simple answer to 
the question "what is a 'backward class'" would be that 
it is a section of the population, which, at the discre­
tion of the state, is entitled to 'protective discrimi­
nation* . In G. Vishwanath v. Govt. of Mysore it was 
pointed out by the Court that it is the State which has 
to determine who the socially and educationally backward 
classes are. Though the State's decision is open to 
judicial review, in the nature of things, the State is 
in a better position in this respect and the law presu­
mes that in passing an order the State has acted in the
86 State of A. P . v. P. Sagar. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1379, at 
p. 1382; Triloki Naih v. £tate of J. & A.I.R. 1969 
S.C. 1, at p. 3*
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interests of society. It is not sufficient to show 
that the impugned order is not the very best that could 
have been passed but it must be further proved that the 
same directly or indirectly contravenes one or the other 
of the Constitutional provisions or is a fraud on the 
Constitution.8*^ Ordinarily, the decision of the State 
Government to the effect that a particular class or caste 
is socially and educationally backward will prevail, 
subject of course, to the right of a party to satisfy the 
High Court that the test of backwardness adopted by the
Government was based on irrational or irrelevant grou-
88nds. The basis on which classification of backward
89classes may be made would vary from State to State. J
Among the criteria frequently used for deter­
mining backward classes have been caste, religion, edu­
cation, and economic conditions. Of these, easte is by 
far the most prominent, and, despite the fact that it is 
one of the grounds on which discrimination is forbidden 
in Articles 15(1) and 16(2), it still is the criterion 
most widely used for this purpose. Perhaps this is not 
surprising in the light of the observations of the
87 A.I.R.1964 Mys. 132 (135).
Chait Ram v. Slkandar Choudharv. A.I.R. 1968 Pat. 
2(3? (339).
89 Ramakrishna Singh v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1960
Hys. (345).
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Backward Classes Commission on this subject, referred 
90to above. The legal position as to the use of diffe­
rent criteria is best illustrated by reference to judi­
cial opinion with regard to the criterion of caste.
The position in|this respect was stated by the 
Supreme Court in M. R. Balaji v. State of Mysore ,9^ and 
clarified in two subsequent cases. In that case an 
Order of the Mysore Government reserving seats for back­
ward classes in educational institutions under Article 
15(4) was challenged on the ground, inter alia, that 
the classification made on the sole ground of caste was 
unconstitutional. The Court ruled that the impugned 
order made a classification based only on caste without 
regard to other relevant factors and that such a classi-
Qp
fication was not permissible under Article 15(4).
Article 15(4) referred to backward classes and not back­
ward castes; indeed the test of caste would break down
93as regards backward communities which had no caste. ^
But caste eould be one of the relevant factors in deter­
mining social backwardness. "Social backwardness which 
results from poverty is likely to be aggravated by con­
siderations of caste to which the poor citizens may
9^ P. 329, supra.
91 A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649.
9  ^Ibid, at p. 663.
9^ Ibid, at p. 659.
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belong, but that only shows the relevance of both caste 
and poverty in determining the backwardness of citizens. 
The Court Clarified* this decision in Janardhan1 s case^  
by saying that it had not in any way invalidated the 
reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, for 
whom separate reservation can be made. The decision in 
Chitralekha v. State of MLvsore 1 explained1 a part of the 
decision in Bala.iits case pertaining to the relevance of 
caste in determining backwardness. It said that though 
caste was a relevant test in determining social backward­
ness of citizens, it was not obligatory to apply that 
test and a determination of social backwardness was not
void merely because it ignored caste, if such determina-
96tion was based on other relevant criteria. The line 
laid down in these decisions has been followed in subse­
quent decisions.
Thus, in Nanda Kishore Sharma v. State of Bihar.
the Patna High Court held that the Orders of the State
Government, reserving seats in medical colleges were
illegal as the classification of the backward classes
97was made solely on considerations of caste. The Supreme
94 Ibid. at p. 659.
95 A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 702.
96 A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1823, at p. 1833.
97 A.I.R. 1965 Pat. 372, at p. 373.
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Court struck down similar orders of the Government of 
Andhra Pradesh as the classification therein proceeded 
on the bases of caste and community.^ In Triloki Nath v. 
State of J. & K ., the Supreme Court again reiterated that 
the expression 1backward class1 is not to be used as 
synonymous with 1 backward caste* or 1 backward community * 
and held that for the purpose of Article 16, a test solely 
based on caste, community, race, religion, sex, descent,
Q Q
place of birth or residence cannot be adopted. ^
What the Constitution prohibits is a discri­
mination based solely on caste, when there is no nexus 
between it and backwardness. If, however, a group of 
persons, clearly identifiable by their caste, is really 
backward socially and educationally, and is, on that ba­
sis, given the benefit of certain reservations, the ineli­
gibility of a person belonging to another caste to secure 
those reservations is clearly not based on the ground of 
caste but is a consequence of a reservation properly made 
in favour of a backward class.1 The principle that a 
classification of a commlnity as backward, solely on 
considerations of easte, is invalid does not apply to
State of A.P. v. P. Sagar. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1379.
99 A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1, at p. 3.
^ S. A. Partha v. State of Mysore. A.I.R. 1961 Mys.220(230).
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those cases where, though the backward community is 
described conveniently by its caste name, it is neverthe­
less socially and educationally backward. In such cases, 
the classification is not based solely on caste but on the 
fact that the community is indisputably backward, socially
and educationally, but is more conveniently described by
2  ^its caste. In Rajendran v. State of Madras the Supreme
Court, following Bala.1its Case^, has reiterated this 
principle: tta caste is also a class of citisens and if 
the caste as a whole is socially and educationally back­
ward, reservation can be made in favour of such a caste 
on the ground that it is a socially and educationally 
backward class of citizens."^
Whether a particular section of the population 
is a backward class for the purposes of protective dis­
crimination has to be decided by reference to particular
£
circumstances. In State of Kerala v. R. Jacob the 
Kerala High Court upheld an order of the State Government 
reserving seats in medical colleges for i)Ezhavas, Mus­
lims, and Latin Catholics (including Anglo-Catholics) and
 ^Chait Ram v. Sikandart A.I.R. 1968 Pat. 337 (339).
3 A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1012.
4 A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649.
3 Ra.iendran v. State of Madras. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1012,
6 A.I.R. 1964 Ker. 316.
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ii) the children of outstanding sportsmen, hut struck 
down the reservation in favour of the children of medical 
practitioners, on the ground that it was based on a cla­
ssification which had no rational relation to the object 
to be secured. Where a means-cum-easte or community test 
was adopted and a particular aggregate annual income was 
set for the determination of a backward class, it was 
held that, merely because the income of a person is less 
than such income limit, he will not be entitled to claim 
that he belongs to backward class on the basis of the
7
test of income.
Test of backwardness
Perhaps the greatest difficulty in administe­
ring the policy of protective discrimination is the lack 
of defining criteria for ascertaining backwardness. There 
is an infinite variety in conditions of backwardness 
throughout the country, which necessitates decisions to 
be made by reference to local areas. Hence no general 
standard can be laid down.
The Backward Classes Commission thought that
^ I»aila Chacko v. State of Kerala. A.I.R. 1967 Ker. 124, 
at pp. 126-128.
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the backward classes are those,
who do not command adequate and sufficient repre­
sentation in government service..*; those who do 
not command a large amount of natural resources such 
as, land, mines, forests, money or industrial under­
takings; those who live in insanitary surroundings 
and in ill-ventilated houses; those who are nomadic; 
those who live by begging and other unwholesome 
means; those who are agricultural labourers or those 
who practise unremunerative occupations without any 
means to enter better paying professions; and those 
who on account of poverty, ignorance and other social 
disabilities are unable to educate themselves or 
produce sufficient leadership, ...; (they are) the 
communities, classes or social groups who occupy 
an inferior social position in relation to upper 
classes and who answer the above discriprition...g
The Commission adopted, for general guidance, the criteria 
of low social status linked to caste, lack of educational 
development, inadequate representation in government ser­
vice, and inadequate representation in the field of trade,
o
commerce and industry. As can be seen, this by no means 
solves the problem. The Government of India have left 
it to the State Governments to choose their own criteria 
for backwardness, at the same time indicating a preference 
for the economic factor.
Eactors which are responsible for backwardness 
are many and interdependent, among which three main 
kinds can be named: social, educational and economic.
Q
Report, p. 46
9 Ibid.
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Social causes for backwardness derive from the stratifi­
cation of society. According to Sorokin, social strati­
fication of a given population into hierarchically super­
posed classes leads to the existence of upper and lower 
social layers. Its basis and very essence consists in 
an unequal distribution of rights and privileges, duties
and responsibilities, social values and privations, soial
10power and influences among members of the society. It
is clear that in India this stratification is mainly
institutionalised through caste. It is pointed out that
gradations of caste extend to the lowest level, leading
to hierarchical grouping even among those considered
backward and consequently the existence of dominant castes
among them. It is interesting that while some of these
castes claim the equality gruaranteed to them, they have
an vested interest in denying it to those who are lower
11than themselves.
Secondly, lack of educational development shuts 
off from a community many of the opportunities for advance 
ment in the social and economic sphere. An analysis of 
the social composition of students in institutions of 
higher education could be an index to the relative deve­
lopment of various communities. It is indicated by
P. A. Sorokin, op. cit., p. 11.
^  M. N. Srinivas, op. cit.. p. 105.
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surveys that traditionally privileged groups are very
strongly represented, while the under-privileged are
ippoorly represented in such institutions.
Thirdly, the economic factor is perhaps the most
vital of all. In the ultimate analysis poverty is the
primary cause of all backwardness. In this respect one
can with advantage refer to American writers, who have
considered the economic basis of discrimination in that 
13country.  ^ C. S. Johnson has pointed out how the low 
economic status of the American Negro has threefold con­
sequences which work against national integration: i) by 
perpetuating the low economic status with all its impli­
cations of poorer health, education, and family life;
ii) these conditions in turn providing a further justifi­
cation to the majority for further segregation and dis­
crimination, being convinced of their inferiority; and
iii) this in turn sapping the ambition of the Negro Youth, 
with all its consequences.^ Though social conditions
in different countries are different, there can be no 
doubt as to the general validity of these observations.
With regard to Harijans, in particular, it is observed
12 Ibid. p. 93.
13^ e.g., Simpson and Yinger, Racial and Cultural Minorities. 
(3rd ed., 1965), p. 497.
14 integration of racial minorities in American 
society", in 1. Bryson and others (ed.), Conflicts of 
Power in Modern Culture. (1947), p. 267, at p. £73.
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that, so long as they are not economically independent, 
the rights which the Constitution guarantees them will 
not he translated into practise.^
In Balajifs case the Supreme Court considered
the test of backwardness in some length. It held that
the concept of backward classes was not relative, in the
sense that any class which was backward in relation to
the most advanced class in the community must be inelu- 
16ded in it. The backwardness must be both social and
17educational and not either social or educational. 1 
Caste was a relevant factor in determining social back­
wardness. Occupations followed by certain classes (Which 
are looked upon as inferior) may contribute to social 
backwardness; and so may the habitation of people. The
problem of social backwardness is mainly a problem of
18rural India. But a division of backward classes into 
backward and more ackward classes was not called for.
This in substance amounted to a division of the popula­
tion into the most advanced and the rest, the rest being 
divided into backward and more backward classes and this
M. N. Srinivas, op. cit., p. 104*.
16 A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649, at p. 658.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid. p. 659.
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was not warranted by Article 15(4).^  The Court was 
doubtful of the literacy test adopted in the impugned 
order, and held that, even if it were correct, to classify 
any class as backward on that basis, the average of that 
class must be "well below" the average of 6.9 per thou­
sand. The Order was void in that it classified communi-
20ties which were just below 6.9 per thousand as backward.
Backwardness, social and educational, is ultimately and
21primarily due to poverty.
Where an Order of the Mysore Government defined 
socially and educationally backward classes on the basis 
of i) the annual family income of the family of a student 
and ii) the nature of occupation of parent or guardian,
it was held that the student had to prove that the occu­
pation in question fell within the category of "any other
occupation involving manual labour". The occupation of
22a Purohit did not fall within this category. The occu­
pations contemplated by such an Order were not casual or 
temporary occupations but the habitual occupations of 
families. Hence a school teacher who took to agriculture 
after his retirement was not a member of the backward
19 Ibid. p. 661.
20 Ibid. p. 660.
2^ Ibid. p. 664.
22 Sudha v. Selection Committee for Admission to Medical 
Colleges. A.I.R. 1967 MvsTgSTr'at' -----------
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23classes.  ^ In a case where caste and poverty were rele­
vant considerations, it was held that a student’s income
certificate was not adequate and that of his father was
24-required, although the father and son were separated.
Poverty played a great part in backwardness and customs,
25usages, caste and occupation were relevant factors.  ^ But
26caste cannot be the sole or dominant criterion.
The scone and extent of protective discrimination
Generally, the disputes that arise before courts 
are not as to whether special provision for backward cla­
sses should be permitted, but concern the tests to be 
adopted in determining backwardness, and the scope and 
extent of such special provision. The problem of determi­
ning backwardness has already been considered in the 
preceding section.
In interpreting the provisions relating to prote­
ctive discrimination two aspects must be constantly kept 
in view: first, that they are exceptions to the fundamental 
right of non-discrimination and second, that they are 
nevertheless means of achieving an egalitarian society
^  B. Subhas Chandra She tty v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1969 
Mys. 48 I56-51).
^  Abhav Kumar v. Principal. P.M.College, A.I.R. 1968 Pat. 
504 (506).
Hariharan Pillai v. State of Kerala. A.I.R. 1968 Ker. 42.
26 Ibid; Desu Rayudu v. A.P. PSC..A.I.R. 1967 A.P. 353.
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in keeping with, the Preamble and the Directive Principles 
of the Constitution. Though apparently there is dichotomy 
of principles, there is unity of purpose. The task is 
one of achieving a balance between the two conflicting 
principles. This is illustrated by reference to the judi­
cial interpretation of Articles 15 and 16.
Article 15, as originally enacted, did not 
include the present clause (4) permitting special provi­
sion for backward classes. Its inclusion was brought 
about by the decision of the Supreme Court in State of 
Madras v. Shrimati Champakam Dor air a j an. ^  This was an
appeal from the decision of the Madras High Court in Shri-
28mati Champakam Doraira.ian v. State of Madras. where the 
High Court had held that the Communal G. 0. of the State 
Government, fixing proportionate numbers of seats for 
different communities in medical and engineering colleges 
violated Articles 15(1) and 29(2) and therefore was void.
The Supreme Court upheld this decision. Both the High
29 30Court  ^and the Supreme Court^ thought it significant
that these Articles did not contain a provision analogous
27 A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 226.
28 A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 1+9.
2^ Ibid. at p. 167.
30 A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 226, at p. 228.
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to Article 16(4). The Supreme Court rejected the argu­
ment that, having regard to the Directive Principles, and 
particularly Article 46, the State was entitled to main­
tain the Communal G. 0. It held that Directive Principles 
cannot override Fundamental Rights, hut have to conform 
and run subsidiary to them. Accordingly the appeal could 
not be sustained. To overcome the situation created by 
this decision, Parliament amended the Constitution. Clause 
(4) was added to Article 15 by the Constitution (First 
Amendment) Act, 1951.
Both clauses, clause (4) of Article 15 and 
clause (4) of Article 16, are exceptions to the general 
rule that the state shall not discriminate between its 
citizens. But while Article 16(4) specifically concerns 
reservations for backward classes in government services, 
Article 15(4) is of much wider application. It enables 
the state to make "any special provision" for the advance­
ment of any socially and educationally backward classes 
of citizens. However, it is noteworthy that this clause 
has been most frequently invoked before the courts in 
connection with the reservations of seats in educational 
institutions. Though both the clauses concern different 
aspects of a special provision, there is common; ground 
in the matter of their interpretation.
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The question as to the extent of reservation
which is permitted under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) has
come up before the courts on several occasions. In Bala.ii*s 
31case the Supreme Court considered the nature of these 
Articles* It pointed out that Article 15(4) was a special 
provision, in derogation of the fundamental rights of 
citizens under Article 15(1) and 29(2), to both of which 
Article 15(4) was a proviso. It would be unreasonable to 
construe this special provision as justifying a total reser­
vation of seats as contended by the State.32 It had to 
be seen that the national interest did not suffer by the 
exclusion of students with superior qualifications and 
merit. It struck down the impugned order, which had reser­
ved 68 per cent of the seats for the backward classes. It
held that generally speaking the reservation must be less
than 50 per cent, but did not lay down any hard and fast 
33rule. In Ramesh Chander Garg v. State of Pun.iab a reser­
vation of 60 per cent of seats was held invalid.3^
It is the fundamental right of a citizen, whether
he belongs to a backward community or not, to secure
31 A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649*
32 Ibid, at p. 662.
^  p.663*
3^ A.I.R. 1966 Punj. 476.
373
admission to any educational institution maintained by 
the state without being discriminated against• The rule 
should be applied in such a way as to protect the inte­
rests of students of the backward classes without at the
same time causing prejudice to students of other commu- 
35nities. In a case from the State of Mysore it was 
revealed that, in the notification issued by the Govern­
ment, the list of backward classes included 95 per cent 
of the population of the State and excluded only a few 
communities, viz.« Brahmins, Kayasthas, Banias, Anglo- 
Indians and Parsis, from getting the benefit of seats 
reserved for all other communities of the State. It was 
held that it was a discrimination against the communities 
who had been excluded and who represented only five per 
cent of the population, than a provision in favour of 
backward classes. The object of Article 15(4) was not 
to enable the state to discriminate against a small se­
ction of the population or to permit a provision being 
made for comparatively backward classes, i.e., classes
who, compared with the most advanced classes, were back-
36ward. The Order was therefore unconstitutional.
3 5 PuPPala Sudarsan v. The State of Andhra Pradesh. A.I.R.
T958 T571) •
 ^ Ramakrishna Singh y. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1960 Mys.
338 (346-352). ----
374
In Abdul Latiff v. State of Bihar an order of 
the State government giving preference to Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes in the settlement of excise shops 
was held unconstitutional, in as much as the effect of 
the order was not merely to give preference to candidates 
belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, but 
to exclude candidates from all other communities in cases 
where there was a single candidate from the former. The 
Patna High Court pointed out that, as a matter of constru­
ction, it is manifest that Article 15(4) is not an inde­
pendent or substantive enactment, but is an exception or 
a qualification to the main guarantee under Article 15(1). 
It is therefore not permissible to interpret Article 15(4) 
in such a way as to destroy or nullify the meaning of the 
guarantee under Article 15(1). It is because the inte­
rest of the society as a whole is served by promoting 
the advancement of the weaker elements that Article 15(4) 
authorises special provision to be made. But if a provi­
sion, which is in the nature of an exception, completely 
excludes the rest of the society that clearly is outside 
the scope of Article 15(4).^
On the other hand, the provisions relating to 
protective discrimination should not be so interpreted
37 A.I.R. 1964- Pat. 393, at pp. 394, 395.
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as to be detrimental to the interests of backward classes. 
In V. Raghuramulu v. State of A.P. it was held that a 
circular of the State Government, fixing a maximum of 15 
per cent of the total number of places in any faculty to 
be reserved for backward classes, proceeded on the assump­
tion that in no event could a larger percentage be secured 
by those classes in open competetion. Where such an assu­
mption was belied, the reservation, far from conferring 
a right, abridged a fundamental right. However, the Court 
did not declare the whole Order void, but directed that 
it should be applied to instances where the underlying
7 0
assumption was found to exist. This rule was followed 
in Ramakrishna v. State of Mysore. ^
The rule reserving seats for backward classes 
ought not be so worded as to prevent them from getting a 
larger number of seats on their merit, because, in that 
event, it would contravene their right under Article 29(2). 
But the rule should not be so worked as to divide the 
matter into two compartments, viz.. that some students 
belonging to backward classes were to be allowed to 
compete for the general pool and some for reserved seats, 
as that would cause great hardship to students belonging
38 A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 129.
39 A.I.R. I960 Mys. 338 (352)
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to other communities. All seats should he pooled, guaran­
teeing a minimum number of seats to backward classes.^
The issue again came upe before the Kerala High Court in 
R. Jacob Mathew v. State of Kerala. The Court reiterated 
that, notwithstanding the fact that a class has been 
treated as baclcward and given protection under Article 15(4) 
by providing a particular percentage for that group, it 
does not take away the right of any member of that group 
from competing on the general merit basis and securing 
as many seats as possible. These seats are obtained by 
them in their individual right under Article 29(2) and 
not as members of a backward class. The Court said that 
to hold otherwise would means that the provisions of Arti­
cle 15(4) > which are really intended for the advancement 
of the weaker sections of citizens, are really invoked 
for the purpose of causing prejudice to the members of 
that class.^
The scope of Article 16(4) was considered by
42the Supreme Court in Yenkataramana v. State of Madras, 
where a Ctammunal G. 0. of the Madras Government reserving 
posts for different communities was challenged. The 
Court held that the reservation of posts in favour of any
^  Sudarsan v. State of A.P., A.I.R. LQS8 A.P. 569.
41 A.I.R. 1964 Ker. 39 (64).
42 A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 229.
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backward class cannot be regarded as unconstitutional.
But the ineligibility of a Brahmin for any of the posts 
reserved for any of the other communities was based only 
on the ground of his being a Brahmin. This was not san- 
ctionedjby Article 16(4) and was therefore an infringe­
ment of a citizen*s right under Article 16. Accordingly
A'K
the Communal Gr. 0. was declared void and illegal-*
The extent of reservation that can be made 
under Article 16(4) was considered by the Supreme Court
A A
in T. Devadasan v. Union of India in the light of the
At5
decision in Bala.1ifs case. In the latter the Supreme 
Court had observed that in this matter what was true of 
Article 15(4) was equally true of Article 16(4). There 
was no doubt that the Constitution makers assumed that, 
while making adequate reservation under Article 16(4), 
care would be taken not to provide for unreasonable, 
excessive or extravagant reservation, for that would by 
eliminating general competition materially affect effi­
ciency. Therefore, like the special provision improperly 
made under Article 15(4), reservation made under Article 
16(4) beyond the permissible and legitimate limits would
4-3 Ibid* at p. 229.
44 A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 179.
45 A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649.
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be liable to be challenged as a fraud on the Constitu- 
46tion. Devadasan^ case involved a Memorandum of the 
Government of India, whereby a certain percentage of 
vacancies were reserved for Scheduled Castes and Schedu­
led Tribes, adopting the principle of ••carry forward" in 
the second and third year. The actual effect of this 
rule was that, in the year in question, over 64 per cent 
of vacancies were reserved for them. The Supreme Court 
held that Article 16 conferred a right on each individual 
citizen and that, in order to effectuate that right, each 
year of recruitment must be considered by itself. The 
reservation :for backward communities each year should 
not be so excessive as to create a monopoly or to inter­
fere unduly with the legitimate claims of other communi­
ties. Article 16(4) was a proviso or explanation to 
Article 16(1) and it cannot be so interpreted as to nullify 
or destroy the main provision.^ The Court said that, 
generally speaking, reservation ought to be less than 
50 per cent. As, in the present case, it was as highjas 
64 per cent the "carry forward" rule was unconstitutional.
The question as to the nature of posts to be 
reserved eame up before the Supreme Court in General
46 A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649, (664)
47 A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 179, (187)
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Manager, S. Rly. v. Rangachari, where the issue was whether 
selection posts were within the scope of reservation under 
Article 16(4)• The Court held that it would be unreasona- 
be to treat *posts1 as a term of art and equate it with 
•ex-cadre* posts. The •posts1 were 1 inside* the service 
and not outside. The condition precedent for the exercise 
of the power conferred by Article 16(4) was that a back­
ward class of citizens should not be adequately represen­
ted in the service. This may refer either to numerical 
inadequacy or to the-qualitative inadequacy of representa­
tion. Socially and educationally backward classes requi­
red adequate representation not only in the lowest rung
but also it was necessary that they should aspire to se-
48cure representation in selection posts as well. The 
Punjab High Court followed this broad and liberal constru­
ction of the words *appointments* and *posts1 in Suresh 
Kumar v. Union of India in holding that it was within 
the powers of the State under Article 16(4) to prnvide 
for reservation of appointments and also to provide for 
reservation of selection posts. This construction was 
necessary to give effect to the intention of the Consti-
tution-makers to provide for adequate representation of
49backward classes in the services.  ^ At the same time,
48 A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 36.
49 A.I.R. 1966 Ptrnj. 443.
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there is nothing to prevent the allocation of seats reser­
ved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes to other 
backward classes of citizens, when there are no qualified 
candidates belonging to the former category or in prefe­
rring a candidate belonging to a more backward class to 
another candidate of a backward class which has got better 
representation in services.
Article 16(4) cannot, however, be utilised to
demote a person lawfully appointed in order to make room
for a candidate belonging to the backward classes. Thus,
in Sudama Prashad v. Divisional Supt., ¥. Rly., where the
petitioner was reverted from an officiating post for the
sole purpose of promoting a candidate belonging to the
Scheduled Caste, it was held that the said order violated
51Article 16 and was set aside.
Finally, the provisions relating to protective
discrimination must always be interpreted in their proper
perspective by reference to the objectives to be achieved.
52The Supreme Court1s observations in Balaji*s case in 
this regard are of general validity. It emphasised that 
in taking executive action to implement the policy of
^  B. S. Kesava Iyengar v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1956 
Mys. 20(25j).
51 A.I.R. 1965 Raj. 109 (111-114).
52 A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649.
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Article 15(4), it is necessary for the States to remember 
that the policy which is intended to be implemented is 
the policy which has been declared by Article 46 and the 
Preamble of the Constitution. It is for the attainment 
of social and economic justice that Article 15(4) autho­
rises the making of special provision for the advancement 
of backward classes, even if such provision may be incon­
sistent with some of the fundamental rights. The context, 
therefore, requires that executive action taken by the 
State must be based on an objective approach, free from 
all extraneous pressures. The said action is intended 
to do social and economic justice and must be taken in a 
manner that justice is seen to be done.
A critique of the policy: need for a reappraisal
The policy of protective discrimination has now 
been in operation for twenty years. Though this cannot 
be considered a long period /'of time in the life of a 
nation or in terms of social change, it is long enough to 
assess the efficacy of this policy and the trend of its 
results. Some of the questions which need answering are, 
whether the policy has fulfilled its expectations; whether 
it ought to be continued; and if so, on Itfiat basis and for 
how long.
5 3 Ibid. pp. 663-664
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Among its drawbacks which have become apparent 
in the light of past experience three may briefly be 
touched upon. First of all, it should be realised that 
what this scheme is designed to do is really small in 
relation to the larger problem of backwardness generally. 
It has been pointed out that, as it is, it hardly touches 
the fringes of the real problem, and it is asked how
such a policy can hope to improve the lot of millions who
54.are hardly touched by it. ^
Secondly, the adoption of the criterion of 
group membership for eligibility of benefits has resulted 
in an increase of caste and communal consciousness, a 
factor which it was meant to remove. It has created a 
vested interest in the survival of caste, and it may be 
said that a new caste, the Scheduled Caste, has been given 
Constitutional blessing. The necessity of having to com­
pile caste or class lists has led to difficulties in its 
operation. Different groups, often relatively advanced 
than the rest, vie with each other to be classified as 
backward, and in some instances have been successful in 
doing so by exerting political pressure.
Third, and perhaps the most important, criticism 
is that protective discrimination has not been effective
54.
lelah Dushkin, op. cit.
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enough, even within its limited sphere. The benefits 
distributed through it have often been dissipated by 
spreading them over a very large population. It must be 
borne in mind that the policy was meant to be of an exce­
ptional character. But instances are not lacking where 
the exception has become the rule, and in one State as
much as 95 per cent of the population was declared as
55backward.  ^ So expanded has the term ‘backward classes1 
become that, some States have felt it necessary to sub­
divide them into 'backward* and 'more backward* (Mysore), 
and 'backward' and 'most backward* (Madras).^ One factor 
which strongly emerges from the various Reports is that, 
among those classified as backward classes, there are some 
who are in an extreme state of backwardness and that gene­
rally help has not reached those people in the greatest 
need. The Backward Classes Commission has pointed out 
that these are left out of the race, while the more voci­
ferous and dominant among the groups manage to corner 
the benefits.^ The Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes 
Commission has pointed out that at the base of the diffe­
rent levels among tribals was a class which was in an
^  See p. 373, supra.
^  Report of the Committee on Emotional Integration. (1962),
p. 84*•
57 Report, p. 148. See also pp. xx-xxiii.
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extremely underdeveloped stage, and at the top was a
class which could very well afford to forgo any further 
58help. The Advisory Committee on the Revision of the
Lists noted that "a lionfs share of the various benefits
earmarked for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes is appropriated by the numerically larger and
politically well organised communities. The smaller and
more backward communities have tended to get lost in
democratic processes, though most deserving of special
aid.,." The Committee recommended that the distribution
of benefits needed to be focused on more backward and
59smaller groups on a selective basis.  ^ The continuation
of this state of affairs with regard to backward classes,
and in particular Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,
has been confirmed more recently by the Commissioner for
60Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Nevertheless, despite shortcomings in its opera­
tion, the principle of protective discrimination has 
much to commend itself. Special circumstances of backward­
ness in which a sizable proportion of the population lived
5^ Report of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes 
Commission, (1961), forwarding letter.
59 Report of the Advisory Committee on the Revision of 
the Lists of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,
(1965;, p. 6.
60 16th Report. (1968), pp. 10-11, 76.
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could be overcome only by special measures designed to 
meet them. Although the present scheme has not achieved 
the degree of effectiveness hoped for, nonetheless it has 
proved a useful weapon in breaking the traditional co­
relationship between castes and communities on the one 
hand and backwardness on the other. Thousands of people, 
who otherwise would not have had opportunities of higher 
education and decent jobs, have been helped to secure 
these, while special projects have been implemented to 
improve the lot of backward communities as a whole. Far­
ther it is evident that, apart from distributing material 
benefits, this schemehas helped to create an them an awa­
reness of a better life and hope for the future.
However, the continuation of this policy calls 
for careful consideration in the light of past experience 
and the objectives. It must be ensured that this scheme, 
which was designed as a temporary measure, does not 
become a permanent feature. That would neither be in 
the interests of the groups involved nor those of the 
country generally. It would only promote in the former, 
complacency and a false sense of security. Vested inte­
rests among the groups are bound to arise, creating a 
sense of grievance among the general public. The result 
would be mutual isolation and the keeping alive of the 
consciousness of existing divisions. Ideally, the scheme 
must be brought to an end at the earliest possible
opportunity.
But while the temporary nature of the scheme 
cannot he over-emphasised, a glance at the existing 
socio-economic conditions leads to the inevitable conclu­
sion that there is no real alternative to it in the imme­
diate future. The condition of the really backward people 
has hardly shown any appreciable improvement over the 
years and it is only proper that special attention should 
be given to them and continue till it is done. On account 
of the rapidly chaniing conditions, it is hard to predict 
the length of time necessary for this purpose. Conside­
ring that backwardness is a matter of generations rather 
than years, a further period of 15 to 20 years seems a 
fair guess. But should the circumstances warrant it at 
the end of this period, it oughtto be continued further.
To make the ^policy more effective some changes 
in its implementation are necessary. At present it is 
characterised by an element of uncertainly as to its fu­
ture. Although the scheme is understood to be of a tem­
porary character, the Constitutional provisions themselves 
are silent in this respect, except those relating to 
political reservations. With regard to political reser­
vations the striking factor is the abruptness with which 
it is meant to cease at the end of the prescribed period. 
The success of the scheme depends on making it evident
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in unmistakable terms that it is a temporary measure and 
in providing for its phased withdrawal. The government 
must, in consultation with various agencies acquainted 
with the situation, announce an integrated plan lasting 
over a number of years, and declare therein the programme 
for its automatic and graduated reduction year by year. 
Together with the scaling down of the benefits, attempts 
should be made to increase the self-reliance of the peo­
ple involved. The present system is less conducive to 
this and it is not unlikely that in some fields the ability 
of the backward classes to stand on their own feet will 
be just as much at the end as it was in the beginning of 
the scheme. The ease of the political reservations serves 
as a good illustration in this respect. In the last 
General Elections only one member of the Scheduled Tribes 
was elected to Parliament from a general seat, but not
a single person belonging to the Scheduled Castes was so
61elected, apart from the seats reserved for them. Their 
position in the forthcoming General Election can only 
be imagined, should reservations for them cease totally 
in 1970. In the circumstances, a gradual reduction in 
the number of seats reserved, together with efforts to 
induce political parties to accept members of these commu­
nities as their official candidates seems to be the
^  Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes, 0-£rfcTiITeport, 196$), p. £6.
best course.
In the allocation of benefits, proportionately 
greater emphasis should be placed on educational develop­
ment than on the representation in public services and in 
politics. It is not suggested here that the last two 
are not important, or that the backward classes are already 
adequately represented therein. In fact, an analysis of 
the representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
in services shows that they are still under-represented 
therein, particularly in the upper echelons of service.^ 
This is also true of other groups. Humayun Kabir has 
drawn attention to the inadequate representation in the 
services of the religious minority communities, and has 
suggested that all backward classes, who are not adequa­
tely represented in the services should be provided with 
reservations for a period of 25 years. He has suggested 
that representation in the services should be the test of 
backwardness. J But while it is realised that all sections 
of the population ought to be adequately represented in 
all vital spheres of national life, the question is whe­
ther reservation of seats is the best method to achieve
62 See the statistical tables in the Commissioner*s 14th 
Report, pp. 145-146.
63 Minorities in a Democracy. (1968), pp. 50-51.
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this result. This cannot he, in the long term interest 
of the country or the communities themselves. It must 
therefore he used only sparingly to make good the glaring 
deficiencies in representation. The long term solution 
must be tbjpugh the educational advancement of the communi­
ties concerned.^ If educational development of these 
communities is ensured, the question of their due place in 
society will resolve itself.
Assessing backwardness remains a complex problem. 
Nevertheless, there is a strong case for adopting the 
economic factor as the principal criterion in giving assi­
stance. Poverty is the main cause of all backwardness.
Once it is removed, increasing economic independence, along 
with educational development, would enable backward commu­
nities to compete successfully with the rest.
At present the eligibility for benefits is 
mainly restricted to members of particular groups. Its 
drawback is that it does not take into account the diffe­
rent stages of advancement within the same caste or commu­
nity, with the result that aid is given to some who do 
not need it, while the really backward among them may not 
receive enough of it. There is a case for eliminating 
the criteria of caste and community and for laying down
^  See also, Humayun Kabir, Ibid, p. 52.
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principles for determining backwardness whereby no one
who is socially and educationally backward is left out
65of the special protection. It would be advantageous 
to adopt the smaller family group as a unit, in preference 
to the larger and unweildy caste or community group. Aid 
could be withdrawn by stages, beginning with the * other 
backward classes*, and then the Scheduled Castes and Sche­
duled Tribes. So long as reference to caste groups conti­
nues, it may serve to indicate the possibility of back­
wardness in some of its sections, but the actual determi­
nation itself must be made by reference to the conditions 
of individual family groups. Any family, irrespective 
of the caste or community it belongs to, should be eligible 
to receive aid if it is below a certain economic level.
To ensure the effectiveness of protective discrimination, 
the help given should be graduated so that those in grea­
ter need would receive a larger share of it.
In conclusion, it may be emphasised that the 
two issues discussed in this chapter, the removal of 
social disabilities and protective discrimination, are but 
two facets of a much larger problem of under-development.
65 Y. Narayanan Nair, "Protective Discrimination —  The 
Supreme Court Retreats?", (1969) II S.C.J., p. 33> at 
pp. 41-42.
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Their significance in the context of the present work 
lies in the fact that in both these respects law is 
used as an instrument in bringing about socio-economic 
equality. It seeks to provide a framework within which 
backward sections of the community have a fair chance 
of being raised to the general level of their compatri­
ots. But beyond this immediate task its role is necessa­
rily limited. The real solution lies in the general 
all-round development of the country as a whole on the 
basis of the ideals visualised in the Directive Princi­
ples of State Policy.
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Chapter 71 
CONCLUDING- REMARKS
In the preceding chapters various minority 
issues have been considered at length in the light of 
the principle of equality. It would be unnecessary to 
summarise them again in the present chapter. This chapter 
is, therefore, limited to a few brief general observations 
bearing on the subject.
In any general assessment of the position of 
minorities in India two questions are bound to arise: 
first, whether the scheme of minority protection incorpo­
rated in the Indian Constitution is sound in principle, 
and second, whether it works in practice.
The answer to the first question is in the 
affirmative. The Constitution within its framework seeks 
to provide the widest scope for the realisation of the 
aspirations of minorities. The fact that it does so on 
the basis of equal citizenship, rather than by providing 
for different groups separately, is a positive aspect, 
which has much to commend itself. The creation of
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statutory barriers to protect minority interests was 
bound to lead to isolation and stagnation of the groups 
involved. The present scheme must pay dividends in the 
long run. It is not suggested that the Constitution 
is a perfect document or that a more ingenious scheme of 
minority protection could not have been devised. There 
are always alternative solutions to human problems, and 
a choice has to be made with reference to means and ends 
in view. In the circumstances existing in India the pre­
sent scheme appears to be in the best interests of all 
concerned and deserves a fair trial.
The second question needs to be considered in 
two parts, on the basis of past performance and as re­
gards the outlook for the future. It is apparent that 
no categorical answer, not being a personal opinion or 
a conjecture, can be given.
In judging the past it must be borne in mind 
that solutions to complex human problems cannot simply 
be branded as either a success or a failure. These terms 
are relative to circumstances and also vary according to 
differences in aims, objectives and opinions of people.
The truth lies, more often than not, near the centre.
With reference to the Indian scheme it may be said that, 
by and large, it is a reasonable success. Many shortfalls 
do, however, still exist in respect of several issues,
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as the reader would have had occasion to note in the 
course of reading through this work. But it should also 
he noted that the period under consideration has been one 
of far reaching change in the country as a whole and 
among minority groups themselves. Nor are the shortcomings 
particularly restricted to minority issues alone, and 
hence some concession has to be made to the novelty of 
the Constitution itself. Further, the problem of lingui­
stic minorities is altogether new and has yet to overcome 
its 1teething troubles1, while the experiment in respect 
of the backward classes is as yet unfinished. An objective 
assessment of the past two decades must, therefore, \jfait 
for some years.
The question whether the Constitutional scheme 
can be expected to protect minority interests in the 
future can be answered only by an expression of hope that 
it will. It is not sufficient merely to incorporate 
rights in the Constitution; it is also necessary to ensure 
that the Constitution is made to work at all times in the 
spirit in which it was intended to work. As has been 
pointed out in a linguistic context, trouble often arises 
not because of the inadequacy of Constitutional safeguards, 
but the failure of those who were expected to make them 
work.^ This is generally true in respect of all minorities.
 ^S. R. Chowdhury, "Cultural and Educational Rights of 
Indian Minorities as Judicially interpreted", Public Law, 
1961, p. 271, at pp. 273-274-
395
It has been observed that basically the problem of dealing 
with minorities is to ensure that ordinary human relation­
ship exists in contacts between the dominant group and 
the minorities and that the intercourse between them is 
not tinged with such emotions as fear, anger, suspicion 
or hate. This cannot be achieved without the co-operation 
of all parties and whether it is forthcoming must depend
less upon Constitutional provisions, legislation and govern-
2
ment coersion, than upon public opinion. This depends 
on all Indians, majorities and minorities.
Broadly, two things are essential for this 
purpose: first, the creation of a sense of security among 
minorities that the rights guaranteed to them in the 
Constitution will not be tampered with, and second, the 
creation, in the country as a whole, of conditions condu­
cive to the proper working of the democratic system.
These aspects may be touched upon briefly.
Amendment of the Constitution
Jennings has rightly observed that it is not 
possible to prevent a government, supported by a majority, 
from interfering in accordance with law with the liberty 
and property of a minority and that it is not desirable
2
A. Gledhill, "Constitutional protection of Indian 
minorities", I, J.IIL.I.. (1959), p. 403, at p. 404-
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that an attempt should be mdde. Nevertheless, there are 
certain rights which are commonly recognised as essential 
for effective social life and which, being considered 
to be inherent in the idea of justice, should be protected 
even against a majority. Incorporation of written gua­
rantees implies that they should be removed from the 
sphere of ordinary legislation and be inviolable, exeept 
in grave emergencies and with the consent of all|concerned. 
This means that a flexible Constitution and minority 
rights cannot go together. The subject of Constitutional 
amendment is, therefore, of great relevance in the mino­
rity context.
The procedure for the amendment of the Indian 
Constitution is prescribed in Article 368. The Constitu­
tion can be amended by the passing of a Bill for that 
purpose in each House of Parliament by a two-thirds majo­
rity of those present and voting and an absolute majority 
of each House. Amendments to certain provisions, i.e., 
those relating to the federal structure, require ratifi­
cation by not less than half the total number of States. 
There are, however, a number of provisions of the Consti­
tution which can be altered by a simple majority of the
 ^Sir W.I.Jennings, The law and the Constitution, (5th ed., 
1959), p. 255.
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Parliament and such alterations axe not deemed to he 
amendments to the Constitution. These include provisions 
relating to citizenship (Article 11), delimitation of 
constituencies (Article 81), Parliamentary powers (Article 
105(3) ), language to be used in Parliament (Article 120), 
Constitutions of Centrally administered areas (Article 
240), law of elections (Article 327), language of courts 
(Article 348), and the administration of Scheduled Areas 
and Tribes (Schedules Y and YI). Parliament can also by 
a simple majority, but in consultation with States or on 
their request, alter the provisions concerning the creation 
of new States or the reconstitution of existing ones (Arti­
cles 2, 3 and 4), and the creation of Upper Chambers in 
the States (Article 169(3) )•
Thus it is evident that theoretically there is 
nothing to stop any group commanding a majority of two- 
thirds in Parliament from altering the provisions of the 
Constitution in the manner desired by them. The Consti­
tution does not provide for any consultation with the 
minorities, or require their consent, in matters affecting 
their interests. This means that minorities, who are in 
all cases less than one-third of the population and who 
generally command even a lesser proportion of membership 
in Parliament, can have no say even in matters of utmost 
importance to them. K. Y. Rao has summed up this situation
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lay posing the following questions: "Are the one-third to 
suffer and lose these freedoms if the two—thirds decide 
it otherwise? Are not these rights so fundamental that 
nobody should be allowed to touch them? Are the Muslims, 
for instance, to lose their religion or citizenship, or 
the tribals tojlose their cultural or educational rights, 
if the Hindus (certainly they are more than two-thirds 
in the Parliament) decide it so? Are the minorities to 
live perpetually at the mercy of the majorities? If that 
is so, a written Constitution is as good as any worthless
A
piece of paper." He feels that the minorities, political, 
social, religious and others, could have been given greater 
protection by making some other provisions for the altera­
tion of fundamental rights than the one by a "brute majo-
15
rity", by associating them with it.
The position obtaining till 1967 in respect of
the amendment of Fundamental Eights had been that laid
down by the Supreme Court in Shankari Prasad v. Union of 
6India, decided in 1951. In this case the Court held 
that it was within the competence of Parliament to amend 
the Constitution so as to abridge or take away the
^ K. Y. Rao, Parliamentary Democracy of India, (2nd ed., 
1965), p. 3VT.
5 Ibid. p. 347.
6 A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 458.
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Fundamental Rights. This decision was reaffirmed in 
Sa.i.ian Singh v. State of Ra.iastan.^ in 1965. But in 
Golak Nath v. State of Punjab,^  decided in 1967, a narrow­
ly divided Supreme Court overruled Shankari Prasadfs case 
and by a majority of six to five held that Parliament 
did not have power to amend the Constitution so as to take 
away or abridge Fundamental Rights. The majority view 
was that Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitu­
tion were transcendental and therefore must not be allo­
wed to be whittled down by any majority in Parliament. 
Among other things, the Court held that Article 368 was 
merely procedural and that it did not contain authority 
for amending the Constitution so as to take away or abridge 
Fundamental Rights. Even if Article 368 did contain such 
power, it must be controlled by Article 13(2). The Court 
said that the power of amendment envisaged only minor 
alterations and not any major change. And, if at all the 
provisions guaranteeing Fundamental Rights must be amended 
to curtail those rights, this could be done only by a 
Constituent Assembly convoked by Parliament by enacting a 
law for that purpose.
7 A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 845.
8 A.I.R. 1967 S.C4 1643.
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Following this decision a Bill was introduced 
in Parliament to amend Article 368 so as to supercede it. 
Hot surprisingly, this issue has occasioned much contro­
versy. Shri Frank Anthony, an acknowledge spokesman for 
minorities, has deprecated the Government's habit of ge­
tting round unfavourable decisions by amending the Consti­
tution. He feels that any move to set aside the present 
decision will imperil the position of minorities. Accor­
ding to him, "... in the rapidly changing milieu of growing 
revivalism and increasing intolerance, it would be one of 
the easiest things for a combination in Parliament, cutting 
across party lines, to derogate from or efface the Funda­
mental Rights given to the minorities in respect of edu­
cation, language and culture. The State Legislatures 
seldom apply their minds to legislation processed through 
Parliament. ... By this proposed amendment to Article 
368, the minorities (linguistic, educational and cultural) 
will have a sword of death placed over them and which can
Q
be released at any time by a bare majority in Parliament
On the other hand, the said decision has much 
wider implications than merely those relating to mino­
rities. On these grounds, the opinion is clearly weighted
Q
* "Bid to amend Article 368: threat to minorities", in 
The Pioneer, December 11, 1968.
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in favour of those who hold that the majority view is 
untenable.^ H. M. Seervai points out that if a law made 
by Parliament to amend Part III of the Constitution is 
void as contravening Article 13(2), a law passed by the 
same Parliament convening a Constituent Assembly and autho­
rising it to do that very thing must be equally void.'**■
S. P. Sathe observes that, while the abstract ideals of 
liberty, justice, equality and fraternity are transcen­
dental, the legally enforceable rights as at present gua­
ranteed under the Constitution cannot be called transcen­
dental as they are liable to different interpretation
12according to time and place. He also points out that
there are rights, which though outside Part III, are no
less fundamental to the democratic process, such as right
to vote, or the right to inter-State trade and commerce;
also, in future a number of Directive Principles are likely
13to claim recognition as Fundamental Rights.  ^ Further, 
irrespective of whether Parliament has the legal compe­
tence to amend the Constitution or not, in future it will 
not be easy to have an amendment passed. Since the last 
General Election no single party commands a special
^  For a discussion on this subject, see H. M. Seervai,
Constitutional Law of India. Chapter XIX, p.l088ff., and 
S. P. Sathe, Fundamental Rights and Amendment of the 
Indian Constitution. (19&8).
H. M. Seervai* Ibid* p. 1109.
—
S. P. Sathe, n. 10, supra* p. 48.
13 Ibid* pp. 52-53.
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majority to support an amendment, and the trends indi­
cate that this state of affairs is likely to continue.^
Although superficially the decision in Golak 
Hath*s case appears to he an attractive way of providing 
a sense of security among minorities, in practical terms 
this is in fact not so. Sooner or later this decision 
is bound to be superceded. But even if it is not, the 
minorities can draw little consolation from the fact that 
Parliament has no power to amend the Constitution so as 
to abridge or take away the Fundamental Rights. A Con­
stituent Assembly specially called for that purpose would 
have a similarly unfavourable majority, and if the mino­
rities have no reason to trust Parliament there is no 
reason why they should trust such an Assembly.
Hence a scheme to protect minorities must 
depend for its success on something other than the letter 
of the Constitution: it must depend on its spirit. The 
Constitution will work best in the same atmosphere of 
mutual trust and goodwill between the majority and the 
minorities as pervaded at the time of its framing. Ra­
ther than tying the hands of the majority by a rigid
^  S. P. Sathe, Ibid, pp. 60-61. See also, by the same 
author, "Amendability of Fundamental Rights: Golak Rath 
and the proposed Constitutional Amendment11, in (19&9)t 
I S.C.J., p. 33, pp. 38-39.
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interpretation of the Constitution, there must be freedom 
of action consistent with the spirit and the ideals of 
the Constitution. At the same time it is necessary to 
provide for some form of consultation with minorities with 
regard to amendments touching matters of their interests, 
a feature missing in the present system. The sense of 
security among minorities will depend on the sensitivity 
which future governments and political parties show on 
minority issues, the restraint they exercise in amending 
the Constitution, and the practical steps they take to 
create and maintain confidence among them.
The future of democracy
Apart from the creation of a sense of security 
among minorities, the success of this scheme requires, 
secondly, the proper working of the democratic process. 
Under the Constitution the scheme for minority protection 
is intimately linked with the experiment in democracy and 
it stands to gain or lose with the success or failure 
of democracy in India.
Democracy presupposes many things which still 
do not exist in India in the required degree, for instance, 
widespread education and adequate economic resources. It 
assumes that each individual knows what he wants and that 
his decisions on public issues will be made on merits of
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the case rather than on sectarian considerations* Univer­
sal adult franchise will have no meaning, if votes are 
cast on the basis of religion, language, caste or other 
factors.
Perhaps the greatest impediment to democracy 
in India is the growth of sectarian feeling in the country. 
It is known by different names such as communalism, regio­
nalism, casteism, etc., and appears in different guises.
Its characteristic mark is the intolerance shown by parti­
cular groups towards “outsiders1. The latter, through 
fear or insecurity, may react in various ways, thus setting 
off a chain reaction, which is bound to have repercussions 
on the social and political life of the country. The 
signs of religious communalism can be seen in the tension 
which exists between religious communities which comes 
to surface at the least excuse, and in the growth of orga­
nisations and political parties advocating extremist 
views. In the linguistic sphere, regional fanaticism has 
expressed itself in the creation of private armies of 
local people in several State capitals to intimidate those 
from outside the State. The persistence of caste divi­
sions has already been referred to in the previous chapter. 
The result is that, wherever group consciousness is strong, 
it is the minority which suffers most.'*’3
15 Humayun Kabir, Minorities in a Democracy. (1968), p. 10.
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If democracy is to succeed, it is necessary 
to arrest the growth of this sectarianism and remove 
its traces. It requires unity in the body politic, where­
in the ideals of the Constitution, those of the government 
and those of the people should coincide. There must exist 
a favourable social climate at the grass-roots level. In 
its absence equality will have no meaning as, despite 
what the Constitution and the Government say, sections of 
the population would be subjected to discrimination thro­
ugh social pressure and practically excluded from full
participation in the life of the community. The experience
16in the United States has borne out this fact.
Effective communication is an essential condi­
tion in a democratic system and it is necessary to en­
sure that proper channels exist for ventilation of grie­
vances, real or imaginary, and for representations to be 
made. Until the normal democratic channels have adequa­
tely developed, there is need to provide for some form 
of special machinery for the minorities for this purpose. 
The Organisations of the Linguistic and of the Scheduled 
Castes Commissioners cater for this need in their respe­
ctive spheres. There is scope for a similar provision
^  R. M. Maclver, The Web of Government, (Revised ed.,1965), 
pp. 320-321.
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for the religious minorities, though in a different form. 
Perhaps a non-official body with representatives of diffe­
rent communities and working in liason with governments 
would be best. All these special bodies must be of a 
temporary character. It is assumed that, when conditions 
of democracy have improved, there would be no need for 
special bodies to look after particular interests.
Finally, the achievement of a greater degree 
of unity among the entire people, otherwise known as 
“national integration1, is an urgent task before the coun­
try. The unity which must be sought is not a dull unifor­
mity in disregard of the existing differences, but the 
development of a common outlook in spite of them. It 
implies the growth of a broad-based nationalism which 
will transcend particular group consciousness in matters 
of common interest. The/achievement of this unity in 
diversity and the realisation of the ideals set forth in 
the Constitution will be a continuous task facing all 
Indians, majorities and minorities. The Constitution 
only provides the necessary framework.
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